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A MATTER OF NATIONAL CONCERN examines the Kennedy Administration’s 
contribution to the restoration of public education in Prince Edward County, Virginia, and 
determines if those actions support the dominant narrative of Kennedy’s overall civil rights 
record – a historical assessment generally generated from a few acute crises. For five 
consecutive years (1959-1964), in defiance of federal court orders, the county board of 
supervisors refused to levy taxes to operate public schools, marking Prince Edward County 
as the only locale in the nation without free public education. The county leadership 
organized a segregated private school system for the 1,400 white children, but afforded no 
 formal education for the 1,700 African American students. The Kennedy Administration 
inherited the Prince Edward County school situation – a crisis that threatened to cripple a 
generation, and, if replicated, destroy public education. In the Prince Edward County 
school dilemma, the Kennedy Administration took proactive measures, proved sympathetic 
to the plight of African Americans, challenged Virginia’s congressional delegation, and 
appointed federal judges that supported President Kennedy’s civil rights agenda. The 
Prince Edward County story generally, and the federal government’s actions specifically, 
have been virtually overlooked by historians. A MATTER OF NATIONAL CONCERN 
challenges scholars to re-evaluate the Kennedy Administration’s civil rights record by 
including all of the civil rights events of the Kennedy years, thus developing a thorough, 
comprehensive assessment. 
A MATTER OF NATIONAL CONCERN is the product of the study of 
unpublished archival documents, oral histories, interviews, newspaper reports, and 
secondary sources. This work was created using Microsoft Word 2003. 
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  1 
                                                
 
 
 
 
PROLOGUE: A Dark Spot in the Free World 
 
 
“I believe in an America where every child is educated, not according to his 
means or his race, but according to his capacity – where there are no 
literacy tests for voting that mean anything because there are no illiterate 
citizens – where children go to school for a full schoolday, in a well-lit, 
well-heated, well-equipped classroom, with enough best paid, best trained 
teachers to give every child’s individual needs some individual attention.”  
 
– John F. Kennedy1 
 
 
 
Robert F. Kennedy2 considered Prince Edward County, Virginia “a blight on 
Virginia,” “a national disgrace,” “a dark spot in the free world.” For five consecutive years 
(1959-1964), in defiance of federal court orders to desegregate, the county board of 
supervisors refused to levy taxes to operate public schools, marking Prince Edward County 
as the only locale in the nation without free public education. The county leadership, 
prepared for such a contingency, organized a segregated private school system for the 
1,400 white children, but afforded no formal education, not even Jim Crow education, for 
the 1,700 African American students, forcing hundreds to leave the community, and many 
 
1 John F. Kennedy (1917-1963) served as President of the United States from January 20, 1961 to November 
22, 1963; Senator John F. Kennedy, Convention Hall, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 31, 1960 in The 
Speeches of John F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960 (Washington, D.C., 1961), 836. 
 
2 Robert F. Kennedy (1925-1968) served as U.S. Attorney General from 1961-1964. 
 
 the state, to live with family, friends, or strangers to attend school. Hundreds more 
remained in the county, and received no formal education.3 The Kennedy Administration 
inherited the Prince Edward County school situation – a crisis that threatened to cripple a 
generation, and, if replicated, destroy public education.  
 John F. Kennedy shook his head with “incredulity” when he learned that county 
officials abandoned public education. The President supported the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and believed “that all students should be 
given the opportunity to attend public school regardless of their race,” a principle “that is 
in accordance with the Constitution.”4 Segregationists, on the other hand, considered the 
Brown decision unconstitutional and a threat to local control. The all-white county 
leadership refused to tax the community for a principle – integrated schools – that the 
white majority opposed. In defense of the locked out children, the NAACP filed suit in 
federal court, arguing that the failure to maintain public education in Prince Edward 
County while schools operated throughout the state violated the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The county’s attorneys, supported by the State of Virginia, 
contended that neither the Virginia State Constitution nor the U.S. Constitution required 
the operation of public schools. Further, the federal courts could not compel a local 
governing body to levy taxes for public schools. The case presented complex legal 
                                                 
3 RWN, May 2, 1962, 1; Robert F. Kennedy, Draft of Speech for the Emancipation Proclamation Centennial 
Ceremonies in Louisville, Kentucky, March 18, 1963, Box 2, Attorney General Files, Speeches: 1961-1964, 
Robert F. Kennedy Papers (JFKL); RAA, May 16, 1964, 1; Michigan State University Survey, June 30, 1963, 
Box 10, Attorney General General Correspondence, Robert F. Kennedy Papers (JFKL). 
 
4 Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties (New York, 1980), 135; Theodore C. 
Sorensen, Kennedy (Old Saybrook, Connecticut, 1965), 480; President’s News Conference of February 8, 
1961 in Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C., 1962), 69. 
 2
 questions, touching every level of government, consuming time and further injuring the 
locked out children in a legal battle of attrition. 
 President Kennedy “continually pressed to end” the Prince Edward County school 
crisis. The Kennedy Administration encouraged state and local authorities to resolve the 
matter, to take responsibility for the education of their citizens, but these officials proved 
obstinate. The Department of Justice acted in defense of the locked out children in federal 
court in 1961, 1962, and 1963, but the proceedings moved glacially through both state and 
federal courts, threatening a fifth consecutive year without universal education. President 
Kennedy “found the laws were not as fast as they should be, and that [the administration] 
had to do something ourselves,” explained Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Therefore, 
President Kennedy directed the Attorney General “to find some way to reopen the 
schools.”5  
President Kennedy’s “personal concern inspired an extraordinary project” – the 
Prince Edward Free School Association. The Kennedy Administration coordinated with 
federal, state, local, and private entities to form a temporary school system available to all 
of the county’s school-age children – both black and white. The administration envisioned 
a “model school,” which utilized the latest educational technology, conducted small class 
instruction, and employed a racially integrated faculty. The Free Schools “did not make up 
                                                 
5 Sorensen, Kennedy, 480; NVP, May 12, 1964, 1; Robert Kennedy in Neil V. Sullivan, Bound For Freedom: 
An Educator’s Adventures in Prince Edward County, Virginia (Boston, 1965), ix-x. 
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 for the years of educational opportunity that had been lost,” admitted the Attorney General, 
“but they did stop the human erosion.”6 
 November 22, 1963 marked the tenth week of the Free Schools. For most of the 
students, this period represented their only formal education in four years, and for the 
children ten and younger, the first educational experience of their lives. For those living on 
that day, receiving the news of President Kennedy’s assassination is forever seared into 
their memory. President Kennedy’s personal concern for Prince Edward County’s locked 
out children made the news to these children especially painful. The Free School students 
felt “a special and tragically personal grief for this man who was more to us than a 
President, who was our sponsor and friend,” eulogized the Free Schools’ superintendent.7 
 The school crisis continued beyond the one thousand days of the Kennedy 
presidency, nevertheless, the administration made a significant contribution toward the 
realization of equal opportunity in Prince Edward County. The Free Schools acted as a 
bridge to fill the educational void until the federal courts delivered a verdict forcing the 
county to reopen the public schools. In defense of the locked out children, the Department 
of Justice presented arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in Griffin v. School Board 
of Prince Edward County. Finally, President Kennedy had introduced the most 
comprehensive civil rights legislation in the nation’s history, which, if passed, would 
outlaw the discrimination that beset the county’s African Americans, namely education, 
                                                 
6 Robert F. Kennedy in Sullivan, Bound for Freedom, x; “A Proposal to Establish a System of Free Education 
for Prince Edward County, Virginia,” Box 21, Burke Marshall Papers (JFKL). 
 
7 Michigan State University Survey, June 30, 1963, Box 10, Attorney General General Correspondence, 
Robert F. Kennedy Papers (JFKL); Sullivan, Bound for Freedom, 161. 
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 employment, voting, and public accommodations. The Kennedy Administration’s actions 
hastened the fall of apartheid in Prince Edward County, Virginia. 
 
May 11, 1964 
 
On May 11, 1964, Robert F. Kennedy traveled one hundred fifty miles by military 
helicopter from Washington, D.C. to Prince Edward County to tour the Free Schools and 
accept a donation of 9,964 pennies from the students to benefit the John F. Kennedy 
Memorial Library Fund. The Attorney General, still grief stricken from his brother’s death, 
regretfully could not deliver affirmative news from the nation’s capital. Senators continued 
to filibuster the civil rights bill and the U.S. Supreme Court had yet to hand down the 
Griffin decision.8 Both measures would force Prince Edward County, and for that matter 
Virginia, into the 1960s. 
Senator Harry F. Byrd9 dominated Virginia politics for four decades. 
“Intellectually,” wrote one biographer, “[Byrd] was locked into the world of 1923, unable 
to adjust to new ideas or new conditions.” As society changed, Byrd’s political, economic, 
and social views remained unaltered, and his leadership of the Byrd Organization – the 
dominant faction of the Virginia State Democratic Party – remained uncontested. The 
                                                 
8 The Free School students set to raise $47 worth of pennies – a dollar to represent every year of the 
President’s life – for the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library Fund. The students more than doubled their 
objective – LN, May 12, 1964, 8; RTD, May 12, 1964, 1; Interview Notes, William J. vanden Heuvel by 
Victor S. Navasky, Box 16, Victor S. Navasky Papers (JFKL); RWN, May 12, 1964, 9. 
 
9 Harry Flood Byrd (1887-1966) represented Virginia in the U.S. Senate from 1933-1965.  
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 organization implemented the “pay-as-you-go” principle, resulting in balanced budgets and 
a debt-free state – all accomplished with low taxes. However, low taxes combined with a 
skeletal budget yielded inadequate essential services, namely road construction, public 
welfare, and public schools. In terms of civil rights, the organization rejected the New 
Frontier’s civil rights program, and supported the provisions of the 1902 Virginia State 
Constitution, which created the poll tax and mandated segregated public education. The 
Old Dominion was not Kennedy country; it was Harry Byrd’s Virginia.10 
Harry Byrd found his most loyal constituency in Southside Virginia – a region 
south of the James River, stretching from the Appalachian Mountains in the west to the 
Tidewater in the east, and extending southward to the North Carolina border. Southside 
Virginia was “a bleak country of red clay and scrub pine; of somnolent small towns; of 
marginal, worked-out farms; of much poverty, ignorance, and prejudice.” African 
Americans constituted over forty percent of the Southside’s population – nearly twice the 
ratio of the State. The staunchly conservative Southside suppressed black political power 
to preserve southern traditions and maintain white political, social, and economic 
domination.11 
 Prince Edward County (pop. 14,121, circa 1960) is located in the heart of Southside 
Virginia. Agriculture comprised much of the county’s land use – primarily tobacco and 
                                                 
10 Ronald L. Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia (Charlottesville, Virginia, 1996), 280, 383-406; J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966 (Charlottesville, Virginia, 
1968), 30-50; Wythe Holt, Jr., Virginia’s Constitutional Convention of 1901-1902 (New York, 1990). 
 
11 Wilkinson, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 9-11; James W. Ely, Jr., The Crisis of 
Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance (Knoxville, Tennessee, 
1976), 12. 
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 lumber, but also corn, wheat, alfalfa, poultry, dairy, beef cattle, and hogs. Nonetheless, the 
rural setting was deceiving. More than four-fifths of the county residents worked in 
retailing, general contracting, banking, mining, tobacco marketing, and light industry, 
resulting in a median family income of $3,043 (1959). However, white families earned 
$1,000 above the median value, while African American families earned $1,200 under the 
county’s overall median income, for an income disparity between the races totaling $2,200. 
A disparity also existed in educational achievement. African Americans received, on 
average, a sixth grade education – two grades lower than the county average and four 
grades below the state average, which, of course, continued to drop in the milieu of closed 
public schools. The county “indeed had a school problem,” observed one outsider, “but it 
also had a serious housing problem.” Many of the county’s buildings were crumbling and 
“decaying, their paint has chipped off and they are gray from weather.”12 The results of the 
State’s fiscal and civil rights policies were evident in Prince Edward County. 
 Although Prince Edward was a poor, rural county, it acted as the economic center 
for several surrounding communities. Three U.S. Highways – 15, 360, and 460, and the 
Norfolk and Western Railroad, which connected Norfolk, Virginia to Cincinnati, Ohio, 
intersected the county. Also, the Greyhound Bus Company operated a terminal in town, 
and a small airport provided private, non-commercial air travel.13 
                                                 
12 Edward H. Peeples, Jr., “A Perspective on the Prince Edward County School Issue,” (Master’s Thesis, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1963), 3-14; J. Kenneth Morland, “The Tragedy of Public Schools: Prince 
Edward County, Virginia: A Report for the Virginia Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights,” January 16, 1964, 2-6; Sullivan, Bound for Freedom, 20. 
 
13 Peeples, “A Perspective on the Prince Edward County School Issue,” 7. 
 7
 At 9:37 a.m., the helicopter landed at Farmville Airport – essentially a pasture with 
a small building. A contingent of local officials and one hundred onlookers warmly 
welcomed the Attorney General and his party, nevertheless, Kennedy appeared tense. 
Prince Edward’s white community had little affection for the Attorney General. On several 
occasions, Kennedy had publicly criticized local officials for the school crisis. Under his 
direction, the Department of Justice had attacked the county’s school policy in Federal 
District Court, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court. For 
states’ rights advocates, Kennedy symbolized the encroachment of a strong central 
government into local affairs.14  
After greeting the crowd, Kennedy boarded a convertible for the parade through 
Farmville (pop. 4,293) – the county seat of Prince Edward, and the “citadel of opposition 
to [Kennedy’s] views on integration.” In Farmville, African Americans were not treated as 
social equals. Blacks addressed whites as “Mr.,” “Mrs.,” or “Miss,” but whites addressed 
blacks as “boy,” “uncle,” or by their Christian name. Although many blacks worked for 
whites, the relationship did not extend into social settings. African Americans were barred 
from the local country club, social clubs, the movie theater, the public library, lunch 
counters, and restaurants, and segregated in other public settings, such as the drive-in 
theater and the hospital.15 
                                                 
14 RTD, May 12, 1964, 6; William J. vanden Heuvel to Robert F. Kennedy, May 8, 1964, Box 64, Papers of 
Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General General Correspondence (JFKL); RNL, May 12, 1964, 4; Interview 
Notes, William J. vanden Heuvel by Victor S. Navasky, Box 16, Victor S. Navasky Papers (JFKL). 
 
15 LDA, May 12, 1964, 12; David M. Rudenstine, “Or None at All,” (Senior Thesis, Yale University, 1963), 
8; Interview Notes, Ruth Turner, Summer 1963, #38558 (AFSC). 
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  The Southside Community Hospital stands on a bluff overlooking the Buffalo 
River. The private, non-profit facility acted as the center of the Southside Health District, 
which served nine counties, including 40,000 African Americans. Although the district 
was racially balanced, only sixteen of the one hundred beds were reserved for African 
Americans. Also, in the absence of a public accommodations law, the waiting room 
remained segregated. Finally, the hospital’s policy prohibited black physicians from 
joining the staff or caring for their patients at the facility. For this reason, many African 
Americans traveled sixty miles east to Richmond or thirty miles west to Lynchburg to 
receive medical treatment.16 
 As the motorcade passed the hospital, down Oak Street, and onto High Street, the 
Attorney General found the treatment for his initial uneasiness. Hundreds of “beaming, 
shrieking,” young women blocked the motorcade route. Kennedy left the car to shake 
hands and speak to the crowd. The women were students at Longwood College, an all-
white women’s school (enrollment: 1,100), which emphasized teacher training. A year 
earlier, in a survey to “determine the attitudes of Longwood students towards an 
educational problem” – the Prince Edward County issue, three out of four answered that 
they would agree to teach integrated classes, and two-thirds felt a sense of responsibility 
for “the uneducated youth.” The college students proved more progressive than the 
institution’s leadership, and much of the faculty, who, with few exceptions, kept a hands-
                                                 
16 Herbert Clarence Bradshaw, History of Prince Edward County, Virginia (Richmond, 1955), 605, 608; 
Harry Boyte to Jean Fairfax, March 30, 1962, #38340 (AFSC); Sullivan, Bound for Freedom, 152. 
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 off approach to the local school dilemma. After receiving an unexpected welcome, 
Kennedy returned to the car, visibly more relaxed.17  
 Opposite Longwood College stands a commemorative statue to the “Heroes of the 
Confederacy.” In April 1865, Prince Edward County witnessed the Army of Northern 
Virginia in its final throes. Union soldiers inflicted massive casualties upon the 
Confederate Army at Sayler’s Creek – just miles east of Farmville, further crippling the 
southern war effort. From his temporary headquarters in Farmville, Ulysses S. Grant’s 
correspondence with Robert E. Lee led to the final surrender in neighboring Appomattox 
County. The Confederate monument celebrated the “Defenders of State Sovereignty” – an 
inscription which inspired the name of a massive resistance era segregationist organization, 
the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties. For African Americans, living 
in Prince Edward County was like living in “Civil War times.”  One locked out teenager 
said, “It’s almost like the twilight zone – going back in time.”18 
 The motorcade circled around to Main Street, the heart of the trading center for the 
five surrounding counties. Main Street was lined with five and dime shops, and 
department, clothing, drug, hardware, and farm supply stores. African American farmers 
patronized the downtown businesses, where credit was extended, thereby, indebting blacks 
to the white merchants. Black and white shoppers mingled and chatted cordially outside 
                                                 
17 “Itinerary for Attorney General’s Visit to Prince Edward County, Virginia, May 11, 1964,” Box 64, 
Attorney General General Correspondence, Robert F. Kennedy Papers (JFKL); NYT, May 12, 1964, 27; 
RTD, May 2, 1963, 6; May 12, 1964, 1; May 2, 1963, 6;  NVP, May 12, 1964, 1. 
 
18 Bradshaw, History of Prince Edward County, Virginia, 398-410; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of 
Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, 1988), 847-848; Interview Notes, L. Francis Griffin, Jr. by Ruth 
Turner, Summer 1963, #38558 (AFSC). 
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 the businesses, but in entering these establishments, African Americans faced many 
indignities. “For an ice cream cone or a coca-cola [African Americans] must sidle up to the 
end of a lunch counter to make their purchase,” observed one white resident. “Without the 
slightest pause that may be interpreted as ‘rising above their place’ they must slink off to 
enjoy their purchase without the taint to a white skin.” As one black teenager observed, 
“we can give them our money but we are not decent enough to sit down.”19 
At the corner of Fourth and Main stands the First Baptist Church, the headquarters 
of Prince Edward County’s black resistance. Since 1949, Reverend L. Francis Griffin20 led 
the church and the African American community, employing the pulpit to direct the protest 
for equality. “When I look and see healthy colored babies,” explained Griffin: 
 
I think how God has brought them into the world properly and how the 
rotten system of the Southland will twist them into warped personalities, 
cringing cowards, unable to cope with the society into which they were 
unwillingly thrown and which they have a God-given right to enjoy….I 
would sacrifice my job, money, and any property for the principles of right. 
I offered my life for a decadent democracy [in World War II], and I’m 
willing to die rather than let these children down. 
 
The “Fighting Preacher” had organized a local NAACP chapter, and pushed for improved 
educational facilities, desegregated schools, and the elimination of Jim Crow. “The school 
problem is a minor problem in comparison with what has been going on in this county over 
                                                 
19 Rudenstine, “Or None at All,” 1; WP, August 4, 1963, B7; August 3, 1963, C2; C. G. Gordon Moss, July 
21, 1963, #38558 (AFSC); Interview Notes, Alonzo Wright by Ruth Turner, July 1963, #38558 (AFSC). 
 
20 Rev. L. Francis Griffin (1917-1980) was the pastor of the First Baptist Church from 1949-1980, the 
President of the Prince Edward County Christian Association, and the President of the Virginia State 
Conference of the NAACP from 1963-1967. 
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 many years,” explained Griffin. “Democracy is being crucified daily….I am ashamed to 
live among such bigots.”21  
 Main Street bisected the campuses of Mary E. Branch Elementary School No. 1 
and No. 2 – both Free Schools. As the motorcade arrived at No. 2, the students had 
assembled around the flagpole. The Free School band – producing “the quality of music 
that one might expect from a group of children who have been introduced to musical 
instruments for the first time in their lives” six months earlier – played the “Marine Hymn” 
and “America.” The students recited the pledge of allegiance – a passage few knew months 
earlier, sang patriotic songs, and waved American flags. Oreatha Wiley, 12, presented 
Robert Kennedy with a bag of 2,800 pennies, tied with a red, white, and blue bow. 
Kennedy joked that the pennies were not the largest gift to the memorial library, “but they 
were the heaviest.” Across the street, at Mary E. Branch No. 1, Kennedy told the 
assemblage that in the future the responsibility of providing education “will be carried by 
the people of this area.”22 
At Worsham Elementary School, a former all-white school, the students had 
prepared a tribute to President Kennedy. The Attorney General paused silently, in relative 
solitude, sipping milk from a straw, and reading compositions written by the students, 
                                                 
21 Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s 
Struggle for Equality (New York, 1975), 583-588; Raymond Wolters, The Burden of Brown: Thirty Years of 
School Desegregation (Knoxville, Tennessee, 1984), 66-67; James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of 
Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy (Oxford, 2001), xxv; L. Francis Griffin to 
Sarah Patton Boyle, April 8, 1962, Box 2, Sarah Patton Boyle Papers (UVA). 
 
22 At Mary E. Branch Elementary School No. 2, Susan Saunders, 7, presented 1,800 pennies to Robert 
Kennedy. WP, May 12, 1964, B1; William J. vanden Heuvel to Robert F. Kennedy, May 8, 1964, Box 64, 
Attorney General General Correspondence, Robert F. Kennedy Papers (JFKL); NVP, May 12, 1964, 13; 
RTD, May 12, 1964, 6. 
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 which were displayed on a bulletin board. President Kennedy “was a kind, generous man, 
and a family man,” Gwendolyn Harrison, 12, had written. “If it had not been for President 
Kennedy, our schools might not have opened today.” At the assembly, the Attorney 
General assured the students that President Kennedy was “concerned about your failure to 
get an education and talked about it frequently.”23 
In the auditorium at Robert R. Moton High School (present-day Prince Edward 
County High School), Robert Kennedy’s eyes moistened as he listened to the students sing 
“America.” The Attorney General wiped his eyes as his hands trembled while making 
alterations to his speech. The Attorney General urged the students, on behalf of his brother, 
to further and apply their education. On the front lawn, Kennedy told a crowd of one 
thousand enthusiastic African American well-wishers that the future of the county 
depended on the education of their children.24 
 Next, Robert Kennedy traveled to Hampden-Sydney College, a Presbyterian private 
men’s college, to address the student body – described as “conservative to reactionary.” 
Kennedy entered Johns Auditorium under a homemade placard, which read: 
“GOLDWATER To Whip Mass[achusetts] Socialism!” The “hostile” students “began to 
hiss and grumble” as the Attorney General moved to the lectern. Kennedy removed his 
jacket, rolled up his sleeves, discarded his prepared remarks, and stated: “I believe you 
gentlemen may have a few questions.” For forty-five minutes, Kennedy fielded questions 
on his political future, Vietnam, and the civil rights bill. Asked who favored the civil rights 
                                                 
23 RNL, May 12, 1964, 4; LDA, May 12, 1964, 12; WP, May 12, 1964, B1. 
 
24 RNL, May 12, 1964, 4; RAA, May 16, 1864, 2; RWN, May 12, 1964, 9; RTD, May 12, 1964, 6. 
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 bill, the crowd responded with “moderate applause.” Asked who opposed the bill, applause 
filled the hall. “I don’t understand your opposition,” replied Kennedy. “Go over to Prince 
Edward County, as I have just done, and see the children put their hands over their hearts 
and swear allegiance to the American flag and sing ‘America the Beautiful.’” In the end, 
“with a combination of grace, courage, candor and humor,” observed one attendee, 
“[Kennedy] won over the assembly, to receive a lengthy standing ovation.”25 
 After a four and one-half hour “emotion-packed” visit, Robert Kennedy boarded 
the helicopter for the return trip to Washington, D.C. Kennedy concluded that the Free 
School students “have regained the possibility of a hopeful future.” As the county returned 
to its “lazy springtime norm,” county residents recorded their responses to the Attorney 
General’s visit. “No minds were changed,” said one county official. Africans Americans, 
on the other hand, were jubilant over the support from the federal government.26  
 
A New Frontier 
 
 
 A Matter of National Concern examines the Kennedy Administration’s actions to 
restore public education in Prince Edward County, Virginia. Robert C. Smith’s They 
Closed Their Schools (1965) remains the only full-length published study of the Prince 
Edward County school closings. Scholars of civil rights, massive resistance, Virginia 
                                                 
25 Interview, Dr. Charles McRae by Harry Boyte in Harry Boyte to Jean Fairfax, July 7, 1962, #38438 
(AFSC); LN, May 12, 1964, 15; Interview Notes, William J. vanden Heuvel by Victor S. Navasky, Box 16, 
Victor S. Navasky Papers (JFKL); E-mail, Louis Briel to Brian E. Lee, October 1, 2008; RTD, May 12, 1964, 
1; Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1964, 11.  
 
26 NVP, May 12, 1964, 1; Robert F. Kennedy to Thomas Henderson, May 14, 1964, Box 47, Attorney 
General General Correspondence, Robert F. Kennedy Papers (JFKL); LDA, May 12, 1964, 12. 
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 history, and education periodically include the Prince Edward story in their work. Scores 
of published articles in scholarly and popular periodicals, and unpublished master’s theses 
and doctoral dissertations have explored various aspects of the school closings and its 
aftermath. In all these works, the Kennedy Administration usually receives a fleeting 
passage, if at all. In the meantime, the Kennedy brothers have been the subjects of 
countless monographs, but the authors permit the Prince Edward County school crisis only 
a fleeting passage, if at all – and often only to mention the Free Schools, leaving the 
administration’s other contributions virtually ignored. The slender amount of published 
scholarship on Prince Edward County, and the even thinner amount of study of the 
Kennedy Administration’s activities on behalf of the locked out children, fails to match the 
magnitude of its significance to the history of Virginia, education, and civil rights. 
For more than four decades, historians have analyzed the Kennedy 
Administration’s civil rights record. The dominant narrative concludes that the Kennedys 
proved unsympathetic to the plight of African Americans, placated southern legislators to 
advance their domestic agenda, reacted to events rather than prevent crises, and appointed 
racist federal judges. These assessments derive from historians focusing on the dramatic 
crises, namely the Freedom Rides, the Birmingham demonstrations, and the integration of 
the Universities of Mississippi and Alabama. Focusing on these few, although significant, 
events fails to engage sufficient evidence to formulate a comprehensive assessment of the 
Kennedy Administration’s civil rights record.  
In Prince Edward County, there were no buses set ablaze, no violent mobs, no 
federalized national guardsmen, no bombings, no fire hoses turned on demonstrators, no 
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 public confrontations with recalcitrant state officials, and, in the meantime, no full-length 
published studies since They Closed Their Schools. Since then, oral histories and 
manuscript collections of government officials and agencies, private organizations, and 
individuals have been opened to scholars, revealing a wealth of information that was 
unavailable to Robert C. Smith four decades ago, including the Kennedy Administration’s 
actions to restore public education to Prince Edward County. 
The historical evidence now available on the Prince Edward County situation 
conflicts with the prevailing assessment of the Kennedy Administration’s civil rights 
record. First, the Kennedys were sympathetic to the plight of the county’s locked out 
children, which included 1,700 African Americans. Second, the federal government’s 
action challenged the core of Byrd Organization support, and thus Harry Byrd, the 
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and gatekeeper to much the administration’s 
legislative program. Third, the administration took proactive measures to prevent further 
injury to the children and to halt the spread of school closures throughout the South. 
Finally, Kennedy’s judicial appointments supported the administration’s progressive civil 
rights campaign in Prince Edward County.  
A Matter of National Concern alone will not debunk the prevailing historical 
assessment of the Kennedy Administration’s civil rights record, nor should one focused 
study trump all. Prince Edward County is but a ripple in the vast sea of Kennedy’s one 
thousand days. However, if this story and the other underreported civil rights stories are 
examined and other ripples generated, perhaps those ripples will build a current that will 
sweep down the dominant narrative, and leave in its wake a more comprehensive 
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 assessment of the Kennedy Administration’s civil rights record – be it positive, negative, 
or otherwise. 
Cherry-picking a handful of events only skews the assessment of the Kennedys, 
and diminishes other civil rights episodes. By moving lesser studied events from the 
shadows to the fore, scholars can construct a thorough analysis of the Kennedy years, and, 
at the same time, illuminate the stories of the unknown civil rights heroes from towns 
across the nation. In Prince Edward County, black and some white citizens openly 
challenged Jim Crow society, and exhibited the audacity to pursue true democratic 
government and equal opportunity for all. The Kennedy Administration assisted these 
crusaders in moving closer to their objective. The study of Prince Edward County is but 
part of a new frontier in Kennedy scholarship. 
Let us begin. 
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CHAPTER 1: Save Us From Ourselves 
 
 
“This little Virginia community has defied the courts, and violated every 
principle of democracy. Strong federal intervention is needed to save us 
from ourselves and guarantee our children a fair chance in an everchanging 
world.” 
 
- Rev. L. Francis Griffin27 
 
 
 
Four score and seven years after Abraham Lincoln promised a “new birth of 
freedom,” racial equality remained in its infancy in Prince Edward County, Virginia. The 
white leaders had embraced the separate component of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), but 
failed to make separate conditions equal. On April 23, 1951, Barbara Johns, 16, led her 
schoolmates on a strike, protesting the inadequate facilities at the all-black Robert R. 
Moton High School in Farmville. The strike “set in motion events that forever changed the 
landscape of American education, and arguably marked the start of the modern Civil 
Rights Movement,” determined one journalist. The NAACP filed suit in federal court, not 
to achieve equalization to the white facilities, but to eradicate segregation in public 
schools. The Prince Edward County litigation was combined with similar cases in Kansas, 
 
27 FH, October 25, 1960, 1. 
 South Carolina, and Delaware under appeal to the nation’s highest court in the case of 
Brown v. Board of Education. On May 17, 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that 
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” One year later, the Supreme Court 
directed the federal district courts to implement school desegregation “with all deliberate 
speed.”28 
 Senator Harry F. Byrd believed the Brown decision presented the “gravest crisis 
since the War Between the States.” Segregationists considered the Supreme Court’s action 
illegal, an invasion of states’ rights, akin to legislating from the bench, contrary to the 
intent of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a substitution of judicial precedent with 
sociology and psychology. Beyond the legal questions, Brown threatened to destroy the 
social structure of the South. In Prince Edward County, a segregationist leader predicted 
that school desegregation would result in the “destruction of our community.”29 The 
county’s power structure organized an alternative school system, closed the public schools, 
and all but stifled opposition through social and economic intimidation. The 
segregationists dominated the county, but the extreme, protracted defiance of Brown was 
due, in large measure, to the Byrd Organization, which acted as a bulwark between local 
                                                 
28 Abraham Lincoln, “Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg,” November 19, 
1863 in Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln: Volume VII (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey, 1953), 23; For a thorough examination of the Robert R. Moton High School student strike and the 
subsequent litigation through the Brown decision, see Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown 
v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New York, 1975); Don Baker, 
Washington Post Magazine, March 4, 2001, 10. 
 
29 Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, 141; James Jackson Kilpatrick, The Southern Case for School Segregation (New 
York, 1962), 105-179; J. Barrye Wall to Benjamin Muse, February 22, 1956, Box 2, Benjamin Muse Papers 
(UVA). 
 20
 officials and the federal government, permitting the school closers to fight a battle of 
attrition. 
 
The Southside Virginia Aristocracy 
 
 In the aftermath of the Brown decision, the cities of Charlottesville, Norfolk, and 
Richmond, and the counties of Warren, Arlington, and Prince Edward received 
considerable attention. In facing the challenges of Brown, the individual locales confronted 
individual circumstances, but only Prince Edward County’s leaders determined to close 
their public schools permanently. The convergence of the county’s unique social, political, 
economic, and geographic characteristics with a sympathetic state government and the 
absence of federal executive action formed the backdrop that permitted the extreme 
defiance of the Brown decision. 
Prince Edward County hardly embodied the archetypical setting to initiate a social 
revolution. The county was located in the “black belt,” a region stretching from the 
Chesapeake Bay into the Deep South and east Texas. The black belt was a predominantly 
rural region, consisting of a large African American population – nearly 40% in Prince 
Edward County. Consistent with the rest of the black belt, the county’s African Americans 
remained subordinate to whites in the southern caste system, received an inferior 
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 education, earned substantially less money, were segregated from whites in public settings, 
and lacked significant political power.30 
Integrated education threatened to upset the political structure of the black belt. 
Virginia’s voting laws deterred political participation by blacks and the state’s leading 
politicians ignored them. In Prince Edward County, whites outnumbered blacks three-to-
two, but held a four-to-one advantage in voter registration. A better educated black 
populace would demand more political power and a voice in county government. 
Desegregating the public schools, many whites feared, was the first step towards “limitless 
Negro gains,” which would result in black domination.31 
Prince Edward County’s large African American population posed a significantly 
greater challenge in desegregating its public schools than other locales. In Warren County, 
the minority population was so small that there was no black high school and the few black 
students were bused to schools in the neighboring community. In Arlington County, 
African Americans constituted only a nominal portion of the total population and, 
therefore, the majority of white citizens were unwilling to resist token integration. “The 
extent of that problem,” wrote Virginius Dabney,32 editor of The Richmond Times-
Dispatch, “is almost everywhere in direct proportion to the percentage of Negroes in the 
                                                 
30 Moreland, “The Tragedy of Public Schools,” 3-6. 
 
31 Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia, 23, 36; FH, May 19, 1961, 1; Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, 119. 
 
32 Virginius Dabney (1901-1995) was the editor of The Richmond Times-Dispatch from 1933-1969. 
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 population.”33 School desegregation in Prince Edward County, where the black-to-white 
student ratio was balanced, threatened a century-old social system.  
The population dynamics of Prince Edward County contributed to the preservation 
of southern traditions. In the 1950s, the Washington, D.C., suburban population, for 
example, grew rapidly with newcomers to Virginia. By 1960, only one-fourth of Arlington 
County residents were native-born Virginians. For that reason, many considered the 
Washington, D.C. suburbs divorced from traditional Virginia. On the other hand, although 
Prince Edward County’s population decreased 10% in the 1950s, 90% of its residents had 
lived in the county for an extended period. As one scholar observed, “most people born in 
Prince Edward die in Prince Edward.”34 The stagnant white population, threatened by a 
social revolution, held tightly to its southern traditions and prejudices. 
 “We still hold to the opinion,” stated J. Barrye Wall,35 editor of The Farmville 
Herald, “that a non-segregated school system in Virginia and in the South…can become a 
perpetual disrupting influence in race relationships.” Segregationists feared mingling the 
races would adversely expose white children to the shortcomings – either real or perceived 
– that disproportionately plagued African Americans, namely criminal activity, illegitimate 
children, and foul language. “There was nothing good that our children could gain from 
                                                 
33 Benjamin Muse, Virginia’s Massive Resistance (Bloomington, Indiana, 1961), 67-68; Wilkinson, Harry 
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34 Wilkinson, Harry Byrd, 172-173; Rudenstine, “Or None At All,” 3-5. 
 
35 J. Barrye Wall (1898-1985) was the owner, publisher, and editor of The Farmville Herald, a bi-weekly 
newspaper. Wall was the recognized leader of Prince Edward County’s massive resistance to school 
desegregation and a founding member of both the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties 
and the Prince Edward School Foundation. 
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 interaction in school with blacks,” explained Robert E. Taylor.36 White parents refused to 
subject their children to a sociological experiment, which could ultimately result in 
interracial sex. “Sexual promiscuity is what [whites] fear most,” asserted T.J. McIlwaine,37 
superintendent of schools. White segregationists feared not only the consequences of 
school desegregation leading to “mongrelization,” but also to the breakdown of racial 
segregation in public settings, like hotels, restaurants, and parks. Desegregating the public 
schools, white supremacists feared, opened the door to integration in all forms of social 
life.38 
Desegregating a racially balanced school system posed some practical dilemmas. 
First, standardized tests showed an achievement gap favoring white children. Integrated 
schools, warned T.J. McIlwaine, meant “the teacher who now has an aptitude range of 
three years among white pupils in one classroom will find a range of five to six years in a 
mixed class.” Desegregating the classroom might impede the learning of white children 
and/or leave black children “frustrated and disruptive.” Second, African American 
children, white supremacists argued, did not need college prep courses to work in their 
traditional vocation as farm hands, and therefore, waste taxpayers’ money. Third, 
integrated schools opened the door to integrated faculties. White parents, generally, wanted 
their children taught by white teachers. Finally, rural areas lacked the money, services, and 
                                                 
36 Robert E. Taylor (1919-2007) was the President and CEO of Taylor Manufacturing Company, a 
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 resources to adequately adjust to desegregated schools. Desegregation, warned J. Barrye 
Wall, threatened to “retard the future development of education.”39 
 Sixty miles east, Richmond City faced a similar social revolution, but its schools 
remained open and segregated. Richmond possessed many advantages for delaying 
desegregation that Prince Edward County did not. First, housing segregation created 
homogenous communities, and schools were constructed “in neighborhoods in which one 
race predominate[d], rather than near the border between a white and black residential 
area.” Neighborhood schools contributed to the perpetuation of segregated education. In 
contrast, white and black housing was intermingled in Prince Edward County. Only 
creative districting could produce segregated schools that would satisfy court orders. 
Second, Brown II allowed Richmond to delay under the cover of gradual compliance. The 
white-hot spotlight of being a party litigant in the Brown case did not permit Prince 
Edward County such a luxury. Third, many white Richmonders fled the city for the 
suburbs in neighboring Henrico and Chesterfield counties. In Prince Edward County, there 
was no suburban refuge for white flight. Prince Edward was “a small rural county with 
little money,” explained Robert E. Taylor. “Many families have lived here for 300 years 
and have no place to go.” The county’s segregationists had to make their stand at home to 
avoid school desegregation.40 
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  Prince Edward County’s segregationists demonstrated consistent and unwavering 
leadership throughout the school crisis. The segregationists pledged to “fight them until the 
last ditch and then pull the ditch in behind us.” In contrast, the urban centers lacked the 
leadership and the will to sustain a protracted resistance movement to the Brown decision. 
The Prince Edward County leadership created the climate of a shared fate among the white 
citizens in something greater than themselves. “We were not fighting for ourselves,” 
reflected J. Barrye Wall, “but for a constitutional principle.” Besides, outside forces, 
namely the national NAACP, targeted the county and attempted to impose a social change 
against the will of the white majority. The NAACP’s attack created a unifying device that, 
in the absence of strong moderate leadership, was capitalized upon by segregationists.41 
 Prince Edward County’s segregationists were among the founding members of the 
Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, an organization formed to resist 
school desegregation and thus, it claimed, to preserve states’ rights and individual rights. 
Robert B. Crawford,42 a Farmville businessman, served as the Defenders’ president, 
symbolically placing Prince Edward County at the center of the movement. Crawford 
became “a frequent consultant of the Governor and a major influence in state affairs.” With 
local Defenders chapters opening across the state and the membership exceeding 10,000, 
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 Prince Edward County not only built support for their resistance, but created a fundraising 
instrument for segregated private schools.43 
 In Prince Edward County, the local Defenders “controlled the main organs of 
community action.” Defenders occupied formal positions of power in local government, 
including: the mayor of Farmville, the Farmville Town Council, and, most importantly, the 
county board of supervisors. Many of the prominent business and civic leaders, property 
owners, and farmers joined the local Defenders. The primary source of local news – The 
Farmville Herald, a bi-weekly newspaper – was owned, published, and edited by J. Barrye 
Wall, a founding member of the Defenders.44 
Short, chubby, bespectacled, and cigar chomping, J. Barrye Wall employed The 
Farmville Herald as the propaganda instrument for the county’s massive resistance to 
Brown. Wall’s editorial section denounced integration, the Warren Court, and the NAACP, 
promoted the Defenders, private education, majority rule, local control, states’ rights, 
southern traditions, and his business and political allies, warned of communist influences, 
and demonized dissent. Wall conditioned his readers to hold the NAACP and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, not the local leaders, accountable if the schools closed in response to a 
federal court order. Wall dominated the public discourse, shaped public opinion, managed 
propaganda, and led Prince Edward County’s massive resistance to school desegregation.45 
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  J. Barrye Wall, many believed, anchored the community’s control group, estimated 
at three to eight people, that shaped the county’s policy. The remainder of the oligarchy, 
according to one study, included: Robert E. Taylor, Charles W. “Rat” Glenn,46 B. Blanton 
Hanbury,47 Robert B. Crawford, J.W. Dunnington,48 and E. Louis Dahl49 – all Defenders, 
but none held elected office during the school crisis. This oligarchy set the county’s course 
of action, which was “implemented into law or policy by the titular leaders.”50 
 The “Southside Virginia aristocracy” had the social, economic, and legal influence 
to silence opposition. Individuals who spoke out against county policy were subject to 
social ostracism. The fear of reprisals discouraged dissenters from communicating, curbing 
organized opposition. The control group employed economic intimidation to further their 
agenda. Charles W. Glenn, J.W. Dunnington, and second-tier leader W.S. Weaver51 sat on 
the boards of local banks, which held mortgages on businesses and homes and furnished 
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Foundation, serving as its president until 1964. 
 
48 J.W. Dunnington (1890-1971) directed the Dunnington Tobacco Company from 1921-1971, a civic leader, 
and the director and chairman of the board of the Planters Bank & Trust Company. Dunnington was a 
member of the Prince Edward County chapter of the Defenders.  
 
49 E. Louis Dahl owned and operated a sporting goods store on Main Street in Farmville. Dahl was on the 
executive committee of the Prince Edward County chapter of the Defenders and served as treasurer of the 
Prince Edward School Foundation from 1955-1962. 
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 business loans. Glenn allegedly threatened several dissenters by stating: “if your mortgage 
is foreclosed or you find your house burned down some night you’ll change your attitude.” 
The power group was also among the county’s business leaders, who controlled 
employment and store credit. A business leader who dissented could become the victim of 
a well-organized economic boycott. In terms of legal power, two of the prominent lawyers 
in the community – Frank Nat Watkins,52 commonwealth’s attorney, and J. Barrye Wall, 
Jr.53 – were considered in the second tier of the county’s leadership and were intimately 
connected to the power structure. No practicing member of the local bar protested the 
county’s treatment of African Americans. Dominating the county’s social, economic, legal, 
and political power permitted the oligarchy to shape policy and promote a distinctive belief 
system, which one observer characterized as “anti-United Nations, anti-fluoridation, 
impeach [Chief Justice] Earl Warren, anti-income tax, and support of the…contention that 
an international conspiracy has virtually captured our federal government.”54 
 Many argued that “five funerals” or the “vanish[ing]” of five leaders would have 
greatly altered events in Prince Edward County. “I doubt very much,” opined Dr. C. G. 
                                                                                                                                                    
51 W. S. Weaver (1882-1972) was a farmer and businessman from Rice. Weaver served on the board of 
directors of the Prince Edward School Foundation and the Virginia National Bank in Farmville. 
 
52 Frank Nat Watkins (d. 1970) served as commonwealth’s attorney in Prince Edward County from 1938-
1963, succeeding his father, Asa D. Watkins, who served from 1891-1938. 
 
53 J. Barrye Wall, Jr. (1927-1972) was an attorney in Farmville, who represented the Prince Edward School 
Foundation and the local chapter of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties. Wall was on 
the executive committee of Southside Schools, Inc. 
 
54 Dr. Charles McRae used the term “Southside Virginia aristocracy” in a private interview with Harry Boyte 
– Harry Boyte to Jean Fairfax, July 7, 1962, #38438 (AFSC); Harry Boyte, “Prince Edward Story,” January 
31, 1963, #38552 (AFSC); Lester E. Andrews in a private interview with Harry Boyte –  Harry Boyte to Jean 
Fairfax, July 6, 1962, #38438 (AFSC); William Bagwell to Jean Fairfax, December 10, 1962, #38437 
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 Gordon Moss,55 a professor at Longwood College and a white moderate, “if, without them, 
there would not have been any controversy and concrete issue here at all.” The community 
felt the power and influence of this small group of individuals of which the “dynamo 
among the five” was J. Barrye Wall, who one resident privately observed had a “dictator 
complex.” Wall dismissed the allegation of oligarchic domination. Wall argued that his 
editorials and actions reflected the attitude of the county’s majority. Robert C. Smith 
concluded that “Wall was as much the creator of that opinion as its principal reflector.”56 
If elections measure public sentiment, then the electorate indicated its support of 
segregation in the 1956 presidential election. The county’s primary, secondary, and tertiary 
leadership – many of whom were Defenders – established precinct committees in support 
of T. Coleman Andrews,57 who ran on the States’ Rights Party ticket in Virginia. Andrews 
campaigned on a platform of states’ rights, fiscal conservatism, and the maintenance of 
school segregation. Nationally, Andrews received only 0.17% of the popular vote, but he 
carried Prince Edward County with a majority – 1,588 over President Dwight D. 
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55 Dr. C.G. Gordon Moss (1899-1982) was chairman of the History Department and later Associate Dean, 
then Academic Dean at Longwood College. Moss was the prominent white moderate in the community. 
 
56 Smith, They Closed Their Schools, 156-157; In March 1961, Benjamin Muse interviewed B. Calvin Bass, 
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57 T. Coleman Andrews (1899-1983) was a Richmond accountant and former commissioner of the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service. In 1956, Andrews ran for President, appearing on the States’ Rights Party ticket in 
Virginia.  
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 Eisenhower (R), 933, and Adlai Stevenson (D), 437. Andrews won only one other locality 
in the entire country – Fayette County, Tennessee.58 
 The same core group of Defenders and supporters of the States’ Rights Party 
candidate organized the Prince Edward Educational Corporation. The corporation raised 
money to operate a segregated private school system for the county’s white children in the 
event of a federal court order to desegregate the public schools. “While the currents of 
legal uncertainty whirl,” explained J. Barrye Wall, “the white people of Prince Edward 
have taken such steps as practical to assure education for their children.” Publicly, the 
white leadership convinced the community of the necessity of securing funds for teacher 
salaries for a temporary school system. Privately, the white leadership was “working o[u]t 
a scheme in which we will abandon public schools, sell the buildings to our corporation, 
reopen as privately operated schools with tuition grants from Va and P.E. county as the 
basic financial program.”59 Prince Edward County’s segregationists developed a scheme, 
but they needed assistance from the state government. 
 
No Compromise with Principle 
 
 Senator Harry F. Byrd, a former state senator and governor, was “the most 
prominent Virginian of the twentieth century.” Byrd built a political organization that 
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 dominated Virginia for four decades. The Byrd Organization, the prevailing faction of the 
Virginia State Democratic Party, reflected the Senator’s fiscal, social, and political 
philosophy. The organization customarily won statewide elections, held a great majority in 
the General Assembly, and occupied the governor’s mansion, due in large measure to the 
small, predictable electorate, the state’s virtual one-party system, and the discipline of 
Byrd’s disciples.60 
 The organization’s upper hierarchy, traditionally composed of country gentlemen, 
extended Senator Byrd’s influence into localities across the Commonwealth. Watkins M. 
Abbitt,61 a resident of Appomattox, was one of Harry Byrd’s chief lieutenants. The self-
styled “unreconstructed rebel” represented the Fourth Congressional District, which 
included Prince Edward County, in the U.S. House of Representatives. Abbitt fervently 
opposed the Brown decision, attended the organization’s strategy sessions, was an 
outspoken Defender, and was intimately connected to Prince Edward County’s 
segregationist leadership. Abbitt proved to be an invaluable ally to the county’s 
segregationists in their defiant stance to school desegregation.62 
 Harry Byrd’s influence reached deep into local government. The Virginia General 
Assembly elected circuit court judges to eight-year terms. Since organization men 
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 dominated the General Assembly, the circuit court judges reflected Byrd’s ideology. The 
circuit court judge’s patronage power further extended the organization’s long arm. Judges 
appointed the electoral board, the school trustee electoral board, and the public welfare 
board, making the circuit judge the “kingpin of the local levels of the organization.” Harry 
Byrd’s uncle, Joel West Flood,63 presided over Virginia’s Fifth Judicial Circuit Court, 
which included Prince Edward County. Judge Flood, therefore, appointed the school 
trustee electoral board, who, in turn, appointed the Prince Edward County school board. 
Coincidentally, the chairman of the school trustee electoral board, P.T. Atkinson,64 sat on 
the board of directors of the private school system, the organization whose ultimate goal 
was to obtain the county’s public school buildings as surplus property. Through this 
patronage system, Byrd’s influence permeated down into local government and loyalty 
returned up the ranks, making Byrd’s word “law in Virginia.”65 
“If Byrd’s word was law throughout most of Virginia,” wrote J. Harvie Wilkinson 
III, “it was nothing short of gospel throughout the Southside.” Southside Virginia shared 
the Byrd Organization’s conservative philosophy and consistently delivered wide margins 
of electoral victories. With a near equal black-to-white ratio, white segregationists were 
prepared to resist any challenge to the traditional racial order. “The rural folk, being on the 
whole poorer, less mobile, and less educated than their urban contemporaries,” wrote 
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 William Bryan Crawley, Jr., “were tied more than any other group to the ‘old Virginia’ 
which Byrd represented.” In the era of Brown, the Southside was overrepresented in state 
government and the Fourth Congressional District, the home of Prince Edward County, 
was the most overrepresented district in the state. With this disproportionate power, the 
Byrd Organization relied on the Southside for electoral and legislative victories to 
counterbalance the anti-organization forces emerging in the growing urban centers. 
Reciprocally, the Southside depended on the organization to maintain a segregated 
society.66  
“If we can organize the Southern States for massive resistance to [the Brown 
decision],” Harry Byrd pronounced, “I think that in time the rest of the country will realize 
integration is not going to be accepted in the South.” Senator Byrd believed that massive 
resistance would prove the impossibility of implementing school desegregation, causing 
the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse its decision. In order to accomplish this task, the 
southern states needed to form a coalition. Byrd supported the Southern Manifesto, a 
congressional condemnation of the Brown decision, which nineteen senators and eighty-
two members of the U.S. House of Representatives, including the entire Virginia 
delegation, signed. In confronting this challenge, Byrd placed Virginia in a leadership role. 
“Let Virginia surrender to this illegal demand and you’ll find the ranks of the other 
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 Southern states broken,” warned Harry Byrd. “If Virginia surrenders, the rest of the South 
will go down too.”67 
From his perch in Washington, Byrd led Virginia’s massive resistance. Byrd’s 
lieutenants drafted and passed the Stanley Plan, a three-tiered mechanism to thwart school 
desegregation, named for Governor Thomas B. Stanley.68 First, the legislation created a 
three-man pupil placement board, which was appointed by the governor. Under the plan, 
applicants would be assigned to schools based on their race. Second, if the federal court 
ordered a school desegregated, the governor was authorized to close the school. The 
governor would then seek voluntary compliance to re-open the schools on a segregated 
basis. Finally, the State could withhold funds to public schools that integrated.69  
The Stanley Plan deterred localities from initiating integration, which benefited 
Prince Edward County’s ability to maintain the status quo. As Congressman Bill Tuck70 of 
Virginia’s Fifth Congressional District warned, “If you ever let them integrate anywhere 
the whole state will be integrated in short time.” J. Barrye Wall found “no middle ground 
on this matter of segregation.” The Stanley Plan eliminated the middle ground, which, as 
Bill Tuck stated: “separate[d] the integrationists from the segregationists.”71 Also, the 
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 legislation placed the state between the federal courts and the localities. For Prince Edward 
County, which remained in the thick of federal litigation, the legislation offered state 
support, if not delay. The Stanley Plan affirmed the Prince Edward County segregationists’ 
support of the Byrd Organization.   
Prince Edward County’s white populace supported the Byrd Organization’s 
candidate for governor in 1957. As Attorney General of Virginia, J. Lindsay Almond, Jr.,72 
“one of segregationist’s ablest legal advocates,” presented arguments “three times in the 
cold, pitiless glare of the Supreme Court” in defense of segregated schools in Prince 
Edward County. In August, Almond campaigned in Farmville, pledging to oppose school 
desegregation. “Those who are willing to accept a little integration or that which they call 
‘token integration,’” Almond stated, “are opening the doors to mass integration full and 
complete with all of its ugly and destructive consequences.” Almond pledged not to 
compromise these principles. “We need [Almond] as chief executive of Virginia,” opined 
J. Barrye Wall. In the general election, which was viewed as a referendum on massive 
resistance, three out of four white Virginians voted for Almond, the candidate who vowed 
to close schools rather than integrate. Almond carried Prince Edward County with more 
than eighty percent of the vote. Almond’s campaign rhetoric raised expectations among 
segregationists for a determined stand against school desegregation.73  
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 Governor Almond echoed his campaign rhetoric in his inaugural address: “So far as 
a state system of public education is concerned, integration anywhere means destruction 
everywhere.” In the opening months of his administration, Almond demonstrated his 
commitment to segregated schools. In response to the Little Rock school crisis, Almond 
pushed the “Little Rock Bills,” which authorized the governor to close a school, or even an 
entire school district, if it was patrolled by federal troops. Also, Almond appointed 
William J. Story, a staunch segregationist, to replace a moderate on the State Board of 
Education, thereby ensuring a majority on the board that opposed the Brown decision.74 
However, it was the execution of the Stanley Plan that tested Almond’s commitment to 
massive resistance.  
In September 1958, several schools faced federal court orders to desegregate. 
According to the Stanley Plan, the governor had the authority to close any school that 
integrated. Governor Almond carried out the law by closing schools in Warren County, 
Charlottesville, and Norfolk. There was an ironic element to Almond’s action. The state 
officials decried federal intrusion into state business, but the closing of these schools by the 
state treaded on local hegemony. The irony was lost on J. Barrye Wall, who congratulated 
the governor on his action. “We stand with you in your fight to save our constitutional 
government and efficient, racially separate schools. Lead out – we will follow.”75  
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  However, the Governor Almond’s action had measurable consequences – nearly 
13,000 students were locked out of school. Almond admitted his apprehension that some 
parents, both black and white, might be unable to provide education for their children. 
“One month, one semester, or one year’s loss of established schools for a limited number 
of students,” J. Barrye Wall told his readers, “is a small price to pay for an underlying 
principle of constitutional government.” Unwilling to sacrifice their children’s education, 
white residents of Norfolk filed suit in federal court against the governor for violating the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On their own initiative, the 
administration filed a suit in the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals to test the 
constitutionality of the school closing and fund cut-off laws.76  
 On January 19, 1959, state and federal courts found the massive resistance laws 
unconstitutional. In Harrison v. Day, the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals found 
the closing and the cutting off of State funds to desegregated schools in violation of the 
State Constitution. In James v. Almond, a three-judge federal court declared that Virginia’s 
school closing laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The next 
evening, in “the most famous political address of twentieth century Virginia,” Almond 
proclaimed, “We have just begun to fight,” raising false hopes for protracted resistance to 
the federal government. “We commend you on the position taken,” wrote the chairman of 
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 the Prince Edward County board of supervisors. “The people and board of supervisors of 
Prince Edward County are solidly behind you.”77 
 On January 28, 1959, Governor Almond, in his “finest hour,” retreated from his 
defiant address, calling a special session of the General Assembly to repeal the massive 
resistance laws. “The only way to defeat integration,” Almond explained, “was to close 
down every single, solitary school in the state and keep them closed” – an action he was 
unwilling to take. As a result, five days later, black students peacefully desegregated 
schools in Norfolk and Arlington. The Defenders president, Robert B. Crawford, 
considered February 2, 1959 “the most disastrous day in the history of Virginia.” J. Barrye 
Wall marked the day as “Blue Monday,” the day “when Virginia surrendered her 
sovereignty to the U.S. Supreme Court, through the leadership of an administration elected 
to protect this sovereignty, and the acquiescence of [the] General Assembly.”78  
 J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. was elected governor on the promise that he would not 
compromise his principles and would resist school desegregation. Governor Almond’s 
capitulation triggered acrimony among Prince Edward County segregationists. “There is a 
feeling of resentment all over [the Fourth Congressional] district toward the administration 
in Richmond,” affirmed E. Louis Dahl. The state government had acted as the bulwark 
between the federal government and the localities. Now the Byrd Organization, the 
insurers of segregated schools, fractured. Without the state’s protection, Prince Edward 
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 County lay exposed to the federal government’s implementation of the Brown decision. 
Segregationists were unwilling to accept this alternative. “[R]esistance has [not] weakened 
in Virginia,” Dahl declared. “IT’S STRONGER THAN EVER! In fact, I wish we would 
move on to a better word – DEFIANCE!”79  
Within days of “Blue Monday,” Governor Almond organized the forty-man 
Commission on Education (the Perrow Commission), chaired by State Senator Mosby G. 
Perrow, Jr.,80 to develop state procedures for the school desegregation crisis. The 
centerpiece of the Perrow Plan, local option, transferred the authority of pupil placement 
from the state to the localities. Therefore, localities could determine to integrate or not to 
integrate their schools. Watkins Abbitt criticized the Perrow Plan as a “complete surrender 
to in the integrationists.” Abbitt feared the “great damage to our cause if any integration 
takes place anywhere in Virginia with consent or by the direction of the local authorities.” 
J. Barrye Wall determined that local option would leave the localities exposed to 
desegregation litigation from the federal government and the NAACP. The Prince Edward 
County school litigation still remained in the federal courts. “The localities,” explained 
Wall, “have neither the funds nor the power to defend themselves.” As State Senator Mills 
E. Godwin81 admitted, Southside politicians “could not afford politically to follow 
Almond.” Prince Edward County’s representatives on the commission – State Senator 
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 James D. Hagood82 and Delegate John H. Daniel,83 therefore, were among the nine 
commissioners that signed the minority report opposing the Perrow Plan.84 
“Abandonment of massive resistance in 1959 did not represent a change of heart,” 
wrote a historian, “but only a change in tactics.” The Virginia General Assembly passed a 
series of measures favorable to the establishment of private schools. First, “scholarships” 
were made available to students seeking enrollment in private non-sectarian schools. 
Second, localities could sell school property to private corporations upon popular support 
through a referendum. Third, localities were permitted to provide free transportation to 
students attending private schools. The new legislation, Governor Almond explained, was 
“designed to prevent children from having to attend racially mixed schools.”85 The 
Almond Administration certainly conceded some ground in repealing the massive 
resistance laws, but the Byrd Organization quickly adapted to the changing environment, 
promoting minimal integration and remaining a much needed ally to Prince Edward 
County’s segregationists. 
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 Private Schools Appear to be the Only Answer 
 
 On May 5, 1959, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals directed the Federal 
District Court to order Prince Edward County to admit black children to the white high 
school by September. Two days later, B. Blanton Hanbury, president of the Prince Edward 
Educational Corporation (later known as the Prince Edward School Foundation), 
announced plans to operate private schools for the county’s white children beginning in 
September. “Private schools,” wrote J. Barrye Wall, “appear to be the only answer for 
those who refuse to accept race mixing in the schools.”86 
On June 2, 1959, “with profound regret,” the county board of supervisors – Edward 
A. Carter,87 chairman, William W. Vaughan,88 vice chairman, Charles W. Gates,89 T.D. 
Dillon,90 Hugh M. Jenkins,91 and John C. Steck92 – announced their unanimous decision to 
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 cut off funds for the operation of public schools. Considering the composition of the board, 
the supervisors’ decision came without profound surprise. At least three of the six 
supervisors were Defenders – Vaughan, Jenkins, and Gates. John C. Steck may not have 
been a Defender, but as managing editor of The Farmville Herald, he remained under the 
thumb of J. Barrye Wall. The surprise from the fund cut off came from its pre-maturity.  
 
Table 1. Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors, 1951-1964 
District Supervisor Occupation Years of Service 
Buffalo T.D. Dillon Farmer 1950-1963 
 Hugh E. Carwile, Jr. Farmer 1964-1997 
 
Farmville James H. Clark* Businessman 1950-1954 
 John G. Bruce Real Estate 1954-1958 
 John C. Steck* Journalist 1958-1977 
 
Hampden Edward A. Carter Insurance Agent 1932-1959a 
 Charles Pickett Farmer 1960-1970 
 
Leigh Robert B. Wilson, Jr.* Farmer 1950-1954 
 Hugh M. Jenkins Farmer 1955-1979 
 
Lockett Charles W. Gates Farmer 1948-1967 
 
Prospect William W. Vaughan* Farmer 1948-1967b 
    
* died in office 
a Carter served as chairman from 1950-1959. 
b Vaughan served as chairman from 1960-1967. 
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 The school board had not received any applications from any black student seeking 
admission to a white school. In addition, the board of supervisors had allocated funds to 
the school board on a month-to-month basis in the event of a federal court order to 
desegregate. The supervisors could have continued this procedure until the situation 
became untenable, but as Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss, a moderate Longwood College 
professor, asserted, “the white supremacists were determined to have no public schools at 
all, segregated or integrated.”93  
The closing of Prince Edward County’s public schools differed from the previous 
school closings in Warren County, Charlottesville, and Norfolk, because the local 
governing body, not the governor, took the action. John C. Steck defended the supervisors’ 
decision in his pamphlet, The Prince Edward County Story (1960), by citing “that first 
American tenet: that men should not be taxed against their will and without their consent 
for a purpose to which they are deeply and conscientiously opposed.” In a public meeting, 
William B. Wall94 reasoned that “if school funds came into the treasury we’d be ordered to 
integrate.” The supervisors further justified their decision by asserting that the county was 
under no constitutional obligation – neither by the federal or state government – to operate 
a public school system.95 Section 129 of the Virginia State Constitution required the 
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 General Assembly to “establish and maintain an efficient system of public free schools 
throughout the State.” The supervisors’ action placed the state between the county and 
federal courts, raising a federal-state constitutional issue: did the federal judiciary have the 
authority to compel a local elective body to operate public schools? 
  
The closing of schools posed different economic consequences for Prince Edward 
County than the other locales. “Norfolk,” wrote J. Harvie Wilkinson III, “was hardest hit 
by massive resistance.” Governor Almond’s decision to close Norfolk’s schools had 
tremendous economic repercussions. Norfolk’s ports, manufacturing capacity, tourism 
appeal, and downtown redevelopment invited new industry. That 2,500-3,000 of 10,000 
students were without school was detrimental to industrial growth. Virginia business 
leaders quietly pressured Governor Almond to abandon massive resistance. In Prince 
Edward County, the business leaders were not the bloc against the school closings, but its 
impetus. The members of the private school corporation’s executive committee were 
among the county’s business leaders. The existing industry did not require an educated 
workforce, and no new industry came to the county in the 1950s. “The great industries for 
one reason or another have found other sites for their operations,” reported J. Barrye Wall. 
“Prince Edward will remain essentially agricultural.” An uneducated, unorganized 
workforce equaled low wages and higher profits. The white community, explained Dr. 
Moss, “wanted that Negro population for the dirty work of raising tobacco on farms or 
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 laboring in the local tobacco processing plants. The housewives of the county wanted that 
Negro population for household servant work.”96 
 The lack of public schools created economic advantages for residents, businesses, 
and farmers. The county budget was reduced from $937,143 to $210,654, the property tax 
rate dropped from $3.40 to $1.60 per $100 of assessed value, and the levy on merchants’ 
capital decreased from $0.80 to $0.30. Without local funding, the county abrogated the 
responsibility of public education to the State. The county even expected the state to pay 
for the maintenance of the vacated public school buildings. E. Louis Dahl considered that 
any appropriation for the public school system would “serve to keep open the door through 
which the long arm of the Federal court may reach into our county and interfere with our 
educational system.” The county, therefore, could not “remain partly in the public school 
business and partly out of it.”97 
The county elections determined that the people were willing to follow the control 
group in the most extreme resistance to school desegregation. Four of the six supervisors – 
Vaughan, Gates, Jenkins, and Steck – faced opposition in the Democratic primary. The 
challengers offered no alternative to school closings – all of the candidates favored the 
fund cut off.  All of the incumbents defeated their opposition in the primary election and, 
after the formality of the general election, remained in power. In 1959, no viable pro-
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 public school candidate sought office, nor could one expect to gain a majority from that 
electorate. The county board of supervisors remained a safe place for segregationists.98 
 The white community showed its support for the private school system by engaging 
in a formidable task. With only $11,000 collected, no teachers, no school buildings, and no 
educational materials, preparations for the school openings in September required a 
community effort. Scores of volunteers adapted churches and community buildings into 
useable classroom space, registered children for school, constructed a football field, and 
collected educational and non-educational material needed for the operation of classes. On 
September 14, 1959, nearly 1,500 white students attended classes taught by the former 
public school teachers at sixteen makeshift locations. Governor Almond sanctioned the 
private school as legal “under the program adopted by the General Assembly of 
Virginia.”99 
 With the private schools in operation, the segregationists moved to the next phase 
of their plan: the acquisition of the public school buildings and state tuition grants. 
However, the county’s failure to provide education for the 1,700 African American 
children proved to be an albatross around the neck of the Prince Edward School 
Foundation. The Perrow Commission outlined the freedom of choice plan, but for the 
county’s African Americans, there were no choices, thus creating an obstacle for 
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 Foundation students to receive the state tuition grants, and limiting the probability of 
sustaining a segregated private school system in a poor rural community. Therefore, in 
December 1959, without consulting the county’s African American leadership, the 
segregationist leaders announced plans to operate Southside Schools, Inc., a private school 
for black children, which would be funded by private donations and state tuition grants. 
The segregationists rejected tuition grants for the Foundation for fear of damaging their 
legal case, but if African Americans accepted the tuition grants, the white community 
would stand on stronger footing in accepting state assistance. However, considering the 
Foundation found difficulty in meeting its own expenses and African Americans earned 
meager incomes, it did not appear feasible to adequately fund and operate a second private 
school. The NAACP actively discouraged black parents from registering their children in 
this program. “How can segregated private schools meet the need when segregated public 
schools were not satisfactory?” asked Rev. L. Francis Griffin, leader of the county’s 
African American community. With only one application on file, African Americans 
unmistakably rejected the program. Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss considered Southside Schools 
nothing more than a “paper proposition,” a scheme to acquire the public school buildings. 
“If the Negroes had accepted the offer,” argued Dr. Moss, “and had then asked for the use 
of the Negro schools for these private schools, the white children and the white population 
could have done the same.”  The rejection of Southside Schools necessitated other means 
to obtain the school buildings and funding.100 
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  In January 1960, the Foundation announced its interest in purchasing Farmville 
High School (a white high school) as surplus property. Although the public sentiment 
appeared to favor the sale, the school board refused to accept the responsibility of releasing 
the property. The special session of the General Assembly required ten percent of qualified 
voters to sign a petition before a school sale could go before the public as a referendum. 
The Foundation promptly and publicly withdrew their interest in purchasing Farmville 
High School for fear of disrupting the perception of white unanimity by putting the school 
issue before a secret ballot. Privately, the Foundation pressured the school board to sell the 
property, resulting in five of the six school board members’ resignations. Nonetheless, the 
Foundation abandoned its quest for the public school buildings and organized a fund drive 
to construct new buildings.101 
  
The Perrow Plan proved inadequate for the unique circumstances of Prince Edward 
County. The General Assembly, J. Barrye Wall implored Delegate John H. Daniel, needed 
to enact “some additional legislation to provide maneuvering space for those counties with 
the great problem of immediate integration,” because, as J. Segar Gravatt,102 counsel to the 
board of supervisors, explained, “any private school sustained principally by tuition grants 
money is going to be held a public school.” Prince Edward County requested and the 
General Assembly passed legislation that permitted individuals to make a voluntary tax-
exempt contribution – not to exceed 25% of their property tax – to a private non-sectarian 
school. In other words, a Prince Edward resident with a property tax bill of $100 could pay 
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 $75 to the county and make a $25 tax-exempt contribution to the Foundation. The board of 
supervisors increased the property tax rate from $1.60 to $4.00 per $100 of assessed value, 
raising an additional $270,000 for educational purposes. Therefore, each white student 
received a $100 local scholarship. In addition, the county accepted state tuition grants for 
the 1960-61 school year – $125 for elementary students and $150 for high school students. 
With the Foundation’s tuition set at $245 and $265 respectively, the combined financial 
assistance left parents with an affordable tuition bill. During the 1960-61 school year, the 
state and county combined for 1,347 tuition grants, exceeding $336,000, but for the second 
straight year the board of supervisors unanimously declined to appropriate money to 
operate public schools. “Prince Edward County,” J. Barrye Wall delighted, “having 
abandoned public schools may look forward to supporting private schools through the Acts 
establishing private schools as a State policy.”103 
 
WE NEED HELP 
 
 “Some of us,” declared Rev. L. Francis Griffin, “are determined to see democracy 
become an actuality in Prince Edward County…regardless of the attitude of diehard 
segregationists.” In their pursuit of democracy, the county’s African Americans found no 
solace with the board of supervisors, the General Assembly, the Governor’s office, or 
Virginia’s congressional delegation. Furthermore, suffrage laws restricted African 
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 Americans’ opportunity to alter the existing political climate. Locally, African American 
dependence on white businessmen for employment stifled dissent for fear of economic 
repercussions. In Prince Edward County, the segregationists held the cards. In seeking a 
positive resolution to the school crisis, the county’s African Americans had little more than 
their faith.104 
 Rev. L. Francis Griffin viewed the school crisis as a religious and moral issue as 
well as a legal battle. Rev. Griffin considered segregation in direct conflict with his 
Christian faith, and he believed that “all forms of worship should be related to a form of 
action.” With the First Baptist Church as the nerve center, the “Fighting Preacher” led the 
county’s African American community throughout the school crisis in search of a 
“Christian-Democratic” solution. However, many of the county’s other houses of worship 
did not share Griffin’s conviction. All of the white churches and some of the black 
churches “failed to raise their voices against this social evil.” The white ministers failed to 
recognize the school closings as a moral issue. “I do not know of any white minister 
anywhere in the town or county,” observed Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss, “who…has ever been 
brave enough to accept” the school closings as a moral issue. Supporting the Foundation 
became a “Christian Duty,” evident in the conversion of church buildings into makeshift 
                                                                                                                                                    
103 J. Barrye Wall to John H. Daniel, January 28, 1960, Box 22, John H. Daniel Papers (UVA); FH, March 8, 
1960, 1; May 3, 1960, 4A; July 19, 1960, 1; J. Barrye Wall to Watkins M. Abbitt, January 19, 1960, Box 2, 
Watkins M. Abbitt Papers (UR); SSN, June 1960, 12; March 1961, 1. 
 
104 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Conference Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights: 
Third Annual Conference on Problems of Schools in Transition From the Educator’s Viewpoint 
(Washington, DC, 1961), 103 – in future citations this will be referred to as the “Williamsburg Conference”; 
Interview, Everett Berryman, Jr. by Brian E. Lee, December 31, 2008. 
 51
 classroom space. In terms of social responsibility, the county’s churches, Griffin 
bemoaned, were “reduced to Sunday social clubs.”105 
School teachers and college professors joined the clergy in the abrogation of their 
moral responsibility. As a group, Virginia’s teachers remained apathetic to the school 
closings. The Virginia Education Association, an all-white teachers’ organization, failed to 
publish a single article favoring school integration in their journal. Locally, the white 
teachers who opposed the school closings maintained their silence. “I don’t see what other 
step [the board of supervisors] can take,” stated one teacher in support of the school 
closings. Similarly, college professors who favored integration were passive in the 1950s. 
At Longwood College, a survey showed that one-third of the faculty supported 
segregation, one-third opposed the school closings, and one-third favored integration but 
were afraid to express their opinions. A sympathetic Longwood professor privately 
lamented that “the time is not yet ripe for the organization of open opposition.” As Rev. L. 
Francis Griffin asserted, “The responsible and intelligent leadership of the county, by 
inaction and failure to face realities capitulated their leadership to unreasonable racists.”106 
The “unreasonable racists” assured that the moderate voices were silenced. A group 
of white moderates – called the “Bush League” by the local segregationists – secretly 
organized to plot a strategy to re-open the public schools. In June 1960, as the Bush 
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 Leaguers exited, in what became their final meeting, the “private school fanatics,” in an act 
of intimidation, shined lights onto the faces of public school sympathizers and recorded 
their names. The names were distributed around the community and the people on the list 
were labeled “integrationists,” characterized as traitors, and “suffered abuse and reprisals 
of various kinds.” Lester E. Andrews, 107 a Bush Leaguer, curbed his public dissent after 
his business – the Farmville Manufacturing Company, employees, wife, and children all 
became targets for reprisals by the control group. Andrews served as chairman of the 
school board until he and four others resigned in April 1960 rather than face continued 
pressure to sell school property to the Foundation. “That crowd,” – the private school 
supporters, explained B. Calvin Bass,108 “intimidated the whole community.” The 
intimidation forced the “only significant movement of dissent” to disband.109 
 White dissent became a virtual one man crusade. Dr. Moss considered public 
education necessary for all Americans and believed that the school closings violated 
democratic and Christian principles. Dr. Moss regularly opposed the school closings in 
public meetings, in letters to the editor of The Farmville Herald, and in speaking 
engagements around the state. For his actions, Dr. Moss paid the social consequences. “I 
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 have been snubbed on Main Street by virtually lifetime friends,” lamented Dr. Moss. “I sit 
in the pew by myself in church every Sunday. I am not allowed to serve on the vestry, 
although my work as treasurer of the church is quite willingly accepted.” In addition, Dr. 
Moss’ position on the school closings threatened him professionally. “Within a matter of 
days after my first public speech for public schools,” Dr. Moss reflected, “a delegation was 
in the office of the president of Longwood College demanding that I be fired.” The 
treatment of Dr. Moss served as an example to all who considered challenging the 
decisions of the power structure.110  
 Congressman Watkins M. Abbitt used his influence to stifle any “troublemaking” 
that the local power structure could not control. When local pressures failed to dissuade Dr. 
Moss to cease his public dissent, Abbitt petitioned the State Superintendent of Instruction 
to terminate the professor. “It is shocking to me,” opined Abbitt, “that a State Department 
would keep State personnel in a community whose sentiments do not coincide with local 
sentiment.” Similarly, Abbitt used his Washington connections to investigate the activities 
of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), which had established a presence in 
Farmville to find a resolution to the school crisis. J. Barrye Wall believed the AFSC was 
“upstirring the Negroes,” which contributed to the county “being infiltrated from within.” 
Abbitt requested the House Un-American Activities Committee investigate the AFSC and 
its associates for any subversive activities. Dr. Moss continued his employment at 
Longwood College under close scrutiny and the House committee found no history of 
subversive activities from the AFSC. The Prince Edward County school crisis, Rev. L. 
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 Francis Griffin reported to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “is a story of hatred, 
reprisals, harassments in which the principal characters are determined that stubborn wills 
are far more important than our inherited democratic way of life, and the preservation of a 
free public school system.”111 
 In the absence of a free public school system, the Prince Edward County Christian 
Association (PECCA) formed to “meet an unprecedented crisis.” PECCA’s immediate 
objective was the placement of locked out upperclassmen into accredited schools, so these 
students could complete their education. Next, PECCA established training centers within 
the community, not as a permanent replacement of public education or as a private school, 
but, as Rev. L. Francis Griffin explained, to “maintain high morale among the youth.” The 
black leadership constantly struggled to maintain the balance between assisting the school-
less children and not damaging their legal case. The official NAACP policy was “not to 
encourage the setting up of separate makeshift schools for colored children displaced 
through school closings.” Therefore, Rev. Griffin remained sensitive to accusations that 
the training centers were schools. The training centers were not schools, Griffin explained, 
“because we have inadequate facilities, lack necessary equipment such as libraries and 
laboratories, lack qualified teachers and do not follow a set curriculum.” The training 
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 centers were designed as a bridge until the federal courts ordered the public schools re-
opened.112 
 On April 22, 1960, the Federal District Court stipulated that Prince Edward County 
must conform with the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ May 5, 1959 ruling – that the 
school board begin admitting African American students to the white public schools. Since 
the county abandoned public schools, the court order had “no practical effect.”113 Without 
the Executive Branch enforcing the federal court orders, the county’s segregationists had 
the advantage of waging an unobstructed battle of attrition.  
In an open letter to the presidential candidates – Richard M. Nixon and John F. 
Kennedy, Rev. L. Francis Griffin insisted that Prince Edward County “defied the courts, 
and violated every principle of democracy,” and presented the case that “strong federal 
intervention is needed to save us from ourselves and guarantee our children a fair chance in 
an everchanging world.” During his presidency, Dwight D. Eisenhower never publicly 
endorsed the Brown decision, nor employed the moral authority of his office, nor took 
executive action on behalf of the school-less children of Prince Edward County. Rev. 
Griffin asked the presidential candidates: “If you are elected President will you use the 
powers of this great office to correct this evil that is negatively affecting the lives of 
approximately 1,400 white children and 1,700 Negro children?”114 
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  Senator Kennedy campaigned on the “Rights of Man” – the Democratic Party 
platform, which included the strongest civil rights plank ever adopted by a major political 
party. The platform promised all Americans equal access to the polls, employment, 
housing, public facilities, and education. “A new Democratic Administration,” the 
platform read, “will use its full powers – legal and moral – to ensure the beginning of 
good-faith compliance with the Constitutional requirement that racial discrimination be 
ended in public education.” The platform called for all school districts affected by the 
Brown decision to submit plans for first-step compliance by 1963. The Democrats pledged 
to provide technical and financial assistance to schools facing challenges in the transition 
to desegregated education. Finally, the Democrats sought to empower the Attorney 
General with the authority to file suits in federal court to “prevent the denial of any civil 
right on grounds of race, creed, or color.”115  
 J. Barrye Wall was convinced that Kennedy would “translate into being the 
national Democratic platform, with which we are in total disagreement.” At the core of his 
opposition was the proposal to empower the Attorney General with the authority to initiate 
civil rights litigation. “The new Attorney General backed by a strong and imaginative 
president,” warned Wall, “would invoke all of the powers of the present laws and seek new 
powers if necessary.” In the absence of an affirmative federal court order to reopen the 
public schools, an active Department of Justice remained the segregationists’ foremost 
threat. “In our opinion,” predicted Wall, “Mr. Kennedy will further debase the Constitution 
                                                 
115 Time, July 25, 1960. 
 57
 in favor of his principle of desegregation.” For these reasons, “we find ourselves unable to 
vote for the national Democratic party candidates.”116  
 J. Barrye Wall publicly and vehemently opposed the Kennedy-Johnson ticket, 
while Harry Byrd maintained his “golden silence.” The conservative Virginia State 
Democratic Party often found itself in conflict with the National Democrats. In the 
previous two election cycles, the Republican candidate, fueled by Byrd’s non-endorsement 
of the Democratic candidate, carried Virginia. Fearing Kennedy would implement and 
exceed the party’s civil rights plank, Byrd not only refrained from endorsing a candidate – 
tantamount to an endorsement of Nixon, but maneuvered behind-the-scenes to defeat the 
Kennedy-Johnson ticket. In a close contest, Kennedy lost Virginia by 42,194 to Vice-
President Nixon. “Had Senator Byrd come out for him,” reflected Governor Almond, a 
Kennedy supporter, “Senator Kennedy would have carried Virginia. I think that was the 
difference.”117 
 John F. Kennedy won the general election by the narrowest popular margin in the 
twentieth century – 118,550 votes, but won a deceivingly comfortable victory in the 
Electoral College – 303 to 219.118 African Americans attributed Kennedy’s slim victory to 
their support. Pollsters estimated that seven out of ten black voters pulled the lever for 
Kennedy – a gain of seven percentage points from the Democratic candidate in 1956. “If 
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 any group had reason to expect remembrance of past promises once Kennedy was in the 
White House, it was the Negroes and their allies in the cause of equal civil rights,” 
observed one journalist. “The Negro vote elected Kennedy and we must not hesitate to 
remind him of that,” declared Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., president of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).119 
 
Table 2. 1960 Presidential Election Results, Prince Edward County, Virginia 
 
Precinct Nixon Kennedy Coiner Hass
Farmville Corp. 767 360 11 0
Farmville District 284 190 3 0
Rice 116 187 3 1
Prospect 161 197 5 0
Worsham 209 257 2 1
Green Bay 73 132 3 1
Darlington Heights 111 136 4 0
Totals 1,721 1,459 31 3
 
Source: The Farmville Herald, November 11, 1960, 8A. 
 
 The Virginia Christian Leadership Conference (VCLC), an affiliate of SCLC, 
formed after the election, and quickly began lobbying the President-elect for assistance in 
Prince Edward County. In a letter to the incoming administration, Dr. Milton A. Reid,120 
VCLC president, declared the Prince Edward County school closings “our nation’s biggest 
shame.” Despite the NAACP’s legal battle and PECCA’s interim program, the Eisenhower 
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 Administration seemed “not to have taken any note that this is the only school district in 
America without public education.”  Dr. Reid explained that African Americans were 
“trying to get those schools open,” but he pleaded that “WE NEED HELP.” VCLC invited 
a representative from the incoming Kennedy Administration to the “Pilgrimage for Free 
Public School Education.”121 
 On January 2, 1961, over 1,000 pilgrims assembled at the First Baptist Church in 
Farmville. The purpose of the mass meeting was to focus national attention on the Prince 
Edward County school crisis, to awaken the consciousness of citizens in the county and 
state, and lend financial assistance to the training centers. Although no representatives of 
the Kennedy Administration attended the pilgrimage, the speakers directed their comments 
to the President-elect. “We must let Mr. Kennedy know we want more out of him than we 
got out of President Eisenhower,” declared Rev. Ralph Abernathy.122 “We trust that under 
the New Administration in Washington,” remarked Dr. Milton A. Reid, “that when the 
country decides to move ahead, it will move at least 200 miles and pass through Prince 
Edward County.” Finally, Dr. Reid reminded the assemblage of their voting power and 
Kennedy’s debt to African Americans. “If the Negro can determine the election of one, 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy to the Presidency of the nation,” declared Dr. Reid, “the same 
vote, can determine the ‘Byrds’ in Washington, the ‘Almonds’ in Richmond, the 
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 ‘Vaughans,’ the ‘Dillons,’ the ‘Picketts,’ the ‘Jenkins,’ the ‘Gates,’ and the ‘Stecks’ of 
Prince Edward County.”123 
 
* * * * * 
 
 One week before the inauguration, the NAACP filed a supplemental complaint in 
Federal District Court challenging the use of state and local funds and tax deductible 
contributions to the Prince Edward School Foundation in the absence of formal schools for 
African Americans. “The NAACP has pulled out all the stops,” J. Barrye Wall fretted.  “I 
believe we can whip them provided we get into this fight to win.” Two years after the 
retreat from massive resistance, Wall remained apprehensive of the Almond 
Administration’s commitment to Prince Edward County’s cause. “I fear that the state is 
going to leave us on the limb.”124  
 Throughout the school crisis, the state proved an indispensable ally to the Prince 
Edward County segregationists. From the beginning, the Attorney General’s office 
supplied legal assistance. The General Assembly passed laws commensurate with the 
evolving federal court orders, essentially changing the rules in the middle of the game. As 
the state leaders employed the state’s powers to assist the county’s segregationists, Senator 
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 Harry Byrd and Congressman Watkins Abbitt utilized their connections in Washington to 
support the Prince Edward School Foundation. Without the support of the Byrd 
Organization, Prince Edward County’s resistance to the Brown decision would have 
faltered. John F. Kennedy’s campaign pledges, which J. Barrye Wall expected to be 
implemented, posed new challenges, requiring the state’s cooperation more than ever.  
 The election of John F. Kennedy ushered in “a dynamic change to [Prince Edward 
County], especially in the black community,” reflected Everett Berryman, Jr., a locked out 
student. Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric and pledges showed promise of a new day in the 
county. The county’s segregationists controlled the social, political, and economic 
instruments and maintained intimate relationships with State policy makers, who thwarted 
every victory achieved by the African American litigants. Time and again, the NAACP 
received favorable federal court rulings, which failed to be enforced by the Executive 
Branch. “I think the failure of [Eisenhower] to indicate his endorsement of the Supreme 
Court decisions has cost us heavily,” declared Kennedy on the campaign trail. “I hope the 
next President states that he stands for equal rights, that he stands for a fair chance for all 
Americans to have a decent education.”125 The question remained: would the Kennedy 
Administration translate the campaign promises into executive action? 
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CHAPTER 2: Executive Action 
 
 
“It is my position that all students should be given the opportunity to attend 
public school regardless of their race, and that is in accordance with the 
Constitution.”  
 
- President John F. Kennedy126 
 
 
 
 In the opening months of his administration, John F. Kennedy faced an array of 
international challenges – communist advances in Southeast Asia, the Bay of Pigs 
invasion, the space race, the Vienna summit, the Berlin crisis, and the Soviet Union’s 
resumption of nuclear testing. “These eight months,” reflected Theodore C. Sorensen,127 a 
Kennedy advisor, “were the darkest period for the President personally and for 
freedom.”128 During that same eight-month period, as the world moved nearer to the “hour 
of maximum danger,” the country moved nearer to the eighth new school year since the 
Brown decision. When the torch was passed to Kennedy, only six percent of southern 
 
126 President Kennedy stated these remarks in response to a reporter’s question at his February 8, 1961 press 
conference. Public Papers of the President: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, D.C., 1962), 69. 
 
127 Theodore C. Sorensen (b. 1928) served as Special Counsel to President Kennedy. 
 
128 Sorensen, Kennedy, 292-293. 
 
 African American children attended school with white children, and four states – Alabama, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina – had failed to integrate a single school.129 As 
the communists measured President Kennedy’s commitment to preserving democracy, 
segregationists measured his commitment to enforcing the Brown decision. 
 The Executive Branch’s power to enforce the Brown decision remained in dispute. 
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 explicitly permitted the Attorney General to 
intervene in voting rights cases. However, Congress failed to pass Title III, which would 
have given the Attorney General explicit authority to initiate school desegregation suits. 
Eisenhower’s Department of Justice entered school desegregation cases as a “friend of the 
court” only upon the invitation from a federal judge. Without legislation or an invitation 
from the court, the implementation of the Brown decision depended on black parents’ 
willingness to file suits school district-by-school district.130  
The Democratic Party platform supported empowering the Attorney General with 
the authority to initiate school desegregation suits. However, the congressional elections 
strengthened the conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats (59 in the 
Senate and 285 in the House), dampening prospects for passing meaningful civil rights 
legislation in 1961. The introduction of civil rights legislation threatened to alienate 
southern congressmen, who, through seniority, dominated committee chairmanships (10 of 
                                                 
129 SSN, December 1960, 1; The United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1961 United States Commission 
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 16 in the Senate and 12 of 20 in the House). The conservative coalition, if goaded, could 
have jeopardized Kennedy’s domestic program – federal assistance to public schools, 
Medicare, housing legislation, aid to depressed areas, and increased minimum wage, which 
favored African Americans.131 
 In light of this political situation, Harris Wofford,132 a civil rights adviser, 
recommended “a minimum of civil rights legislation and maximum of executive action.” 
Wofford considered additional legislation unnecessary because “existing constitutional 
powers,” which the Eisenhower Administration failed to employ, were ample. Wofford 
proposed that Kennedy test his executive power by authorizing the Attorney General to 
bring “some well-chosen suits and to intervene in many others.”133 After ten years in 
federal courts, two years without public schools, and unsympathetic state and local 
governments, Prince Edward County’s African Americans needed executive action. 
 
Moral Authority 
 
 “The situation in Prince Edward County,” Wofford advised Kennedy, “must soon 
be met – at least if other districts make that same unhappy choice.” The administration 
                                                 
131 Helen Fuller, Year of Trial: Kennedy’s Crucial Decisions (New York, 1962), 70-118; James N. Giglio, 
The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, Kansas, 1991), 37, 97-121; Sorensen, Kennedy, 473-476; 
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132 Harris Wofford (b. 1926) advised Kennedy on civil rights during the presidential campaign and then 
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133 Harris Wofford to John F. Kennedy, December 30, 1960, Box 1071, John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential 
Papers (JFKL). 
 66
 identified New Orleans and Atlanta as the two key school districts that faced the choice 
between compliance and resistance. In the previous fall, New Orleans chose resistance and 
remained a crisis center. Atlanta faced court orders to desegregate by September 1961, but 
the violent response to the integration of the University of Georgia in January presented a 
bad omen, marking Atlanta as the “next storm center of school desegregation.” In 1960, 
Roy R. Pearson,134 administrator of the Prince Edward School Foundation, made a 
“whirlwind visit” to Atlanta and New Orleans, accepting speaking engagements to discuss 
the process of organizing private schools.135 The exportation of Prince Edward County’s 
school philosophy threatened the future of public schools across the South. 
 The Kennedy Administration’s response to the Prince Edward County school 
situation was fixed to the outcome of an acute school desegregation crisis in Louisiana. 
“Effective action in New Orleans,” Wofford believed, “will help prevent a repetition in 
Atlanta next September.”136 If the public school levy broke in New Orleans, Prince 
Edward County styled private schools could have flooded the South. In New Orleans, the 
administration tested the implementation of executive action and established the federal 
government’s school desegregation policy.  
                                                 
 
134 Roy R. Pearson served as the first administrator of the Prince Edward School Foundation. Pearson created 
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135 Harris Wofford to John F. Kennedy, December 30, 1960, Box 1071, John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential 
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136 Harris Wofford to John F. Kennedy, December 30, 1960, Box 1071, John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential 
Papers (JFKL). 
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  In New Orleans, the new administration inherited the most volatile school 
desegregation crisis since Little Rock. In May 1960, frustrated by desegregation’s glacial 
pace and the school board’s lethargy, Judge J. Skelly Wright,137 in an unprecedented act, 
drafted a desegregation plan. Judge Wright ordered Orleans Parish to desegregate a grade-
a-year beginning with the first grade in September 1960. The Louisiana State Legislature 
responded with a flurry of bills to sustain segregation, including empowering Governor 
Jimmie Davis138 with the authority to close all of Louisiana’s public schools if any one 
school was desegregated. Under his own authority, Davis superseded the popularly elected 
school board and placed the school district under his “control, management, and 
administration.” On August 27, the federal court found the actions of the state legislature 
and governor unconstitutional and ordered the school board to make preparations for 
desegregating the first grade by November 14.  
 Despite the federal court’s ruling, Louisiana’s state officials continued to frustrate 
court orders. On November 4, the state legislature convened a special session to obstruct 
the federal court orders, passing twenty-nine bills, including an interposition statute 
permitting the state to nullify any unwarranted federal intervention in Louisiana’s public 
schools. On November 10, Judge Wright responded with a restraining order against state 
interference with the desegregation of New Orleans’ public schools. Notwithstanding, the 
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 State Superintendent of Education, Shelby Jackson,139 declared November 14 a state 
holiday, but Judge Wright overturned the attempted delaying tactic. Judge Wright met 
every attempt by Louisiana to “legislate and litigate.” 
 On November 14, the “desegregation” of two formerly all-white elementary 
schools by four African American girls triggered a crisis. The four girls were greeted daily 
by jeering “cheerleaders” shouting obscenities and threats. A near total white boycott of 
the two elementary schools resulted, enforced by social, economic, and physical 
intimidation. The evening after “D-Day” the White Citizens’ Council held a rally, arousing 
emotions and inciting two thousand teenagers to action. The following morning, the 
teenagers stormed the business district, victimizing African American bystanders, severely 
beating two, and injuring several others. Mounted police averted a mass riot. 
 In the late fall and winter, Governor Davis called the Louisiana State Legislature 
into special sessions to frustrate federal court orders. The legislature met compliance to 
court orders with reprisals, including: the stripping of the school board’s power – seven 
times, firing the superintendent and school board attorney, and withholding the salaries of 
the employees at the two desegregated schools. In an act reminiscent of Virginia’s post-
massive resistance legislation, Governor Davis approved preparations for a private school 
system funded by public tuition grants.140 
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  On November 25, 1960 – nine days after the near riot, Eisenhower’s Department of 
Justice accepted Judge Wright’s invitation to enter the New Orleans litigation as amicus 
curiae – literally “friend of the court” – to enforce the court’s orders. In the summer, Judge 
Wright had invited the Eisenhower Administration to enter the case, but they declined for 
fear of damaging Republican fortunes in the November elections. “I knew that I was going 
to be alone, totally and absolutely alone,” reflected Judge Wright.141 
 Dwight D. Eisenhower never publicly endorsed the Brown decision during his 
presidency. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy criticized Eisenhower’s 
silence. “Unless the President speaks, then, of course, the country doesn’t speak….[T]he 
presidency is above all a place of moral leadership and I believe on this great moral issue 
he should speak out and give his views clearly.” Harris Wofford advised President-elect 
Kennedy to employ the moral authority of the presidency in New Orleans. “Supporters of 
the school system [in New Orleans] say that Presidential support of the school board is 
desperately needed.”142 
 Accordingly, President Kennedy addressed the New Orleans school crisis at his 
February 8, 1961 press conference. “At such time as I think it most useful and most 
effective,” Kennedy pledged, “I will attempt to use the moral authority or position of 
influence of the Presidency in New Orleans and in other places.” Departing from 
precedent, Kennedy issued a presidential endorsement of Brown: “On the general question, 
                                                 
141 “Order Designating United States of America as Amicus Curiae,” November 25, 1960, U.S. District Court 
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 there is no doubt in my view: students should be permitted to attend schools in accordance 
with court decisions.” Furthermore, the federal government’s assistance in implementing 
the court orders, assured Kennedy, was a “matter which we are carefully considering.”143 
 The Department of Justice explored the prospects of Louisiana voluntarily 
complying with the court orders. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and his 
unconfirmed nominee for Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Burke 
Marshall,144 negotiated with state and local leaders, including Shelby Jackson. Jackson 
froze $350,000 appropriated for the salaries of the employees of the two desegregated 
schools. Marshall threatened litigation, but Jackson remained obstinate. The Department of 
Justice “couldn’t back down,” therefore, the Attorney General authorized Marshall to do 
“whatever is necessary.” On February 16, the Department of Justice expanded the previous 
administration’s original contempt suit by filing charges against Shelby Jackson for his 
“open and flagrant” effort to interfere with court orders. The difference this time, opined 
The Washington Post, was the “full support of the White House.”145 
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  The Kennedy Administration quickly and decisively employed the moral force of 
the presidency and executive action, thus signaling a new direction in civil rights policy 
and establishing the administration’s school desegregation policy – the Department of 
Justice explained the violation of the law to the local people, permitted time for voluntary 
compliance, and, if necessary, filed suit. “We will not stand for defiance of federal court 
orders whether by a mob or by a reluctant official,” explained Robert Kennedy. “On the 
other hand we will make every effort to work with people of good will and integrity in the 
South.” The administration’s activities aroused interest beyond New Orleans. “The 
Kennedy move,” observed the Southern School News, “was seen as a means of showing 
that the federal government means business with regard to its position that state officials 
shall do nothing which could restrict operation of public schools.”146 
 Despite the Kennedy Administration’s vigor, Louisiana continued its defiance. The 
following day the Louisiana House of Representatives approved a bill authorizing school 
boards to hold referenda to decide whether schools should desegregate or close. Also, the 
House approved a bill to empower Governor Davis to pack the East Baton Rouge school 
board with four segregationists to delay court orders. In response, the Department of 
Justice filed a motion to enter the Louisiana cases to “assist the court in preventing 
potentially dangerous and critical situations from coming to a head.”147 
 The Department of Justice’s motion sought to broaden the power of amicus curiae. 
Initially, federal courts, if deemed necessary, invited the Department of Justice to enter 
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 school desegregation cases as an adviser. As a result of Brewer v. Hoxie, Kasper v. 
Brittain, Aaron v. Cooper, and United States v. Faubus, the Department of Justice’s 
amicus role expanded to protect officials performing federal duties, federal court orders, 
and the administration of justice. Since Robert F. Kennedy asked to intervene rather than 
wait for the court’s invitation, an affirmative decision in the Louisiana cases would further 
expand the role of the Department of Justice, hastening the process of desegregation.148 
 
A National Problem 
 
On February 25-26, 1961, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights held a conference 
in Williamsburg, Virginia, to study the problems public schools faced in desegregating.149 
Among the participants were representatives from the Prince Edward County school board, 
the Prince Edward School Foundation, the Department of Justice, and the White House. 
The conference presented an opportunity for direct debate between officials from Prince 
Edward County and the Kennedy Administration.  
President Kennedy, employing the moral authority of the presidency, sent a 
message of support to open the conference: “Our public school system must be preserved 
and improved. Our very survival as a free nation depends upon it. This is no time for 
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 schools to close for any reason, and certainly no time for schools to close in the name of 
racial discrimination.”150 Speaking for the commission, Father Theodore M. Hesburgh151 
echoed the President’s message in his opening statement: “The Commission believes the 
abandonment of free public education to avoid desegregation poses a grave threat to the 
Nation and should be squarely faced as a national problem.”152 
 Throughout the conference, the representatives of the Prince Edward County school 
board exhibited their opposition to Father Hesburgh’s assertion. Dr. W. Edward Smith,153 
school board chairman, and Collins Denny, Jr.,154 counsel, declared private education a 
viable substitute for public education. Dr. Smith praised the white community for 
establishing the private school system, for which the children responded “wonderfully,” 
but scorned the black leadership, primarily the NAACP, for failing to provide private 
education for their children.155 
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 Frank D. Reeves156 represented the White House at the conference. Reeves, an 
African American and former NAACP attorney, had worked on several civil rights cases, 
including the Prince Edward County litigation.157 Familiar with the case, Reeves opened a 
debate with the Prince Edward delegation: “Do you concede that the Negro 
residents…may have a preference for public as against private education; and,” Reeves 
continued, “if they do, what has the school board, in its public responsibility, done to 
afford them a public education?” 
 “The school board of Prince Edward County has done everything that the school 
board of Prince Edward County is permitted to do,” replied Collins Denny. 
 “As attorney for the school board,” Reeves retorted, “have you given consideration 
to the possibility of the school board…joining the litigation…to force the board of 
supervisors to provide funds for the operation of public schools?”158 
 In his professional and private dealings, Collins Denny exhibited his abhorrence for 
desegregated public schools. As a founding member and counsel of the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, Denny contributed to the formulation of the 
organization’s plan to obstruct school desegregation and replace schools threatened by 
court orders with a segregated private system financed through public tuition grants. The 
school board, Dr. W. Edward Smith privately admitted, “acted only on the advice of its 
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 attorney.” Denny declared to the assemblage that “we are not going to educate them in 
desegregated schools.”159 
 In their statements and associations, the public school representatives bolstered 
segregated private education, fueling suspicion of collusion with the Prince Edward School 
Foundation, whose board of directors had a large Defenders membership, to circumvent 
court orders. “The [Prince Edward School] Foundation was not formed as a means to 
circumvent any court decisions or, as we have been otherwise accused of, to break down 
public schools,” answered B. Blanton Hanbury, PESF president. However, the PESF 
announced the operation of their school within weeks of the federal court order to 
desegregate the public schools, followed by the property tax credit, and public tuition 
grants. Father Hesburgh cut to the heart of the matter: “So equivalently, the money that is 
given…in tuition through the state actually pays for the operation of these private schools; 
therefore, in a sense they are private in quotation marks.”160 
 The Kennedy Administration’s participation at the conference put the federal 
government’s support of the school-less children on the record. Frank Reeves stated for the 
record the administration’s belief that “Prince Edward County is an outstanding example 
of the impossibility – of providing education for all of our children on a private schools 
basis.”161 Also, the Prince Edward County delegation exhibited their recalcitrance and 
confirmed the desperate situation for the community’s African American children. 
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  On February 28, 1961, Burke Marshall recommended that the Attorney General 
intervene in the Prince Edward case. “If the Department is going into any other school 
suits,” Marshall advised, “it would be more appropriate to go into this one.” However, in 
the absence of legislation, the Department of Justice lacked clear authority to enter school 
desegregation cases on its own initiative. Without an invitation from the court, the 
Attorney General needed an alternative strategy to intervene in Prince Edward County. 
Burke Marshall, “the architect of the government’s civil rights policy,” sketched a course 
to federal intervention – judicial precedent. An affirmative decision in the Department of 
Justice’s pending intervention motion in Louisiana, Marshall believed, could establish the 
precedent to enter the Prince Edward County litigation. Therefore, Judge J. Skelly 
Wright’s imminent ruling in the Louisiana cases would determine the Department of 
Justice’s action in Prince Edward County.162  
 
Sit-in On Congress 
 
 While the Department of Justice waited for the federal court’s decision in 
Louisiana, the Virginia Christian Leadership Conference (VCLC) continued planning a 
direct-action campaign to “focus national and international attention” on Prince Edward 
County. Dr. Milton A. Reid proposed busing five hundred parents and children of Prince 
Edward County to Washington, D.C., to stage a sit-in at the Capitol, seeking action from 
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 all three branches of government: legislation to prevent school closings and a bill to 
provide immediate relief to Prince Edward County, an executive order to re-open the 
schools, and an expedited, affirmative ruling from the courts. The pilgrims planned to 
stage a “Sit-in on Congress” until President Kennedy granted the protest leaders an 
audience.163 
 On March 6, 1961, Rev. Walter E. Fauntroy,164 a representative of the SCLC, 
presented the Sit-in on Congress proposal to Frank D. Reeves. Reeves considered it 
“impractical for [Kennedy] to see groups under pressure.” Furthermore, the President 
lacked the authority to issue an executive order to open the schools. Without such 
authority, and considering that matter was pending in court, a conference with the 
President offered “no value.” Reeves, however, assured Fauntroy that the Department of 
Justice was “studying [the] possibility of intervention in [the] pending litigation or any 
other possible action.” However, Reeves explained, without legislation the Department of 
Justice had “no legal basis…to initiate action.”165 
 Despite the rebuke from the White House, preparations continued for the sit-in 
campaign. VCLC collected money from national organizations, local churches, schools, 
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 and civic groups to defray the campaign’s cost – an estimated $4,000. Hundreds of letters 
circulated throughout Virginia promoting the event. Liaisons worked with congressmen on 
legislation. Transportation services and a facility for a mass meeting in Washington were 
reserved. By the end of March, $700 had been spent. In addition, petitions addressed to 
President Kennedy were circulated, which read: 
 
We, the undersigned citizens of the state of Virginia, representing a cross-
section of the clergy, parents, children, educators, lay and professional life, 
do hereby prayerfully petition that you as Chief Executive of our great 
nation, do forthwith exert the great moral influence of your office and the 
powers of the executive authority to initiate remedial action through the 
Judicial and Legislative branches of our government that the public 
education facilities of Prince Edward County, Virginia be restored. We ask 
that your action be of such a nature that it would be effective in any other 
school districts, similarly situated, in the face of a Federal Court order to 
desegregate under the Supreme Court Decision of 1954.166 
 
 On March 17, 1961, Judge J. Skelly Wright granted the Attorney General 
permission to enter the school desegregation cases in Louisiana, broadening the power of 
the Department of Justice. As planned, Burke Marshall obtained a judicial precedent, 
although non-binding in Virginia, to intervene in Prince Edward County. The 
administration never favored the proposed Sit-in on Congress, and the implementation of 
the campaign in conjunction with federal intervention could prove counterproductive. On 
March 21, Burke Marshall’s second assistant, St. John Barrett,167 conferred with Oliver W. 
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 Hill,168 chief counsel of Prince Edward County’s school-less children. The substance of the 
phone conversation is lost to history, but one can assume that, if the Prince Edward County 
situation was the topic, the Department of Justice discouraged the sit-in campaign from 
being implemented.169 
 The next day, Rev. L. Francis Griffin informed the executive director of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Rev. Wyatt Tee Walker,170 “that no 
cooperation from the litigants, the other out-of-school youth, the parents of those young 
persons, or from the recognized leadership of the County can be anticipated in any sit-in 
movement on Congress at this time.” In his letter, Griffin cited a long discussion with 
Oliver W. Hill, who considered the campaign “ill-advisable at this time” and discouraged 
the plaintiffs’ participation. “Our chances for getting justice in the courts,” Hill counseled, 
“is better now than it has ever been since the inception of the Case.”171  Without the 
participation of the school-less children, the sit-in campaign lost its viability. 
After securing commitments and spending money, Dr. Milton A. Reid found the 
belated cancellation “a most embarrassing situation.” Reid considered continuing the 
campaign without Rev. L. Francis Griffin’s blessing, but as Rev. Dan Bowers explained, 
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 “no one can go into Prince Edward and work unilaterally. Griffin cannot be bypassed.” 
Privately, Griffin admitted his apprehension in using the children in such a protest and 
questioned the expected results.172 In formulating his legal advice, it is unlikely that Oliver 
Hill remained ignorant of the direct-action campaign ten weeks into its planning, and that 
Rev. Griffin, despite his reservations, would suddenly withdraw his support without cause. 
Therefore, it is likely that the Department of Justice provided counsel with assurances of 
their impending intervention. 
 
More and More Into It 
 
 As established in the New Orleans school crisis, the Department of Justice 
permitted “officials involved” to “take steps to correct the situation.” As Attorney General 
of Virginia, Albertis S. Harrison, Jr.173 represented the state’s interests in the Prince 
Edward County case. During massive resistance, Harrison chartered a moderate course, 
recognizing the inevitability of integration. However, as a resident of Southside Virginia, 
Harrison publicly “opposed integration” for fear of being labeled a traitor to Virginia’s 
black belt, but he privately pledged to “soft-peddle it.” With great appeal to conservatives 
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 and moderates, Harrison, the Byrd Organization candidate, was the favorite to win the 
gubernatorial election in 1961.174  
 On March 23, 1961, upon the Attorney General’s request, Albertis Harrison met 
with Robert F. Kennedy and Burke Marshall for an unpublicized conference in 
Washington, D.C., to discuss the Prince Edward case. Kennedy threatened to intervene in 
the case if he determined that the defendants frustrated or obstructed court orders. Harrison 
denied any violation of the court’s orders and found “no occasion” for federal intervention. 
Additionally, Kennedy sought assurance that the schools would be re-opened, but Harrison 
offered no such pledge. The state had no authority, Harrison explained, to compel a 
locality to operate public schools. “Such a pledge,” Harrison deduced, “was apparently the 
only assurance which would have deterred [Kennedy] from an otherwise fixed intention to 
intervene in the suit.” Harrison advised the Prince Edward attorneys of the substance of the 
conference, but “it did not appear that any action on their part was indicated.”175 
 On April 11, 1961, while the Department of Justice gave “every consideration to 
the question whether any Federal action [was] proper and desirable,” the Prince Edward 
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 litigants presented arguments in Federal District Court. Judge Oren R. Lewis176 granted the 
NAACP’s motion to broaden its complaint to include the contention that the school closing 
frustrated a court order. In addition, Judge Lewis permitted the NAACP to challenge the 
use of public funds to operate the segregated private school, tax credits for contributions to 
the private school, and the release of public school property to a private corporation. Judge 
Lewis asked the litigants to present arguments on the supplemental motion on May 8, 
1961.177 
 Judge Lewis did not ask the Department of Justice to enter the case as amicus 
curiae as Judge Wright had in New Orleans. When the Department of Justice “acted 
without court orders,” explained Nicholas Katzenbach,178 an Assistant Attorney General, 
“it was often on thin ice, which is one of the reasons Burke [Marshall] so often tried to 
negotiate and compromise.” Marshall continued negotiations with Albertis Harrison to find 
a resolution to the Prince Edward County school crisis. After their phone conversation on 
April 19, 1961, proved fruitless, Marshall sent Harrison a copy of the opinion in the St. 
Helena Parish school case, which permitted federal intervention. “If this action of the court 
in Louisiana, and the obligations under which it places the Federal Government appears to 
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 you to be likely to change the situation in Prince Edward County,” wrote Marshall, “I 
would appreciate it if you would call me at your earliest convenience.”179  
 In a television interview on April 21, 1961, Robert Kennedy reiterated the 
administration’s policy. “Some progress and some attention has to be given by the citizens 
of the South so that they can progress themselves. If they are not going to take action, of 
course the federal government comes more and more into it.”180 
 
We Will Move 
 
 On May 6, 1961, Robert Kennedy traveled to the University of Georgia to deliver 
his maiden address as Attorney General. Kennedy was greeted by a warm spring morning 
and a freshly cleaned sidewalk. The previous evening, vandals painted “Kennedy go 
home” and “Yankee go home” on the pavement. Also cleansed from view were five 
ministers bearing placards which read: “The Bible teaches separation.” After learning in 
advance of a “civil rights bombshell” in the Attorney General’s prepared remarks, 
Georgia’s top politicians boycotted the event. In the past, politicians condemned 
segregation from afar, but never had such a high ranking federal official done so in the 
Deep South. The Attorney General could have selected a more favorable venue for the 
occasion, but to do so, Kennedy believed, would have been hypocritical.  
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  Kennedy’s hands trembled slightly, but his language was “firm” and his “voice was 
even firmer” as he silenced an audience of sixteen hundred law students, alumni, faculty, 
and dignitaries with his endorsement of the Brown decision. “I happened to believe that the 
1954 decision was right,” Kennedy stated. “But, my belief does not matter – it is the law.” 
From his unique position as the President’s brother and Attorney General, Robert Kennedy 
spoke with a shade of the President’s authority and the moral force of that office.  
 Kennedy questioned the morality of closing Prince Edward County’s public 
schools. “I cannot believe that anyone can support a principle which prevents more than a 
thousand of our children in one county from attending public school.” The Attorney 
General also alleged that Prince Edward County circumvented the federal court’s orders to 
avoid integration. “In this case – in all cases – I say to you today that if the orders of the 
court are circumvented, the Department of Justice will act. We will not stand by or be 
aloof. We will move.”181 
 Ten days earlier, the Department of Justice acted in Prince Edward County with, as 
The New York Times reported, the “toughest move on the school segregation problem to 
date.” Upon the recommendation of Burke Marshall and “strongly backed” by President 
Kennedy, the Attorney General filed a motion in Federal District Court to intervene, not as 
amicus, but as a party plaintiff in the Prince Edward suit, because the “obstruction and 
circumvention of school desegregation decrees violate[d] the interests of the United States 
in the due administration of justice as well as the interest of the original plaintiffs in the 
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 desegregation suit.” The intervention, Marshall presumed, would “make it easier for 
everyone to comply with the orders of the courts and demands of the Constitution.”182  
 In its motion, the Department of Justice moved to expand the NAACP’s complaint. 
The Attorney General petitioned the court to add the Commonwealth of Virginia, the 
comptroller of Virginia, and the Prince Edward School Foundation as defendants. The 
Attorney General did “something [the NAACP] couldn’t do,” explained Samuel W. 
Tucker,183 a NAACP attorney. “A citizen cannot sue the state but the United States 
government can.” In addition, the Attorney General asked the court to enjoin the 
defendants from failing to maintain a free public school system; issuing tuition grants to 
the students of the Prince Edward School Foundation and permitting tax credits for 
donations to the private school as long as no public schools operated in the county; and 
circumventing court orders. Finally, the Attorney General asked the federal court to order 
the State of Virginia to withhold state money from all public schools in Virginia until 
Prince Edward County’s public schools re-opened.184 
 The motion’s language failed to capture the Attorney General’s intended purpose, 
because the absence of legislation made federal intervention tenuous. Therefore, for 
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 “technical reasons,” the motion was written in “negative form,” not to protect the 
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, but to “prevent the circumvention and nullification of 
the prior orders of this Court and to safeguard the due administration of justice and the 
integrity of the judicial processes of the United States.” Regardless of the motion’s 
language, the Attorney General sought to re-open the schools, and indeed that was the 
perception of the administration’s intent. Michael Smith, 13, told The Washington Post: “I 
think President Kennedy is going to get our schools opened up.” Everett Berryman, 13, 
added that the federal government “should be able to do something about our schools.”185  
 The motion placed the weight, prestige, and facilities of the federal government 
behind the school-less children of Prince Edward County. “We are happy over this 
announcement,” declared Rev. L. Francis Griffin. “We believe this is the right and 
democratic procedure for the federal government.” Direct executive action, wrote Rev. 
Walter E. Fauntroy, will be “far more effective and speedy than the cumbersome process 
of getting a bill through both Houses.” The Washington Post considered the action a 
potential “catalyst in bringing a solution to a situation that has become a source of shame 
for all citizens of Virginia.” The Department of Justice’s motion presented significance 
beyond Virginia. For the first time, the federal government acknowledged that the closing 
of all the schools in one county could be unconstitutional. “If successful,” wrote Fauntroy, 
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 it “will set the decisive precedent to prevent the Prince Edward situation from occurring 
anywhere else in the United States.”186 
 States’ rights advocates considered the Department of Justice’s motion a 
destructive precedent for the federal-state relationship. Congressman Watkins M. Abbitt 
immediately released a statement condemning the action as:  
 
an attempt by totalitarian executive action and judicial usurpation of power 
to make hollow shells of our state and local governments and assume 
dictatorial control over a purely local function….Not since reconstruction 
days…has the Federal government ever attempted to compel a locality to 
levy taxes upon its local citizens and by judicial fiat compel the operation of 
purely public functions.187  
 
Supporters of the closed schools argued that the federal government lacked the authority to 
compel a local legislative body to tax itself and operate public schools. On Capitol Hill, 
Sen. Herman Talmadge (Ga.-D) warned that the motion would set the precedent for 
“Federal control over any facet of life in which the Executive Branch for any reason might 
choose to intervene.” J.V. Lewis,188 a Prince Edward County Defender, argued that the 
“Kennedy Crowd” was “sowing the seeds…[of] insurrection.” A crowd of two hundred 
fifty gathered in Farmville for a Defenders rally, unanimously adopting a resolution 
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 denouncing the motion as “coercion and intimidation of a type found only in 
totalitarianism.”189  
 The Attorney General’s threat to close all public schools in Virginia until Prince 
Edward County’s public schools re-opened was met with tremendous indignation. Robert 
Kennedy left himself vulnerable to the charge that he, not the massive resisters, was the 
school closer. Senator Harry F. Byrd admonished Kennedy’s action in a statement: 
 
I am amazed that the Attorney General of the United States seeks to close 
every public school in Virginia to 847,000 white and Negro students unless 
Prince Edward surrenders its position in regard to integration….The attempt 
to punish an entire State because the action of one county…is fantastic and 
completely unrealistic. 
 
Many Virginians became anxious over the fate of their children’s education. Ironically, 
Governor Almond, the one who closed schools in 1958, attempted to ease public concern 
on the issue of school closings. Almond considered the perceived threat to public 
education a “misunderstanding” and cautioned “temperate discretion and judgment.” The 
Attorney General wanted, Almond explained, to re-open the schools in Prince Edward 
“not…to close down all schools in Virginia.”190 
 The response to the Attorney General’s motion required the Department of Justice 
to clarify its position. “It is now being said that the Department of Justice is attempting to 
close all public schools in Virginia because of the Prince Edward situation. This is not 
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 true,” assured Kennedy, “nor is the Prince Edward suit a threat against local control. We 
are maintaining the orders of the court. We are doing nothing more and nothing less.” The 
action was designed, a government source divulged, for “leverage purposes” – to prohibit 
the transfer of responsibility from local to state officials – as they had successfully been 
doing. Finally, as U.S. Solicitor General Archibald Cox191 explained, the ultimate aim was 
to “bring about the operation of a public school system.”192 
 
The Sharpest Setback 
 
 On May 8-9, 1961, St. John Barrett presented the Department of Justice’s case 
before Judge Oren R. Lewis in Federal District Court. Tall and slight of build, the young 
attorney spoke softly and deliberately. The Department of Justice, Barrett argued, had a 
“clear duty” to act when “it appears the integrity of the judicial process is threatened.” The 
state and county “nullified and circumvented” the federal court’s orders when the schools 
closed and public funds supported the private schools. Barrett considered federal 
intervention necessary, because only the United States could “adequately” defend the 
interests of the nation. 
 A veteran of the Little Rock and New Orleans litigation, Barrett cited these cases as 
precedents for federal intervention. The closing of Prince Edward County’s public schools 
to avoid desegregation was as obstructive as Governor Faubus’ use of the Arkansas 
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 National Guard in Little Rock or the defiance of Governor Davis and the State legislature 
in Louisiana. Judge Lewis, however, did not consider the defendants in defiance of the 
court and “they certainly aren’t using force to prevent enforcement of an order.” In 
response, St. John Barrett asserted: “Federal Court orders can be frustrated and nullified by 
more subtle methods than troops or legislatures gone wild.”  
 Another matter, the constitutionality of closing public schools, remained 
unresolved. Judge Lewis considered deferring the question to the Virginia State Supreme 
Court of Appeals, but the federal government was not seeking to open the schools under 
the Virginia State Constitution, because the Department of Justice considered the closing 
of Prince Edward County’s public schools a violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. “The one fact that renders the school closing illegal is that other 
schools are open,” argued Barrett. Lewis remained unconvinced that closing all public 
schools in Virginia was practical. Barrett insisted that the Department of Justice had no 
desire to close all schools in Virginia. Rather, the Attorney General sought an “affirmative 
order” to re-open the schools. “I don’t see how I can order the reopening of schools,” said 
Judge Lewis, “without also saying how big, what kind of schools, how many teachers and 
so forth.”  
 Judge Lewis indicated throughout the hearing that the motion lacked footing for an 
affirmative ruling. “I am rather encouraged and believe that this is the first time any ‘little 
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 sunshine’ has come into this case so far as I am concerned,” remarked Frank Nat Watkins, 
Commonwealth’s Attorney.193 
The rays of hope the Department of Justice conveyed on the school-less children 
raised expectations only to be eclipsed by two inauspicious setbacks. The Attorney 
General’s intervention motion made the county board of supervisors “more determined 
than ever to keep schools closed” and they were “not about to consider” opening schools 
for African Americans. On June 9, 1961, the board of supervisors, for the third consecutive 
year, voted unanimously to withhold funds for the operation of public schools. The board 
did, however, approve $285,000 for tuition grants for white students.194 Unless the courts 
acted, a third school year promised segregated “private” education for white children and 
no formal schooling for black children. 
 On June 14, 1961, the school-less children received their second consecutive 
setback. Judge Oren R. Lewis announced his decision to deny the Department of Justice’s 
motion to intervene, listing several reasons. First, the rules and procedures for intervention 
required a “timely application.” Since the motion was filed one year after the court’s ruling 
– April 22, 1960, Judge Lewis determined that the Attorney General’s application failed to 
qualify as timely. Ultimately, the school-less children were penalized for the Eisenhower 
Administration’s lethargy. Second, permitting intervention without legislation was 
“contrary to the intent of Congress.” If Lewis’ interpretation held, then executive action 
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 would be undercut and, with poor prospects of passing meaningful legislation, the fate of 
public schools would be left to parents filing suits school district-by-school district. Third, 
Judge Lewis saw no parallels between the situation in Prince Edward County and the crises 
in Little Rock and New Orleans. Lewis found “no known defiance of this Court’s orders 
by either the State of Virginia or the County of Prince Edward.” Fourth, there was little 
difference between the original plaintiffs’ complaint and the Department of Justice’s 
motion. True, the NAACP and the federal government addressed similar issues, and sought 
similar relief. However, the Department of Justice’s authority to file a complaint against 
the state, and remove the county from the protection of the state, was a significant 
difference. Fifth, if the Court were to hear the case in its present form, it would have to 
interpret the Virginia State Constitution. Under this circumstance, the federal 
government’s involvement would be improper. Sixth, making the Commonwealth of 
Virginia a defendant required a three-judge court, which would “materially delay the 
adjudication of the private constitutional rights asserted by the individual plaintiffs.” 
Finally, the court considered withholding state funds to all public schools in Virginia in the 
absence of public schools in Prince Edward County “unnecessarily punitive.” If permitted 
to intervene, the government would likely “urge this Court to enter an order that could 
jeopardize the education of several hundred thousand children who have had no 
responsibility whatsoever for the closing of public schools in Prince Edward County.” 195 
 Judge Lewis’ decision, reported The Washington Post, was the “sharpest setback 
that the civil rights efforts of the Kennedy Administration have received in a courtroom.” 
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 Five days after Judge Lewis announced his decision, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
affirmed Judge J. Skelly Wright’s earlier ruling permitting the Department of Justice to 
enter the Louisiana school desegregation cases. Judge Wright’s March opinion read, in 
part: 
 
the history of the Civil Rights Acts…does not mean that the Justice 
Department of the United States can have nothing to do with the 
administration of justice or that it must remain indifferent when the 
judgments of the federal courts are sought to be subverted by state 
action….The absence of specific statutory authority is of itself no obstacle, 
for it is well settled that there is no such prerequisite to the appearance of 
the United States before its own courts.”196 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s ambiguous implementation orders in Brown II led to 
inconsistent lower court rulings. 
 “I think we have the opposition on the R-U-N,” delighted J. Segar Gravatt, counsel 
to the board of supervisors, “between Judge Lewis’s opinion eliminating the Justice 
Department and the offer of the School Board of Prince Edward to make its facilities 
available to the Virginia Teachers’ Association” – an African American teachers’ 
organization. The VTA planned to implement a six-week summer “crash program,” led by 
volunteer teachers, for the school-less children, emphasizing reading, writing, math, and 
study skills – the first professionally directed educational program implemented for 
African American children since the school closings. On behalf of the school board, Dr. W. 
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 Edward Smith offered the VTA use of the public school buildings and buses free of 
charge, but for a deceptive purpose. “If we can ever get the Negro children into the schools 
of Prince Edward,” explained Gravatt, “I do not believe that they will ever permit the 
NAACP to get them out again. If we can discredit the NAACP leadership in the 
County…our battle will be won.” Representing the African American community, Rev. L. 
Francis Griffin rejected the offer, citing overwhelming opposition to the “use of former 
public school buildings which have been denied them for the past two years.”197 
 After performing a study, the VTA reported that many children experienced 
educational regression. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) lobbied the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to assist Prince Edward County in 
facing the educational regression in the event of a federal court order to re-open the 
schools. Also, AFSC asked HEW to organize a temporary school system for African 
Americans if an affirmative order was delayed or not forthcoming. The U.S. Commissioner 
of Education, Sterling M. McMurrin,198 explained that federal assistance violated federal-
state relationships in education. The states held the primary responsibility for providing 
education. The federal government had no authority to operate projects in localities 
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 independent of state and local programs. Federal assistance, therefore, could only be 
provided when requested by the state.199  
State Senator Armistead L. Boothe,200 the anti-Byrd organization candidate for 
lieutenant governor, considered the state, not the federal government, responsible for re-
opening Prince Edward County’s public schools. “We are paying a fearful price,” stated 
Boothe, “in the dollars of illiteracy and in the coins of ignorance minted from the minds of 
1,700 children.” Boothe proposed that the state provide money to operate the public 
schools. African Americans would likely attend the public schools and the white students 
would receive tuition grants to continue their private education. The “Boothe Plan” was 
estimated to cost the state $125,000 – “a modest price to pay to erase a dark blot from 
Virginia’s education escutcheon.” Albertis Harrison, the Byrd Organization candidate for 
governor, retorted, “If Virginia went into Prince Edward and opened the school with State 
funds, we would have to do the same in every county.” J. Barrye Wall rejected the 
proposal as “appeasement and a surrender of the principles underlying this Republic for 
which Prince Edward stands.”201 
Albertis Harrison privately and naively hoped the school crisis would stay out of 
politics, however, the Attorney General’s intervention motion made the Prince Edward 
County school crisis one of the principal issues of the Democratic primary campaign. 
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 Samuel W. Tucker, a NAACP attorney, considered the Department of Justice’s 
intervention “timely,” because it forced public debate on the Prince Edward County crisis. 
“After a history of defiance, evasion, and vacillation in state leadership I don’t think 
Virginia citizens are going to let either candidate remain silent on the issue.” The Byrd 
Organization ticket, Harrison-Godwin-Button, tied the Stephens-Boothe-Boyd ticket to the 
Kennedys and the NAACP, labeled the antis “integrationists,” attacked Boothe as “an ultra 
liberal,” and warned of their commitment to “maximum integration.” Conversely, A.E.S. 
Stephens202 warned that the Harrison ticket still “harbor[ed] massive resistance” and would 
“wait on the sidelines for another chance to padlock our classroom doors.”203 
Although wary of Harrison, J. Barrye Wall and The Farmville Herald endorsed the 
Byrd Organization candidates and vigorously attacked the anti-organization ticket. “One of 
Stephens’ main projects will be to work against this county and other counties in 
Southside Virginia,” warned J. Barrye Wall. “OBVIOUSLY STEPHENS MUST NOT BE 
ELECTED!” The Byrd Organization ticket, which pledged to oppose “integration of the 
races in our public schools,” carried the state by comfortable majorities (Harrison – 57%, 
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 Godwin 54%, and Button 52%), but outpolled the Stephens-Boothe-Boyd four-to-one in 
Prince Edward County.204 
 Prince Edward County’s school-less children could not count on relief from the 
state or local government. The only level of government willing to assist the county’s 
African American students – the federal government – was denied intervention. Although 
the federal government lacked the statutory authority to intervene in the Prince Edward 
County litigation, the Kennedy Administration demonstrated its continued interest. On July 
24, 1961, Judge Lewis convened a four-day hearing for counsel to present arguments on 
the NAACP’s accusation that the state and county circumvented federal court orders. St. 
John Barrett sat conspicuously with the plaintiffs, “strictly as an observer,” fueling 
suspicion that the Department of Justice was preparing to file a new motion to intervene in 
the case.205 
 In his memorandum opinion denying federal intervention, Judge Lewis found no 
evidence of the circumvention of previous court orders. On July 25, 1961, Prince Edward 
officials confessed that they had done nothing to comply with previous court orders. “We 
have been guided and advised by counsel,” admitted T.J. McIlwaine, superintendent of 
schools, “that there was nothing for us to do since the schools were already closed.” Also, 
Judge Lewis now concluded that the state and county tuition grants distributed to private 
school students in the absence of public schools were indeed an effort to circumvent court 
orders. Lewis enjoined state and county officials from distributing tuition grants to Prince 
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 Edward students. In the intervention hearing, St. John Barrett said that cutting off tuition 
grants “is not essentially what [the Department of Justice] want[s]. We want an affirmative 
order to re-open schools.”206 
 Judge Lewis refused to order the schools re-opened. Rather, Lewis deferred the 
question of the constitutionality of closing the public schools to the Virginia State Supreme 
Court of Appeals. In his memorandum opinion denying federal intervention, Lewis 
exhibited concern that convening a three-judge federal court for the purpose of studying 
the Virginia State Constitution would unduly delay action to the detriment of the original 
plaintiffs. This again illustrates the inconsistencies of federal court rulings. In late August, 
a three-judge federal court in Louisiana concluded that closing one school while the rest of 
the schools in the state continued operating their schools violated the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, public education continued uninterrupted 
in Louisiana. Previously, in Aaron v. McKinley, a three-judge federal court in Arkansas 
enjoined state and local officials from closing public schools in Little Rock. Similarly, in 
James v. Almond, a three-judge federal court enjoined Governor Almond’s execution of 
Virginia’s massive resistance laws in closing Norfolk’s public schools. In fact, in every 
school closings case since Brown – either actual or threatened, the courts ruled against 
padlocking the schools, except in Prince Edward County, Virginia.207 
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 No Conclusions Whatsoever 
 
Throughout the spring and summer, the Department of Justice made preparations to 
assist school districts and prevent disorder in areas facing federal court orders to 
desegregate. “We, the American people,” stated Robert Kennedy “must avoid another 
Little Rock or another New Orleans.” Kennedy telephoned local officials “to get the 
country a little ahead of its problems and not just let them build up.” Burke Marshall 
opened channels with private sources, such as the Southern Education Reporting Service 
and the Southern Regional Council, who provided updates through confidential 
memorandums. In the summer, Burke Marshall and John Seigenthaler208 traveled to 
twenty-three school districts for informal conferences with local officials. “I’d go in, my 
southern accent dripping sorghum and molasses, and warm them up,” recalled 
Seigenthaler, “Burke [Marshall] would tell them what the law was.” The Department of 
Justice “did what it could to make clear the recognition and acceptance of our 
responsibility, and to offer to local officials any kind of assistance which was within the 
power of the federal government to grant,” explained Burke Marshall. “In each case we 
attempted to be useful rather than coercive, suggestive rather than demanding.” In the fall 
of 1961, school desegregation was advanced without a major instance of disorder – even in 
Atlanta, Dallas, Memphis, and New Orleans. In public pronouncements, President 
Kennedy employed the moral authority of the presidency, praising state and local officials, 
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 parents, and children for meeting their responsibilities with “courage, tolerance, and, above 
all, respect for the law.” 209 
Despite the success of executive action in achieving first-step compliance in several 
southern school districts, Prince Edward County remained obstinate. The Department of 
Justice continued negotiating with Prince Edward County’s attorneys. In mid-August 1961, 
Burke Marshall and St. John Barrett invited the defense’s legal counsel – J. Segar Gravatt, 
Collins Denny, Jr., and Frederick T. Gray210 – to a private meeting, presumably to 
negotiate a plan to provide schools for Prince Edward County’s African American 
children. Prior to the conference, Gravatt privately pledged to “make no compromise” on 
their position. True to his pledge, the Prince Edward attorneys reported that they “reached 
no conclusions whatsoever” in their meeting with the Department of Justice. In September, 
classes resumed in Prince Edward County, but only for 1,400 white students. The high 
school students attended a freshly constructed, privately financed, twenty-seven classroom 
facility, valued at $400,000. Prince Edward Academy is “the symbol of a significant 
victory over an evil force; over potential, if not actual tyranny,” declared T. Coleman 
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 Andrews at the building’s dedication.211 The 1,700 African American children receiving 
no formal education could make no such boast of victory.  
                                                
 
* * * * * 
 
Executive action was a pragmatic strategy to advance civil rights by enforcing 
existing laws until conditions permitted passage of meaningful legislation. Critics have 
concluded that the Kennedy Administration’s strategy placated southern congressmen to 
guard the President’s domestic agenda and exhibited the Kennedys’ indifference to the 
plight of African Americans. In addition, critics have charged the administration with 
reacting to crises. The administration’s early action in Prince Edward County counters 
these general assessments. 
The Department of Justice’s action in Prince Edward County directly challenged 
Harry Byrd’s core constituency and, thus, the powerful chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee. Senator Byrd and Congressman Howard W. Smith212 (D, Va.-8) capitalized on 
the states’ rights fervor in response to the Attorney General’s motion to intervene in the 
Prince Edward County case to attack one of the five “must” bills – federal aid-to-
education, a request for $2.3 billion in federal assistance for school construction, operation 
 
211 William C. Battle acted as the intermediary in setting up the meeting – Box 9, Burke Marshall Papers 
(JFKL); John Doar to Frederick T. Gray, August 9, 1961, Reel 1, CRDTKA Part II (microfilm); J. Segar 
Gravatt to Harry F. Byrd, August 5, 1961, Box 5, Watkins M. Abbitt Papers (UR); WP, August 17, 1961, A6; 
FH, September 19, 1961, 1. 
 
212 Howard W. Smith (1883-1976) represented northern Virginia’s Eighth Congressional District in the U.S. 
House of Representatives from 1931-1967. Smith chaired the powerful House Committee on Rules. 
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 costs, maintenance, and teacher salaries. “If non-elected Federal officials will go to [the] 
extremes they are applying in Virginia now,” warned Byrd from the Senate floor, “who can 
imagine the ruthlessness of Federal bureaucrats with the Federal purse to force their 
domination over the schools in our state and localities?” Despite Byrd’s opposition, the bill 
passed the Senate, but was voted down by the House Rules Committee, chaired by Howard 
W. Smith. A parliamentary maneuver moved the bill out of the Rules Committee, where 
Smith cited the administration’s Prince Edward intervention to hold the conservative 
coalition forces together to defeat the bill. Theodore Sorensen considered the bill’s defeat 
“the administration’s biggest domestic disappointment in 1961.”213 
In a scathing review of the Kennedy Administration’s civil rights record, one 
historian wrote, “Worried about Byrd’s intemperate tone” concerning the Department of 
Justice’s intervention motion in Prince Edward County, “the White House went to 
extraordinary lengths to placate him.” President Kennedy made several key appointments 
that did anything but placate Harry Byrd. In May 1961, at the height of the intervention 
blowback, Kennedy appointed Francis Pickens Miller,214 the leading voice of the anti-
organization, to the State Department. In addition, Kennedy appointed three NAACP 
attorneys, who had direct involvement in the Prince Edward County case, to federal 
positions. In May, Oliver W. Hill accepted an appointment to the Federal Housing 
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 Administration. In July, Spottswood W. Robinson III215 received an appointment to the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, thereby, altering the composition of the commission, 
reflecting a “clear majority openly in favor of the liberal civil rights position.” Finally, 
Thurgood Marshall,216 “Mr. Civil Rights,” accepted President Kennedy’s nomination as a 
federal judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. As J. Barrye Wall observed, 
“Everybody connected with the NAACP attack on our school system appears to have 
profited and moved off to better pastures.”217 
The historical record does not support the assertion that the Kennedys were 
unsympathetic to the plight of the school-less children. Within the first one hundred days, 
the administration took affirmative action through public and private negotiations with 
defense attorneys. When the negotiations failed, the Attorney General attempted to stretch 
the limits of his power, taking an unprecedented action by entering the case as a party 
plaintiff to assist the school-less children. President Kennedy and the Attorney General 
made public pronouncements in support of the Brown decision and illuminated the moral 
questions of closing schools to avoid integration. Prince Edward County’s African 
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 Americans beseeched the federal government to intervene and the Kennedys met their 
obligation in early 1961.  
 The Attorney General filed the motion, not in response to an acute crisis or 
pressures, but to prevent further injury to the school-less children. Burke Marshall 
recommended intervening in the Prince Edward case before the Senate confirmed his 
appointment as Assistant Attorney General and one week before Rev. Walter E. Fauntroy 
presented the Sit-in on Congress proposal to the White House.  After Judge Lewis denied 
the Attorney General’s motion, the Department of Justice announced that the ruling would 
receive “considerable study” and that other means to enter the suit were being explored.218 
Without the statutory authority to intervene, Burke Marshall continued the behind-the-
scenes negotiations with the defense attorneys. St. John Barrett’s presence at the Federal 
District Court hearing in July represented a symbolic gesture of the federal government’s 
support of Prince Edward County’s African American children. The administration took 
proactive steps to find a positive resolution before the Prince Edward situation developed 
into another Little Rock or New Orleans.  
 The Department of Justice’s intervention in Louisiana and attempted intervention 
in Prince Edward County were proactive measures which confirmed the administration’s 
commitment to enforcing court ordered desegregation. School divisions facing school 
desegregation in September took notice of the administration’s action in these locales. “As 
a result of realizing that the President was going to move,” reflected John Seigenthaler, 
“[local officials] were extremely concerned that the federal government would come 
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 in.”219 The federal government’s action in Louisiana and Prince Edward County and their 
negotiations with local officials contributed to the peaceful transition to desegregated 
public education in many school divisions across the South. 
 In its 1961 report, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded: “The most 
                                                                                                                                                   
effective executive action in public school desegregation has been the participation of the 
Attorney General of the United States in some desegregation suits,” but “only in Prince 
Edward has the Federal court denied the Attorney General the right to intervene to protect 
the interests of the United States.”220 In Louisiana, Judge J. Skelly Wright permitted the 
federal government to play an active part in school desegregation cases. Contrarily, Judge 
Oren R. Lewis denied federal intervention and failed to draft decisive orders. The Prince 
Edward litigation continued for three more years before the public schools were ordered 
reopened by the U.S. Supreme Court. Had a resolute ruling, like those taken in Louisiana, 
been invoked in Prince Edward County, a positive conclusion might have been rendered 
without such a prolonged delay – a delay often attributed to the Kennedy Administration. 
 
218 NYT, June 16, 1961, 31. 
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CHAPTER 3: On Some Sort of Treadmill 
 
 
“It seems as if we are on some sort of treadmill.” 
 
– Robert L. Carter, NAACP Attorney221 
 
 
 
 
 “The Kennedy Administration will not be satisfied until the schools are open and 
desegregated” in Prince Edward County, assured Burke Marshall. However, without an 
invitation from the court, the Department of Justice had all but exhausted its legal options 
in assisting the school-less children. Judge Oren R. Lewis’ denial of federal intervention 
exposed the limitations of executive action. Civil rights leaders pressured the 
administration to fulfill the promises of the Democratic Party platform by supporting new 
civil rights legislation. “The problems to be met…are too complex to be solved…by other 
 
221 Robert L. Carter (b. 1917) was a lawyer for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund from 1944-
1968; WP, September 8, 1962, C1. 
 
 executive action here and there,” declared Roy Wilkins,222 Executive Director of the 
NAACP. “They may require legislation enacted by Congress.”223 
 “Any [civil rights] legislative program will have a very rough going,” Lee C. 
White,224 Assistant Special Counsel to the President, advised President Kennedy. As the 
second session of the Eighty-seventh Congress approached, the conservative coalition 
maintained its strength. Therefore, the administration sponsored a “safe” civil rights 
legislative agenda – the abolition of the poll tax and literacy test, but balked at 
championing legislation empowering the Attorney General to initiate school desegregation 
suits – the contentious Title III. Instead, the administration accelerated the rate of executive 
action in school desegregation cases. The Department of Justice’s previous actions, Robert 
Kennedy argued, “accomplished more than ever could have been accomplished by…any 
legislation that might have been possible to get passed in Congress.” The administration’s 
pragmatism was validated by Congress’ failure to pass the literacy test bill – a clear 
demonstration of Congress’ disinterest in enacting meaningful civil rights legislation in 
1962.225 Without an invitation from the court or Title III legislation, however, the 
Attorney General lacked legal standing in the Prince Edward County litigation.  
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 “Congress has not seen fit to enact any legislation to implement the Constitutional 
decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases of 1954,” explained Burke Marshall, 
“but we cannot avoid our responsibility to the Constitution and the law for that reason.” 
The Kennedy Administration continued to monitor the Prince Edward County case as it 
proceeded through the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals and the Federal District 
Court, employed its moral authority to encourage local officials to comply with the Brown 
decision, worked “quietly and without publicity” to find a resolution to the school crisis, 
and made preparations to provide assistance in the event that the schools opened.226  
 
Problems for the Parents 
 
On August 24, 1961, Judge Oren Lewis invalidated the use of public funds to 
support the Prince Edward School Foundation. In the absence of public schools, Prince 
Edward County did not provide parents with the freedom of choice, but offered only 
segregated private education for white children and no choices at all for African 
Americans. The county board of supervisors, Judge Lewis determined, “circumvented or 
attempted to circumvent or frustrate” federal court orders by closing the schools for the 
purpose of “preserv[ing] segregation of the races in the schools of Prince Edward County.” 
                                                 
226 Burke Marshall, Speech at the Democratic National Committee, May 21, 1962, Box 13, Burke Marshall 
Papers (JFKL); Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of 
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 Therefore, Judge Lewis barred the distribution of state tuition grants and blocked the 
county’s tax deductible donation ordinance while the public schools remained closed.227 
 “Judge Lewis’ decision,” admitted J. Barrye Wall, “brings problems for the parents 
of Prince Edward County.” Two months earlier, the board of supervisors passed a budget 
based on the appropriation of $285,000 for county scholarships. With the annual budget 
fixed, Judge Lewis’ decision meant that parents had to pay the local property tax and 
school tuition. Many believed that additional burden would alter public opinion and force 
the opening of the public schools. The public schools, if operated, would likely have 
served only African Americans, while the private schools, presumably funded by reinstated 
tuition grants, would have educated the white students. However, the Virginia Conference 
of the NAACP found these conditions unacceptable. “We went to court ten years ago to 
get rid of such an arrangement as that,” explained Robert D. Robertson.228 “Why accept it 
now?” The segregationists were also unwilling to accept such an arrangement, because, as 
Wall repeated, “no public school can be operated except as a potentially integrated school. 
This is exactly what the people of Prince Edward have historically contended that they 
would not do.”229 
 Despite the financial uncertainty following Judge Lewis’ decision, B. Blanton 
Hanbury, president of the local private school, announced that the “Prince Edward School 
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 Foundation will operate its schools during the coming session according to present plans.” 
Parents who could afford to “will be expected to pay tuition, but we will have a scholarship 
program to provide for those who can’t pay.” Congressmen Watkins M. Abbitt and Bill 
Tuck, described as the “most massive of resisters among the state’s major political 
figures,” spearheaded the statewide $200,000 fund drive to ensure the continued education 
of every white student in the county. “This will show the world we can get along without 
any public aid whatever,” declared J. Barrye Wall. Further, “if [the Prince Edward School 
Foundation] can be reasonably financed the federal court can not say we are a public 
school.”230 
Few observers believed that the Prince Edward School Foundation could raise 
sufficient funds to sustain its operation indefinitely. During the previous year’s fund drive 
for a permanent facility, B. Blanton Hanbury privately admitted that the Foundation had 
“exhausted [their] prospects locally.” The philanthropic capacity of the surrounding 
Southside communities also had its limitations. After raising over $10,000 for the 
Foundation the previous two years, Delegate John H. Daniel determined that neighboring 
Charlotte County had “about scraped the bottom of the barrel.” Regardless of the steep 
challenge, Watkins Abbitt implored state leaders to raise the money necessary to ensure the 
perpetuation of private education in Prince Edward County. “We cannot afford to let this 
fall through for lack of funds.”231 
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 A school-age population census revealed fissures in the white community’s stand 
against school desegregation. Of the county’s 1,455 white children, ninety-three attended 
schools outside of Prince Edward County – predominantly in the adjacent counties – and 
ninety-seven did not attend school. Months earlier, the Department of Justice established 
associations to capitalize on such a circumstance. Burke Marshall encouraged the 
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) to solicit white parents to file suit for the re-
opening of Prince Edward County’s public schools – a method that yielded success for 
Norfolk’s white parents in James v. Almond (1959). Over the course of the next several 
months, Harry Boyte,232 the AFSC’s resident program director, conducted scores of private 
interviews throughout the county with the “concerned opposition” in search of potential 
litigants.233 Until the Prince Edward crisis was remedied locally or altered to permit federal 
intervention, the Department of Justice could do little more than encourage private 
organizations and gather intelligence – a situation that offered little immediate relief to 
African American families. 
 Of the 1,500 school-aged African American residents of Prince Edward County, 
nearly three hundred attended schools outside the county. Private organizations, such as 
the American Friends Service Committee, the Prince Edward County Christian 
Association, and the Prince Edward Educational Committee, placed students in homes in 
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 Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C., so they could receive an education. Other children 
lived with friends or relatives outside of the county to attend school. This situation 
separated children from their parents, siblings, and friends. “It is very unfair,” observed 
one mother, “to have to break up a family in order to have your child get an education.” 
The remaining 1,266 African American children received no formal schooling at all. 
“There are 10-year-old boys and girls here,” explained Rev. L. Francis Griffin, “who have 
never been inside a school room, who can’t read or write.”234 
 
A Towering Obligation 
 
 The Department of Justice sought “to take every possible legal step to remedy” the 
Prince Edward situation. However, Judge Lewis’ decision to refer the question of the 
constitutionality of closing the public schools to the Virginia State Supreme Court of 
Appeals presented the Attorney General with few, if any, legal options. Robert Kennedy 
told reporters that “it would be too premature to say what legal action might be taken by 
the federal government” to reopen the county’s public schools. With federal intervention 
prohibited, the Attorney General hoped the matter could be solved by state and local 
officials.235 
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 Armistead Boothe viewed Judge Lewis’ denial of federal intervention as an 
opportunity for the state to take responsibility. “Virginia’s public school problems,” 
declared Boothe, “should be handled by the State and localities rather than the Federal 
Government.” After his unsuccessful campaign for lieutenant governor, Boothe renewed 
his proposal for the state to allocate money for the operation of Prince Edward County’s 
public schools by lobbying J. Lindsay Almond. “As Governor,” Almond responded, “I do 
not have the authority under State law to reopen the schools” in Prince Edward County. 
The Republican candidate for governor disagreed with Almond. H. Clyde Pearson pledged 
that his first official act as governor, if elected, would be to open Prince Edward County’s 
public schools. Pearson argued that to do otherwise would “cause a delay of another 
semester” and “it would be better to remove even the necessity of a court ruling for 
Virginia to obey her Constitution.” Pearson demanded that his Democratic opponent make 
a similar pledge. Albertis Harrison failed to make such a pledge, but succeeded in winning 
the general election – two-to-one statewide and three-to-one in Prince Edward County.236 
 Robert Kennedy remained optimistic that the schools would be reopened, but his 
communications with Governor-elect Harrison indicated “that the situation was not very 
promising.” Albertis Harrison failed to develop a rapport with Virginia’s African 
American leaders – a group he privately characterized as not the “right kind of Negro 
leadership.” Rather than facilitate a negotiated settlement or employ executive action, 
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 Harrison indicated his intention to continue his predecessor’s hands-off policy. “The 
Prince Edward situation must await a decision” by the Virginia State Supreme Court of 
Appeals, declared Harrison. “It would be most inadvisable to move in any direction until 
that occurs.”237 
 Reluctantly, the NAACP filed suit in the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals 
to force the county board of supervisors to operate public schools in Prince Edward 
County. Judge Lewis refused to order the opening of the county’s public schools until the 
State court rendered a decision on the Virginia State Constitution’s provision requiring the 
General Assembly “to establish and maintain an efficient system of free public schools 
throughout the State.” Judge Lewis chastised the NAACP for not finding redress in state 
court. “Why you don’t file a suit [in state court] and get this basic, narrow question 
disposed of,” said Judge Lewis, “I will never understand.” African American lawyers 
avoided filing civil rights litigation in the state court system because the “judges were Byrd 
organization people,” explained Oliver W. Hill. “We never got to first base in state courts.” 
State court proceedings promised African Americans only unfavorable rulings and further 
delays until relief could be found in federal court.238 
 On January 8, 1962, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals heard arguments in 
Griffin v. Board of Supervisors. Samuel W. Tucker, a NAACP attorney, asked the court to 
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 force the county board of supervisors to appropriate funds for the operation of public 
schools. “The county cannot be relieved of its responsibility since schools require both the 
General Assembly and supplemental county funds,” Tucker argued. J. Segar Gravatt, the 
county’s counsel, agreed that the Virginia State Constitution authorized the counties to 
levy taxes for public schools, but argued that the local governing bodies were under no 
obligation to appropriate funds to operate public schools. Presenting arguments for the 
defense as a “friend of the court,” Virginia’s Attorney General, Frederick T. Gray, 
supported Gravatt’s assertion, finding no provisions in the Virginia State Constitution that 
obligated Prince Edward County to operate public schools. The court’s decision was not 
expected until March.239  
 In the meantime, the Virginia General Assembly was concluding the most 
harmonious session in its recent history. The legislature overwhelmingly supported 
Governor Harrison’s legislative program of increased teachers’ pay, industrial 
development, and the revision of daylight saving time. At least one representative found 
the session unsatisfactory. “We have busied ourselves with a multitude of trifles,” opined 
Delegate John C. Webb.240 “We spent untold hours debating routine, run-of-the-mill 
legislation, but never once have we begun to consider what to do about” Prince Edward 
County. Delegate Webb proposed attaching an amendment to the state appropriations bill, 
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 which would have required the State Board of Education to establish and operate public 
schools in Prince Edward County. “The time to act is now,” pleaded Webb. “Virginia 
cannot afford a generation of illiterates anywhere in this Commonwealth no matter what 
their race may be.” Webb’s proposal for the state to take responsibility in Prince Edward 
County was overwhelmingly defeated by a voice vote. The House Appropriations Chair, 
Howard Adams,241 considered the Prince Edward County crisis an issue for the court, not 
the state budget.242 
 On March 5, 1962, the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals unanimously ruled 
that the Virginia State Constitution did not require Prince Edward County to appropriate 
funds to operate public schools. The Court did, however, note that the State Constitution 
required the General Assembly “to establish and maintain free public schools throughout 
the state.” Nevertheless, the Court did not order the General Assembly to fulfill its 
statutory obligation in Prince Edward County, because that would have been considered 
“an invasion by the judicial department on those functions of the legislative department.” 
The court’s decision, declared Delegate John C. Webb, “underscores the necessity for the 
General Assembly to work out a solution to this shameful situation.”243 
“Now that the state Supreme Court has tossed the problem back to the political 
branches,” opined The Washington Post, “Gov. Albertis S. Harrison and the General 
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 Assembly have a towering obligation to clear this blot from the Virginia record.” Harrison 
had the authority to call the General Assembly into special session to find a resolution to 
the Prince Edward crisis, but the governor declined. “The State,” asserted Harrison, “is 
without statutory authority to open a public school in Prince Edward County.” The power 
to operate public schools and employ teachers was vested in local officials, not the State. 
In addition, the state’s operation of a local school system would set a poor precedent. If the 
state appropriated funds to operate a school system in Prince Edward County, “the people 
throughout the rest of Virginia would not long tolerate a situation in which property 
owners in Prince Edward would be relieved of the obligation to pay taxes to support 
schools and this burden transferred to other areas of the state.” Harrison privately 
expressed concern over the Prince Edward crisis, but was reluctant to interfere, because he 
considered it political “dynamite.”244 
Governor Harrison “tossed the problem” back to the county board of supervisors. 
The reopening of the public schools was “a decision for the people of Prince Edward to 
make,” stated the governor. Without the pressures of pending litigation, Harrison hinted, 
the county board of supervisors had the opportunity to reopen the public schools “with 
face-saving grace.” Nevertheless, counsel assured the county’s leaders that legal 
technicalities could delay school integration for another school year. Rev. L. Francis 
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 Griffin saw “no chance” for the public schools to reopen “until the county is prepared for 
at least token integration or a strong court order.”245 
 On March 27, 1962, Samuel W. Tucker filed a petition in Federal District Court for 
an order to reopen the public schools. The petition claimed that closing the schools 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Tucker sought a quick hearing in Federal District 
Court that could be appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in time for an affirmative 
order to open the schools in the fall. A resolution had already been delayed for an 
additional school year as the Prince Edward County hot potato was tossed among the 
Federal District Court, the three branches of state government, and the county board of 
supervisors.246 
 
Opportunity and Obligations 
 
 In the spring, the board of supervisors considered the budget for the 1962-1963 
fiscal year, which began July 1. The previous three county budgets excluded 
appropriations for public education. As became the custom, the school board prepared two 
budgets: one for the operation of public schools and one for closed schools. The Kennedy 
Administration encouraged the county officials to resolve the school crisis themselves by 
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 levying taxes and appropriating sufficient funds to adequately conduct a public school 
system rather than being forced to take action by a federal court order. 
On May 1, 1962, Robert Kennedy employed the moral force of his office at the 
Virginia State Bar’s Law Day ceremonies in Roanoke – just ninety miles from Farmville. 
In his address, the Attorney General reaffirmed his support of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Throughout history, Kennedy explained, “the 
Supreme Court has acted as the conscience of the nation.” The historic decision “should 
not be accepted grudgingly” for it offers “opportunity as well as imposing obligations.” 
The Brown decision provided individuals, and state and local governments the opportunity 
to “identify law and liberty as a living reality” for all. Further, everyone was obligated to 
“respect and execute the law.” When localities defied Brown, the federal courts were 
forced to take action. Many criticized the federal court’s intrusion into other components of 
the constitutional system. The Attorney General defended the federal courts, since critics 
“often overlook the fact that the courts must act precisely because the other organs of 
government have failed to fulfill their own responsibilities.”247 
 In his prepared address, the Attorney General never directly mentioned Prince 
Edward County, but his remarks applied to their school crisis. The state and county 
officials failed to embrace the opportunity to extend liberty to all and reneged on their 
obligation to execute the law, forcing the federal courts to become involved. At a press 
conference earlier that day, Kennedy specifically invoked Prince Edward County, stating 
that the school closings were “a blight on Virginia and on the country in general.” 
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 Kennedy found it incomprehensible that 1,700 African Americans had “no place to go to 
school” and, although he admitted his pessimism, he expressed his desire for state and 
local officials to open the schools by September.248 
 Two days later, the President and Attorney General emphasized the responsibility 
of local people in the process of school desegregation at the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights Fourth Annual Conference on Problems of Segregation and Desegregation of Public 
Schools, held in Washington, D.C. Again, President Kennedy, employing the moral 
authority of his office, sent a message of support to open the conference: “if constitutional 
rights are to be vindicated and public education strengthened, the efforts of all those 
concerned – government officials, educators, community leaders and parents – must be 
redoubled….I know of no greater challenge facing America today.” In a brief, personal 
address to the conference, Robert Kennedy commended the southern communities that 
peacefully desegregated their public schools and called out the Prince Edward County 
officials. “I would hope,” the Attorney General stated, “that the local authorities will take 
the initiative to open all the schools on a desegregated basis in Prince Edward County as 
they have in other areas.”249 
 The previous day, Burke Marshall met with representatives from the American 
Friends Service Committee. After two months of fieldwork, which included scores of local 
interviews, Harry Boyte reported that the white citizens were “willing to accept 
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 desegregation if this were necessary to reopen the public schools.” After a year without 
state and county subsidies, middle and lower income families felt the burden of paying the 
private school tuition costs. Some families became agitated upon receiving threatening 
delinquency notices from the Foundation.  For some, the immorality of depriving 
education to African Americans troubled their conscience. Still others grew embarrassed 
over the negative perception of their county. Finally, the racial strife and the lack of public 
education stunted industrial growth and economic development. Harry Boyte found a 
“sharp and clearly defined opposition to the rigidity indicated in the public posture of the 
county board of supervisors’ delay in acting this spring in preparation for reopening the 
schools next fall.”250 
 The general feeling in the community was that the schools would only be opened 
with a federal court order.  Harry Boyte’s private interviews with the supervisors affirmed 
the community’s forecast. The supervisors sought assurance that Judge Lewis would 
remove the injunction on tuition grants before they would levy taxes for the operation of 
public schools. The supervisors’ counsel, J. Segar Gravatt, however, recommended that the 
board take no action until the federal court ruled on all the issues.251 
 As the budget deadline approached, the white community began displaying public 
opposition to the school closings. At the Farmville Baptist Church, the “Men of the 
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 Church” candidly and constructively discussed the reopening of the public schools – the 
first such discussion at a white church in the county. A former “Bush Leaguer,” Lester E. 
Andrews, raised the issue, because he sensed a shift in the community’s sentiment. The 
discussion was “calm and free from bitterness or segregationist fulminations.” The 
participants agreed that public education had to be restored in some manner.252 The 
potential social and economic reprisals for participating in such a meeting, which Andrews 
personally experienced from his involvement in the “meeting in the woods,” verifies the 
courage of the handful of discussants.  
Despite its significance, the eleventh-hour meeting, unsurprisingly, did not generate 
a grass roots effort capable of toppling the Foundation’s forces. On June 15, 1962, a cadre 
of Foundation men proclaimed their support for the levying of county taxes below the level 
sufficient to operate public schools at a public hearing. Only three white county residents 
spoke in favor of reopening the public schools. Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss implored the 
supervisors to take affirmative action: “You gentlemen have an opportunity for greatness 
this day. Offering leadership to Virginia and the entire South in undertaking positive 
action, not delaying action by voting a budget…that will open all schools on a completely 
operational basis.”253 
For the fourth consecutive year, the county board of supervisors passed a budget 
that did not allocate funds for the operation of public schools. The supervisors, again, 
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 dropped the tax rate from $3.50 to $1.00 per $100 of assessed value and cut the merchant 
capital tax fifty percent – a result of the $600,000 budget surplus created by the injunction 
against the distribution of tuition grants. Despite the injunction’s continuance, the 
supervisors allocated $360,000 for tuition grants. If Judge Lewis lifted the injunction, the 
supervisors were prepared to assist in the perpetuation of the private school experiment. 254 
 The Richmond News Leader, once an ardent supporter of Prince Edward County’s 
defiance, called for the local leaders to soften their position. The editor, James J. 
Kilpatrick, expressed his belief that the county should “accept an order requiring the 
reopening of public schools on a desegregated basis, for any children who chose to attend 
them, provided tuition grants could be made available for any children who did not choose 
to attend them.” Much of the nation, the state, and now a near unanimous Virginia press 
opposed the county’s school situation. Asked privately by Benjamin Muse255 of the 
Southern Regional Council if he felt lonely or on the wrong side of history, J. Barrye Wall 
replied, “We are holding our finger in the dike.”256  
 As the director of the Southern Regional Council’s Southern Leadership Project, 
Benjamin Muse interviewed state and local leaders throughout the South to gauge 
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 sentiment and progress on race relations. Muse conducted several interviews with parties 
related to the Prince Edward County school crisis, and voluntarily sent his reports to Burke 
Marshall, who expressed his appreciation for receiving the “major fruits” of Muse’s work. 
Through these reports, Burke Marshall and his staff became privy to the private attitudes of 
Governor Harrison, J. Barrye Wall, newspapermen, moderates, and others. Burke Marshall 
not only received reliable intelligence from these reports, but it fostered a relationship with 
Benjamin Muse, who could speak candidly with segregationists, while at the same time 
building a network of civil rights advocates. For the Department of Justice, the free 
intelligence was invaluable, but so too was the access to Muse’s civil rights network.257 
 
Who is Responsible? 
 
 J. Barrye Wall posed the question: “Who is responsible for the education of 
children under the Constitution – the parent, the county, the state or the federal 
government?”258 The county and the state possessed the authority to take decisive action, 
but both abrogated their opportunity and obligation. The fate of public education in Prince 
Edward County was tossed back to the federal courts. 
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  In the meantime, a group of college students from the Student Christian Federation 
planned to conduct a seven-week summer crash program for the school-less children. In 
preparing for the session, the student volunteers requested assistance from Sterling M. 
McMurrin, the U.S. Commissioner of Education. Professional staff from the Office of 
Education conducted a two-day workshop to prepare the volunteers for teaching remedial 
reading, reading to young children, and simple arithmetic. Simultaneously, the Virginia 
Teachers’ Association conducted a program for the second consecutive year with volunteer 
certified teachers. These programs were designed to introduce young children who never 
attended school to formal education and to assist elementary and secondary school-aged 
children, as Rev. L. Francis Griffin described,  in “keep[ing] up with their age group” for 
the day, “if and when,” the public schools opened again.259   
 On July 26, 1962, Judge Oren Lewis ordered the reopening of the county’s public 
schools “without regard to race.” The ruling rejected the Virginia State Supreme Court of 
Appeals’ opinion that the county was under no obligation to operate public schools. In his 
ruling, Judge Lewis explained that the U.S. Constitution recognized only two government 
entities: the federal and state governments. The local school board and division 
superintendent must work with the State Board of Education and the State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction to maintain and operate a public school system in the county, because 
all the listed officials were “directly or indirectly” state officials. Therefore, since the state 
operated the public school system, schools must be maintained across the Commonwealth 
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 to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Prince Edward County’s 
public schools could not remain closed, Judge Lewis ruled, “while the Commonwealth of 
Virginia permits other public schools to remain open at the expense of taxpayers” – a 
conclusion the Department of Justice came to fifteen months earlier.260 
 Judge Lewis ordered the Prince Edward County School Board to submit plans for 
the operation of public schools to the Federal District Court by September 7, 1962. The 
school board pledged to comply with the court orders, but the chairman, Dr. W. Edward 
Smith, professed: “Our hands are tied.” The county’s 1962-1963 fiscal budget, which 
excluded the appropriation of funds to operate public schools, went into effect on July 1 
and could not be amended without special legislation. “The school board has no money,” 
declared Dr. Smith. Even if money was available, Smith considered it impossible to hire 
teachers for the start of school in September. “The matter is out of our hands now,” said 
Dr. Smith. “It’s for Washington and Richmond to solve.”261  
 “Governor Harrison’s leadership in a situation of this kind is important,” opined 
The Richmond Times-Dispatch, “and we believe it will be forthcoming.” Nonetheless, 
Albertis Harrison declined to initiate action in Prince Edward County, but offered a private 
assurance that the state would provide prompt assistance upon the request of local officials. 
Judge Lewis’ decision removed the spotlight from the county board of supervisors, but 
Harrison put the heat back on. William W. Vaughan, chairman of the county board of 
supervisors, privately admitted that the supervisors, if ordered, would have complied with 
                                                 
260 NYT, July 27, 1962, 1; WP, July 27, 1962, A1. 
 
261 NYT, July 27, 1962, 1; July 28, 1962, 15; September 15, 1962, 27. 
 128
 a federal decree to reopen the schools – the decree only specifically ordered the school 
board to cooperate with the State. Any action taken by the supervisors to initiate the 
opening of the public schools, including requesting Harrison’s assistance, Vaughan feared, 
would be met with reprisals from the local control group. Attorneys Collins Denny and J. 
Segar Gravatt advised the supervisors to do nothing and reject any offer of State assistance, 
because legal technicalities could be employed to delay action for another year.262  
 Months earlier, with the prospect of a fourth consecutive year without public 
schools looming, Burke Marshall “explored the possibility of federal schooling in Prince 
Edward.” However, the federal government did not have the authority to operate 
educational programs in a community independent of the states and localities. Without a 
request or permission from the state, and despite pressure from all quarters, Marshall found 
“simply no statutory basis” to establish a federal educational program in Prince Edward 
County.263 Even if the administration formally unveiled a federal school program, there 
was no guarantee that the black leadership would welcome it, because desegregated public 
education was the only indicated acceptable solution.  
 The Kennedy Administration did, however, continue planning with other agencies 
in preparation for the reopening of the public schools. On July 27, 1962, the Virginia 
Council on Human Relations (VCHR) convened a conference to discuss the Prince Edward 
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 County school crisis. Among the attendees were Heslip Lee,264 Benjamin Muse, Harold 
Fleming,265 Berl Bernhard,266 Delegate John C. Webb, State Senator Edward Haddock,267 
Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss, and a handful of Prince Edward residents. Burke Marshall 
accepted an invitation, but events of the Albany Movement268 forced him to send Harold 
H. Greene269 in his stead. The purpose of the meeting was to network among local, state, 
and federal entities to discuss their individual roles in reopening the schools. The conferees 
found only a “faint possibility” that schools would be opened in the fall, citing Judge 
Lewis’ “lamentably inconclusive” decision, the lack of funding, and the feasibility of 
finding teachers. Nevertheless, federal agencies were prepared to assist in the opening of 
the schools whenever state and local officials were ready.270 
 The school board complied with the court orders by submitting a plan for the 
operation of public schools to Judge Lewis. If funds were made available, the school board 
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 planned to operate public schools for approximately 1,250 children. The plan provided for 
the education of the county’s African American children and a nominal number of white 
children – the overwhelming majority of white students were expected to continue their 
education at the private school. Although the board submitted the plan, members 
questioned their responsibility. Collins Denny filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Richmond to relieve the school board from charges that it must operate public 
schools. The state and the board of supervisors levied taxes and determined school 
funding, not the local school board. Denny’s action attempted to put the onus on the State, 
but the State Board of Education argued that it had neither the “duty or responsibility” to 
operate schools in Prince Edward County.271 
 At a hearing on September 8, 1962, Judge Lewis agreed that the Virginia State 
Constitution did not require the state to operate a public school system. He explained that 
his July ruling determined that if the state operated a public school system “it must do so 
everywhere.” Despite his earlier announcement, Judge Lewis insisted that the litigants 
obtain a clear ruling from the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals to determine if the 
state was required to operate public schools in every county. Robert L. Carter, NAACP 
general counsel, considered the school closings a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
requiring the matter to be solved in federal court, not state court.272 
 Despite the hope that his July decision presented to African Americans, Judge 
Lewis softened his final edict. He reaffirmed his earlier ruling that Prince Edward County’s 
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 public schools could not be closed while other schools in the Commonwealth were open, 
but withheld issuing an order to reopen the schools until the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
reviewed his decision. Only if the higher court upheld his decision, would Judge Lewis 
issue orders to reopen the schools. Samuel W. Tucker indicated that the NAACP would 
comply and appeal the case to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, but was disappointed in 
Judge Lewis’ failure to issue a decisive ruling. Judge Lewis “hasn’t required anybody to do 
anything that is designed to correct the inequality” resulting from the closing of the public 
schools, explained Samuel W. Tucker. “He recognized the inequality, but doesn’t do 
anything to correct it.”273 
 Judge Lewis’s refusal to issue an affirmative order, opined The Washington Post, 
meant that “this obdurate and malevolent folly will go on.” The court’s indecision resulted 
in a letdown in the black community. “Here I am 15, and it looks like I’ll be 30 before I get 
through high school,” one despondent girl told Time magazine. Again, African American 
children left the county by the hundreds to receive an education. White parents also felt the 
impact from the lack of free public education. Their inability to pay tuition prohibited a 
handful of white students from attending the Foundation’s schools. Most of these parents, 
reasoned B. Blanton Hanbury, “don’t care whether their children go to school or not.” 274 
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  The Foundation set its 1962-1963 budget at $358,000. Tuition remained stable – 
$245 per elementary student and $265 per secondary student. In the previous school year, 
of the 779 families, 376 paid full tuition, 371 received partial scholarships, and 32 accepted 
full scholarships. In the fall of 1962, the Foundation embarked on a $130,000 fundraising 
campaign for scholarships. Many believed the costs would lead to the collapse of the 
Foundation. J. Barrye Wall emphasized the parents’ responsibility in ensuring the 
permanence of the private school system. “The parents of Prince Edward must support 
education as it is available in the county. Those who have children in Prince Edward 
Foundation schools,” Wall continued: 
 
must carry their fair share of the cost. Those who do not have children in 
the schools should see it as a duty to assist by contributing to the 
Foundation scholarship fund which is used to relieve the burdens of those 
parents who are financially unable to pay full tuition charges. It is as simple 
as that.”275 
 
 In a letter to the editor of The Farmville Herald, Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss issued a 
plea to the white community to remove the responsibility of educating the children from 
the parents. Dr. Moss cited the economic realities which threatened to leave more children 
uneducated:  “Once the Foundation finds it has to deny schooling to children who cannot 
meet the tuition charges…the per capita charge is going to have to be raised. Such increase 
will mean that more families will not be able to meet the costs and so more families will 
have ‘to make other arrangements.’” Dr. Moss beseeched the community to reevaluate the 
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 school situation before all of the children were “crippled for life” by the failure to receive 
an education.  “With no embarrassment to any one, we can admit we have attempted the 
impossible, and simply resume public education.”276 
 
 The Kennedy Administration worked within the parameters of its authority to meet 
its responsibility in enforcing the Brown decision. The Department of Justice’s policy of 
“consulting informally” with school officials resulted in the “peaceful and orderly 
desegregation” of an additional sixty school districts in the fall of 1962 – an increase to 
972 total school districts in the South.  In addition, the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare announced that beginning in the fall of 1963 federal funds would be withheld 
for school districts that practiced segregation and served children who lived on military 
bases. In September 1962, the Department of Justice filed its first suit in an impacted-area 
– a school division that received federal funding to assist in educating children of 
personnel at a local military installation – in Prince George County, Virginia. Four similar 
suits followed in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Finally, and most dramatically, 
President Kennedy employed federal troops to enforce the court orders permitting James 
Meredith to integrate the University of Mississippi.277 
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  President Kennedy’s deployment of federal troops to carry out the court’s decrees 
at the University of Mississippi caused many to wonder if there would be a direct effect 
upon Prince Edward County. J. Barrye Wall attempted to calm fears by assuring his 
readers that the Prince Edward officials “violated no order of the federal courts.” Wall 
recognized that “Federal pressures and possibly outside agitation could increase,” 
therefore, he urged both the white and black residents to be “understanding, patient and 
considerate.” However, for the locked out students, the integration of the University of 
Mississippi demonstrated the power of the presidency. Sandra Stokes, 14, argued in a 
private interview that if the President could enroll one black man at Ole Miss, then he 
could do more in Prince Edward County. Barbara Ann Botts, 15, welcomed the use of 
federal troops, if necessary, to reopen the schools.278 
 In Prince Edward County, the responsibility of educating the children fell on the 
parents. The white community believed that it fulfilled its responsibility to their children 
by organizing the private school system, and the African American community failed in 
their responsibility to their children by refusing to organize a similar system. “The loss of 
education for Negro people,” opined J. Barrye Wall, “is the choice of the Negro parents 
under the leadership of the NAACP. This responsibility cannot be transferred to any other 
shoulders.”279 
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 * * * * * 
 
 “For the first two years of his presidency,” wrote one historian, President Kennedy 
“had left Prince Edward…alone.”280 In fact, Kennedy’s Executive Branch was the only 
government entity – be it local, state, or federal, executive, legislative, or judicial – willing 
to take decisive action to resolve the Prince Edward County school closings. The 
Eisenhower Administration failed to enforce federal court orders or employ its moral 
authority. Congress failed to follow up the Brown decision with supporting legislation. 
Governors Almond and Harrison, the General Assembly, the State Board of Education, and 
the county board of supervisors refused to take responsibility for public education in Prince 
Edward County. The Federal District Court proved indecisive and prohibited the 
Department of Justice from participating in the litigation. 
Within the first one hundred days of the Kennedy presidency, the Attorney General 
filed a motion in Federal District Court to employ the power and prestige of the 
Department of Justice to reopen the county’s public schools, but Judge Oren R. Lewis 
denied federal intervention. Judge Lewis believed federal intervention would unduly delay 
the court proceedings, causing harm to the plaintiffs. Instead, Judge Lewis referred the case 
to the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals for an interpretation of the Virginia State 
Constitution’s provisions for operating public schools. The state jurists, who were Byrd 
Organization loyalists, interpreted the State Constitution, which the organization-
dominated General Assembly had amended to evade the Brown decision. Counsel for 
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 Prince Edward County welcomed not only a predictable, favorable ruling in state court, but 
months of delay.  
 The Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the State Constitution did 
not obligate Prince Edward County to operate public schools. The court determined that 
the State Constitution required the state to operate a public school system, but refused to 
issue an order to compel the state to take action in Prince Edward County. Further, 
Governor Harrison and the General Assembly indicated that the state would not initiate 
action to open the schools. The NAACP did not have the authority to bring suit against a 
state, but the United States did. In his motion of April 1961, Robert Kennedy named the 
Commonwealth of Virginia as a defendant, which could have forced the state to fulfill its 
obligations to the school-less children of Prince Edward County if Judge Lewis permitted 
federal intervention. 
 Judge Oren R. Lewis proved “cautious, dilatory, and indecisive where prompt and 
forceful action was indicated,” concluded Benjamin Muse. In July 1961, Judge Lewis 
refused to issue an order to reopen the schools. One year later, in July 1962, Lewis found 
that schools in Prince Edward County could not be closed. He issued an order to reopen the 
schools, but stayed the order. Also, the NAACP, reluctantly, under Judge Lewis’ direction, 
filed suit in the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals in September 1961. One year 
later, in September 1962, Lewis indicated that he wanted the state courts to further clarify 
some issues. The Prince Edward litigation, “having ground slowly through the federal 
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 court mills in 1962,” remained virtually in the same position as it had a year earlier. “It 
seems as if we are on some sort of treadmill,” demurred Robert L. Carter.281 
As the litigation languished in the courts, the Kennedy Administration continued to 
follow events in Prince Edward County. Burke Marshall received regular reports from the 
Southern Regional Council on the developments in Prince Edward County. The 
Department of Justice encouraged the American Friends Service Committee to find white 
moderates to file suit against the county for closing the schools. The Office of Education 
conducted a workshop to train volunteers for the summer crash program. The 
administration participated in an inter-agency meeting to coordinate efforts in the event 
that the schools opened. The Attorney General employed the moral authority of his office 
to encourage voluntary compliance by county officials. Lacking the statutory authority to 
intervene in the litigation, the Kennedy Administration quietly and publicly advocated for 
the school-less children. 
 Still, Americans look to the President when the state and local governments fail to 
meet their obligations in protecting individual rights. J. Barrye Wall considered education 
“a duty of the parents” and public education a “privilege.”282 The state sanctioned this 
philosophy through legislation, court rulings, and executive enforcement. Congress and the 
federal judiciary permitted its continuation through inaction and indecisiveness.  With 
every level of government failing the school-less children, only the Kennedy 
Administration’s direct involvement could assure that education was a right in Prince 
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 Edward County, not an expensive privilege for the more affluent. Under the direction of 
President Kennedy, the federal government had to become more creative to ensure 
universal education in Prince Edward County, Virginia. 
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CHAPTER 4: Free Schools 
 
 
“The shocking result is that about 1,300 Negro children in Prince Edward 
County have not attended school for four years….These are lost children in 
an age of transition. They have been caught in a social revolution which, 
though not of their making, has made itself felt most directly on them. We 
all have a responsibility to find a solution.”  
 
– Robert F. Kennedy283 
 
 
 
 As the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation approached, and in the midst 
of the fourth consecutive year without free public education, several issues remained 
unresolved in the decade long Prince Edward County litigation. Who had the responsibility 
for operating public schools? Could one locality padlock its public schools while others 
locales provided free public education? Could a federal court compel a local governing 
body to levy taxes and appropriate funds to operate public schools? Could tuition grants be 
withheld from private school students in the absence of a public school system? These 
fundamental questions remained the subject of contention as the litigation went before the 
State Circuit Court of Richmond and the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
 
283 Robert F. Kennedy, Speech before the American Association of University Professors, University of 
South Carolina, April 25, 1963, Box 2, Speeches: 1961-1964, Robert F. Kennedy Papers (JFKL). 
 Prince Edward County attorneys initiated a suit in the Richmond Circuit Court to 
determine whether the state must operate public schools when local officials refused to 
appropriate funds. Collins Denny argued that the school board had “the sole right, 
authority and duty to operate schools,” but the board of supervisors could “block this duty” 
by refusing to allocate funding – an “intentional” design in the Virginia State Constitution. 
Not the Governor, nor the General Assembly, nor the State Board of Education could 
usurp the local school board’s authority. The school board violated neither state nor local 
law, nor denied equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Contrarily, 
the NAACP argued that the federal court already determined that closing the public 
schools in Prince Edward County violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Further, the 
General Assembly, Samuel W. Tucker asserted, possessed the authority to compel the 
board of supervisors to levy taxes. Judge John Wingo Knowles’ pending decision, many 
believed, would influence the proceedings in federal court.284 
 All of the litigants – the NAACP, State Board of Education, county board of 
supervisors, and the school board – filed appeals with the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to determine the constitutionality of the school closings and tuition grants. Upon 
the request of the Department of Justice, Robert L. Carter forwarded the NAACP’s brief to 
Burke Marshall. Two days after the brief was filed, Marshall assured Carter that the 
Department of Justice was reviewing the documents and “considering whether we should 
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 not file a brief” – federal intervention still required permission from the court.285 However, 
more was needed than direct federal participation in the litigation to re-establish free 
schools in Prince Edward County, Virginia. 
 
A Case of Great Importance 
 
 On December 20, 1962, the Department of Justice petitioned the U.S. Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals to enter the Prince Edward County litigation as amicus curiae. 
“This is a case of great importance to public education in the United States,” the 
Department of Justice explained. “It is of great importance also to the future course of 
desegregation of the public schools in this country and to the implementation of the 
constitutional principles” of the Brown decision. Further, the United States was “deeply 
concerned” about the educational deprivation of so many of its citizens. “Several hundred 
Negro children have never been to school at all – no schools have been open since they 
have been old enough to attend,” stated Robert Kennedy. “Many cannot read or 
write…These are years of education which can never be regained.” The Department of 
Justice asserted that this “case tests whether the federal courts have power to protect these 
rights before they are forever lost.”286 
The Department of Justice asked the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to issue 
an order for the immediate reopening of Prince Edward County’s public schools on a non-
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 discriminatory basis. A federal court order compelling the county board of supervisors to 
levy taxes for public schools, the Department of Justice determined, was “not beyond the 
scope of federal judicial power,” but “both necessary and proper.” The local officials failed 
to meet their responsibility, imposing an “undue and unreasonable burden” on parents. “It 
is time – in fact, it is high time – to call a halt to this abdication of responsibility on the 
part of the county authorities.” In a statement, Robert Kennedy added: “That the schools in 
Prince Edward County should remain closed is a disgrace to our educational system and to 
our country.” 287 
 Chief Judge Simon E. Sobeloff288 authorized the Department of Justice to file its 
brief and present oral arguments. Five circuit court judges – Sobeloff, Clement F. 
Haynsworth, Jr.,289 Herbert S. Boreman,290 Albert V. Bryan, Sr.291 and J. Spencer Bell292 – 
were scheduled to hear the case, but “by a strange set of circumstances” the defense 
attorneys “were able to get rid of” Sobeloff and “eliminate” Bryan, because of their 
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 previous connections with the case. As U.S. Solicitor General, Simon E. Sobeloff 
presented the government’s arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board 
of Education. While serving as chief judge on the U.S. District Court of the Eastern 
District of Virginia, Albert V. Bryan issued the April 1960 order to the Prince Edward 
County school board to begin admitting African American students to the white public 
schools.293 The disqualification of Sobeloff and Bryan resulted in an unfavorable three-
judge court for the plaintiffs.  
 On January 9, 1963, the three judges heard arguments on the constitutionality of the 
school closings and tuition grants. Burke Marshall and Robert L. Carter presented 
arguments supporting Judge Lewis’ findings that the school closings were unconstitutional, 
and asked for an affirmative order to reopen the schools immediately.  “There’s an urgency 
about this,” claimed Robert L. Carter. The school-less children suffered “irreparable 
damage,” explained Marshall, a deprivation of their constitutional rights, which demanded 
relief from the federal courts. Arguing for the defense, J. Segar Gravatt found “no 
constitutional authority giving power to the United States to say how the children of any 
state should be educated.” The Virginia State Constitution empowered the localities with 
two choices: provide public schools and/or operate private schools with tuition grants. The 
school closings, wrote Collins Denny in the school board’s brief, were not based on racial 
discrimination, because “exactly the same thing has been done in connection with white 
children as was done in connection with colored children. Public schools for all children 
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 have been closed.” Since no public schools were available for either race, the defendants 
argued, there was no violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; therefore, the injunction on tuition grants to the Prince Edward School 
Foundation should be lifted.294  
 The NAACP asked the court for an injunction on state funding to all public schools 
in the Commonwealth while Prince Edward County’s public schools remained closed. The 
Attorney General of Virginia, Robert Y. Button,295 claimed such an order would “make 
hostages of every public school child in Virginia until the board of supervisors of Prince 
Edward County sees fit to make available funds for the operation of public schools.” On 
this matter, the Department of Justice distanced itself from the NAACP and its own 
intervention attempt of 1961, which many feared threatened to close all public schools in 
Virginia. In its brief, the Department of Justice assured the court that “it is not here to 
advocate the spread of an educational vacuum.” Rather, federal intervention was designed 
to restore public education in Prince Edward County.296  
 The state, again, claimed “no duty” for restoring public education in Prince Edward 
County. Echoing Collins Denny’s presentation at the Richmond Circuit Court, the state 
claimed that it could not open schools in Prince Edward County “without action at the 
local level” – which was not forthcoming. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, supported 
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 Judge Lewis’ earlier finding that local officials are agents of the state, and, therefore, must 
provide a public school system in all localities.297 
Weeks after the hearing, Governor Harrison expressed his regrets that some 
children received no formal education in Prince Edward County, but he reiterated his stand 
that the state had no authority to open the schools. The Executive Director of the Virginia 
Council on Human Relations, Rev. Heslip Lee, criticized the state’s failure to act in Prince 
Edward County as “indicative that you can’t look where you would expect to look for 
leadership.” Armistead L. Boothe predicted that the “vacuum” of leadership would 
inevitably be filled by the federal government.298  
 
To Find a Solution 
 
 In February 1963, President Kennedy discussed the Prince Edward County 
situation with his top advisers at a meeting concerning his forthcoming civil rights 
message. The U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had yet to deliver a decision in the 
case, and it was unclear if and when an affirmative order to reopen the schools would be 
issued. President Kennedy expressed his concern that an effort by the federal government 
to recover the lost years of education be made with or without an affirmative court order. 
President Kennedy directed Burke Marshall to investigate all manners in which the federal 
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 government could assist the county’s school-less children – “so long as it is remotely 
possible or legal.”299 
 On February 28, 1963, President Kennedy sent his “Special Message to the 
Congress on Civil Rights” to Capitol Hill. In his message, President Kennedy, again, 
affirmed his support for the Brown decision, which “represented both good law and good 
judgment – it was both morally and legally right.” Kennedy maintained his view that 
“closed schools are not the answer,” and highlighted the Prince Edward County school 
crisis. The Department of Justice, the President reported, had: 
 
intervened to seek the opening of public schools in the case of Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, the only county in the Nation where there are no 
public schools, and where a bitter effort to thwart court decrees requiring 
desegregation has caused nearly 1,500 out of 1,800 school age Negro 
children to go without an education for more than three years. 
 
President Kennedy pledged that “the Executive Branch will continue its efforts to fulfill 
the Constitutional objective of an equal, non-segregated, educational opportunity for all 
children,” and recommended that Congress pass legislation to permit federal technical and 
financial assistance to school districts “in the process of desegregating in compliance with 
the Constitution.”300 
At the direction of the President, the Department of Justice, in coordination with 
the Office of Education and the National Institute of Mental Health, explored solutions for 
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 the Prince Edward County school crisis. Burke Marshall requested that the Assistant 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), James M. Quigley,301 conduct an 
analysis of all realistic programs the federal government could initiate in Prince Edward 
County. Quigley determined that, whether or not the schools opened in the fall, the county 
possessed insufficient resources to accommodate students who had little or no formal 
education in four years. “An action decision can be as modest” as remedial instruction or 
“as ambitious as an effort to run an elementary and secondary education system.” 
However, HEW lacked programs to support general education, therefore, the operation of 
federal school system in Prince Edward County required “substantial assistance from 
private sources.” Quigley suggested promoting the program to private foundations as 
“research-demonstration projects,” which could provide valuable information on the results 
of educational deprivation, while at the same time directly benefiting the locked out 
children.302 
 Quigley based his proposal on existing federal programs and on the assumption of 
the generosity from private foundations. First, under the National Defense Education Act, 
the federal government could provide funding to employ educational media to instruct both 
primary and secondary aged students at the estimated cost of $385,000. Second, under the 
Manpower Development and Training Act, the federal government could contract with an 
                                                 
301 James M. Quigley (b. 1918) served as Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from 1961-
1966. 
 
302 An attached document indicates that Burke Marshall and James M. Quigley discussed the proposal on 
March 28, 1963. James M. Quigley to Burke Marshall, March 18, 1963, Box 1, Prince Edward Free School 
Association Papers (VSU). 
 
 149
 institution of higher learning to provide general and vocational training for approximately 
two hundred people, age 16-21, who, after four years of lost education, possessed 
insufficient skills for employment – cost: $250,000. Third, correspondence courses could 
provide academic and vocational training to secondary students through foundation grants, 
estimated at $60,000. Fourth, the National Institute of Mental Health could contract with a 
research institute to provide remedial reading training, and the National Science 
Foundation, similarly, could establish a mathematics program. Fifth, with generous support 
from private sources, the federal government could establish a federal school program with 
donated textbooks from publishers, master teachers from across the nation (who would be 
granted leaves by their employers), and instructional aide from graduate students and 
returning Peace Corps volunteers.303 
 Assistant Secretary Quigley considered a survey – to determine the children’s 
educational level, age distribution, and likely enrollment, and the availability of 
classrooms, transportation, teaching materials, and faculty – the foundation for any future 
action in Prince Edward County. “With these guideposts,” Quigley determined, “valid 
decisions can be made as to which proposals and how much of each proposal should be 
used.” Regardless of the program selected, “the active support of the Administration” was 
necessary to “remedy this deplorable situation.”304 
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  On March 18, 1963, at the Emancipation Proclamation Centennial celebration in 
Louisville, Kentucky, Robert Kennedy put Prince Edward County’s “deplorable situation” 
in perspective:  
 
We may observe, with as much sadness as irony that outside of Africa, 
south of the Sahara where education is still a difficult challenge, the only 
places on earth known not to provide free public education are Communist 
China, North Vietnam, Sarawak, Singapore, British Honduras – and Prince 
Edward County, Virginia.” 
 
J. Barrye Wall considered the Attorney General’s remarks a “slap” at Prince Edward 
County, because “by association he damns [its] people…by the spurious method of 
association with people of which we never had any contact.” Annie V. Putney of Farmville 
wrote in a letter to the editor of The Farmville Herald that the Attorney General’s remark 
was not a slap, “but a statement of fact.” Burton G. Hurdle, Jr. of Hampden-Sydney wrote, 
“Prince Edward County looks senile, foolish, and backward in the frowning eyes of the 
nation. It has no feeling of obligation or responsibility.”305 
 On March 27, 1963, Judge John Wingo Knowles of the Richmond Circuit Court 
determined that the State Board of Education and the Prince Edward County school board 
fulfilled their responsibilities as outlined in the Virginia State Constitution, found no 
violation of federal law, nor found any law prohibiting the distribution of tuition grants – 
even in the absence of public schools. Judge Knowles’ opinion upheld the state and local 
attorneys’ contentions, and was in direct conflict with Judge Lewis’ ruling in Federal 
District Court, which included an interpretation of the Virginia State Constitution – under 
 151
 appeal in the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Richmond Circuit Court ruling 
“definitely makes the localities responsible for education in Virginia, and it rules out 
federal interference or authority under the Constitution,” observed J. Barrye Wall.306 
 Judge Knowles found no violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because the county denied public education to all children, both black and 
white. The county’s actions and the state court’s consent was met with rebuke by the 
Attorney General. “In Prince Edward County, Virginia, public officials met the legal 
requirement of equality in public education by closing all public schools in the county. 
Equality was achieved in the mathematical sense that zero equals zero – that is, the lack of 
public education for Negro children satisfies requirements of equality if there is no public 
education for white children….The federal government is working actively to find what it 
can do to erase the mockery of ‘zero equals zero.’”307 
 The Kennedy Administration continued working quietly behind-the-scenes to 
develop a federal program for Prince Edward County’s school-less children. Civil rights 
organizations were well aware of the Department of Justice’s intervention in the litigation, 
finding the action “an earnest of the government’s good intentions,” but remained unaware 
of other federal plans for Prince Edward County. Civil rights leaders grew restless with 
their perception of the administration exclusively focusing on the crisis’ legal issues. “For 
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 this Administration…to continue to approach [the Prince Edward County] situation as 
solely a legal one is very wrong,” declared Leslie Dunbar of the Southern Regional 
Council.308 
On April 10, 1963, the NAACP publicly called on the administration to make a 
“practical, concrete demonstration of [its] good intentions” by launching and operating a 
remedial program for the children deprived of an education in Prince Edward County. 
“Only government – federal government in this case – can or should bear the burden of 
providing this aid.” Hundreds of Prince Edward County’s African Americans signed a 
petition requesting federal assistance. “Mr. Kennedy,” the petition read, “we believe that 
you have the concern and the power to make available to the children of Prince Edward 
County, on an emergency basis, a massive program of Federal assistance to help them 
prepare for their return to public schools.”309 
The following day, the Public Information Officer at the Department of Justice, 
Edwin O. Guthman,310 revealed to The Lynchburg News that weeks earlier President 
Kennedy directed the Office of Education and Department of Justice to make “an intensive 
study to determine what kind of remedial training program would be possible and 
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 appropriate for the children of Prince Edward County.” Further, the Office of Education 
had arranged for a survey of the “educational needs of the county” for a “final 
determination of what kind of educational programs, including remedial reading programs 
can be instituted.” Finally, Guthman concluded, “If the Federal government can help, we 
want to help.” 311 
“It has always been my hope that we could avoid any move by the Federal 
Government to set up any type of schools in the county...,” responded Governor Harrison, 
“but…there may be no means available to us that would discourage the Federal 
Government’s apparent intention of setting up the so called remedial program.” Harrison 
“preferred” that such a program be carried out by the state and locality. The Lynchburg 
News called on Harrison to do “more than ‘prefer’ that a remedial program be instituted by 
the State and locality rather than the Federal government. Let him take the lead in these 
matters.” Armistead Boothe urged the state to beat “Jack and Bobby to the draw.”312 The 
state repeatedly repudiated any federal incursion into local affairs, but continued to draw 
the line at initiating any action on behalf of the school-less children. 
On May 21, 1963, a Michigan State University research team, funded by a $75,000 
grant from the Office of Education, arrived in Farmville to begin a year-long study on the 
effects of closed public schools. Dr. Robert L. Green313 expected to report on the first 
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 phase of the project – the survey of demographic, educational, and social data of the 
African American population – by the end of June 1963. The survey results would be made 
available to the Office of Education, which planned to use the findings to determine further 
federal action. The results from the second phase of the project – the testing of the children 
– were not expected until June 1964.314 
The Kennedy Administration moved to take action in Prince Edward County even 
before receiving results from the Michigan State study. The National Institute of Mental 
Health, a research agency of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, tentatively 
approved a $2.5 million grant to the Institute of Educational Research for a five-year 
research project to assess and develop the reading skills of the county’s children, which 
also doubled as a “catch up” remedial program. The program was expected to be run from 
prefabricated buildings or trailers, beginning in August. A spokesman for the NAACP 
stated that this remedial program “is what we have been asking for.”315 
 
Profiles in Courage 
 
 President Kennedy’s Civil Rights Message in February 1963 “signaled a shift in his 
thinking about civil rights legislation,” reflected Theodore Sorensen. Nevertheless, the 
measures disappointed civil rights leaders for its failure to mandate strong employment 
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 provisions or set a deadline for school desegregation. Also, President Kennedy failed to 
build public or congressional support for his civil rights program. In February, Burke 
Marshall privately admitted that passing meaningful civil rights legislation was “not 
possible.” Any attempt to secure such legislation would only be “an exercise of the moral 
force of the White House.” Robert Kennedy found “no public demand for it. There was no 
demand by the newspapers or radio or television….Nobody paid any attention.” The 
Attorney General concluded that what “aroused people generally in the country and 
aroused the press was the Birmingham riots.”316 
In April 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. launched a series of nonviolent 
demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, “the most thoroughly segregated big city in the 
U.S.” Police Commissioner Eugene “Bull” Connor supervised the use of police tanks, 
clubs, attack dogs, tear gas, electric cattle prods, and fire hoses to break up the peaceful 
protests in view of the television cameras. The images on the front page of the newspapers, 
the evening news telecasts, and the international embarrassment “sickened” President 
Kennedy and awakened the American public. “Recognizing that the American conscience 
was at last beginning to stir,” wrote Theodore Sorensen, President Kennedy “began laying 
his plans for awakening that conscience to the need for further action.” The administration 
drafted sweeping civil rights legislation and notified key congressmen of the President’s 
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 forthcoming announcement. The President embarked on a speaking tour to prepare the 
nation for his new civil rights program, culminating on the evening of June 11, 1963 – just 
hours after the President nationalized the Alabama National Guard to ensure the peaceful 
integration of the University of Alabama.317  
On June 11, 1963, President Kennedy “delivered one of the most eloquent, moving, 
and important addresses of his Presidency” – his Radio and Television Report to the 
American People on Civil Rights. Four months earlier, Congress and the country “were not 
listening,” wrote Theodore Sorensen, but on this evening “the country was listening.” This 
“moral crisis,” declared Kennedy: 
 
cannot be met by repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased 
demonstrations in the streets. It cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It 
is time to act in the Congress, in your State and local legislative body and, 
above all, in all our daily lives. 
 
President Kennedy announced that he would soon ask the Congress to act, “to make a 
commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place 
in American life or law” by passing meaningful civil rights legislation.318 
On June 19, 1963, President Kennedy sent his civil rights bill to Capitol Hill. If 
passed, it would represent the most comprehensive civil rights legislation in the nation’s 
history. The bill included the strengthening of voting rights, the extension of the U.S. 
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 Commission on Civil Rights, a ban on the segregated public facilities, federal technical and 
financial assistance to schools in the process of desegregating, and empowering the 
Attorney General to initiate school desegregation suits. The President held a series of 
White House meetings in support of his bill with businessmen, civil rights leaders, labor 
officials, clergy, lawyers, women, and educators – 1,600 people in all, in what one 
historian described as “a highly ambitious and unusual exercise of Presidential 
leadership.”319 
President Kennedy hitched his political future to the Civil Rights Bill of 1963. 
Immediately, the President’s approval rating plummeted in the South from 60% in March 
to 33% in late June. Sixty-two percent of white southerners believed the administration 
was “pushing racial integration too fast.” These numbers appeared ominous for a politician 
facing a re-election bid. However, President Kennedy knew the bill might cost him a 
second term, but proceeded nonetheless. “There comes a time,” said President Kennedy, 
“when a man has to take a stand and history will record that he has to meet these tough 
situations and ultimately make a decision.”320 
 The Prince Edward County board of supervisors, for the fifth consecutive year, 
took their stand, deciding against the appropriation of funds for the operation of public 
schools. The supervisors voted to maintain the low tax rate and allocate $375,000 for 
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 tuition grants – in the event that Judge Lewis’ injunction was lifted. J. Barrye Wall 
defended the supervisors’ decision: “Reopening of public schools in Prince Edward 
voluntarily will not solve the problem which faces the people of the United States. At stake 
is control of public education. Prince Edward will not pass control to the federal courts by 
default.”321 
 A Farmville merchant proposed not to pass control to the federal courts, but to 
fulfill the county’s “moral obligation” to open the public schools. Edwin M. “Sonny” 
Pairet322 challenged John C. Steck for the Democratic nomination to represent the 
Farmville District on the county board of supervisors, running “to bring the [school] issue 
out in the open” – the only candidate to do so during the period of the school closings. 
Pairet was “not an integrationist,” but he recognized not only the moral issue of closed 
schools, but the economic consequences – the loss of potential industry, the fiscal 
instability of the private schools without tuition grants, and some parents’ inability to make 
tuition payments.323 
 Edwin M. Pairet proposed to let the people decide the school issue through a 
referendum. The other two candidates, C. H. Lafoon and John C. Steck, supported the fund 
cut off and rejected the call for a referendum. Lafoon, a real estate broker, favored 
segregation, declaring that his convictions were so strong “that I feel like I am doing the 
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322 Edwin M. “Sonny” Pairet (b. 1930) operated an appliance store in Farmville.  
 
323 Twenty-one warrants were issued to parents for a total of $4,762.40 of unpaid tuition to the Prince Edward 
School Foundation in May 1963. RTD, June 20, 1963, 2; WP, August 4, 1963, B7. 
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 Lord’s work.” Steck contended that if the public schools were opened without a decision 
from the court and the private school accepted tuition grants, the NAACP would “bring a 
suit within a week to have [the Prince Edward School Foundation] declared public 
schools.” Many considered this election itself a referendum on the school situation. 324 
John C. Steck won the election by a plurality (Steck - 799, Pairet - 438, and Lafoon 
- 376). However, school closing advocates combined the votes of Steck and Lafoon to 
argue that the election revealed a 73% percent super majority favoring closed public 
schools, and thus a mandate to maintain the status quo. Steck considered his victory a 
message of public support for the supervisors’ allocation of $375,000 in tuition grants. 
Pairet believed the election proved that people “are confused. They have a big investment 
in the private schooling, and they don’t want to change until they get a mandate from the 
courts.” Overall, all but one of the supervisors retained their seats, and the new member, 
Hugh E. Carwile, Jr.325 sat on the board of directors of the Prince Edward School 
Foundation. J. Barrye Wall considered the election results “a vote of confidence” to the 
county board of supervisors.326   
Although only garnering twenty-seven percent of the vote, “Sonny” Pairet’s 
challenge for a seat on the county board of supervisors was a significant act. Challenging 
the control group could have resulted in social ostracism for him and his young family, and 
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 economic reprisals against his electronic appliance dealership. Fortunately, Pairet reported 
that he suffered no reprisals for his actions. “They all know me and that I say what I 
want.”327 Edwin M. Pairet displayed great personal courage, while chartering untested 
waters and breaking down a barrier so others too would say what they want. 
 
See What Could Be Done 
 
In Prince Edward County, little was said between the black and white leadership. 
“There are no lines of communication and there never have been lines of communication,” 
explained Rev. L. Francis Griffin. Previous attempts to organize a bi-racial committee 
collapsed for, among other reasons, the failure of the white leadership to “concede that 
equals [were] talking.” Only recently had a bi-racial committee begun holding conferences, 
but these meetings were held in a “secret hideout,” and without the participation of the 
recognized white leadership. William F. Watkins, Jr.,328 the mayor of Farmville, made no 
preparations for a government sanctioned committee. J. Barrye Wall found no constructive 
purposes in organizing a bi-racial commission, because elected officials “have an 
obligation to discharge their duties, not to bargain over them with citizens’ committees.”329 
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 Since the community’s black and white leadership did not communicate, finding a 
resolution required an intermediary. 
In May 1963, Robert Kennedy assigned William J. vanden Heuvel330 to work 
specifically on the Prince Edward County school crisis. Kennedy exhibited confidence in 
his freshly appointed Special Assistant. “All I want you to do is to keep me posted. Talk to 
me every day – a minute will be enough – then I will know where you are and what you 
are up to.” Vanden Heuvel, only 33, but described as “amiably self-assured,” was not 
intimidated by the Prince Edward impasse. After graduating from Cornell Law School in 
1952, and editing The Law Quarterly, vanden Heuvel served as an assistant to William J. 
Donovan, American Ambassador to Thailand, then as a law partner of Senator Jacob K. 
Javits (NY-R), and an unsuccessful candidate for Congress. As President of the 
International Rescue Committee, vanden Heuvel participated in the negotiations to assist 
refugees of the Hungarian Revolution, Angolans from the Congo, Chinese in Hong Kong, 
and prisoners from the Bay of Pigs invasion.331 
 Robert Kennedy instructed Bill vanden Heuvel to travel to Prince Edward County 
to “see what could be done.” Vanden Heuvel sensed that county residents “were beginning 
to feel…a lot of pressure. [Governor Harrison] and others felt an embarrassment for the 
state as the media began focusing” on the county. Finding a solution was compounded by 
the lack of communication between the county’s black and white leadership, posing little 
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 hope for direct negotiations. Vanden Huevel, therefore, interviewed leaders from both 
camps separately, not imposing solutions from Washington, but doing what he considered 
all good lawyers do – listen.332 
 On June 6, 1963, the U.S. Commissioner of Education, Francis Keppel,333 hosted a 
conference on the Prince Edward County school crisis at the Office of Education in 
Washington, D.C. The more than two dozen attendees represented the Department of 
Justice (Burke Marshall and Bill vanden Heuvel), the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, the Office of Education, the President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, 
the Virginia State Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the 
NAACP, the Potomac Institute, the Virginia Council on Human Relations, the Southern 
Regional Council, the American Friends Service Committee, and county residents Rev. L. 
Francis Griffin and Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss. Burke Marshall expressed his pessimism at 
the prospects of the public schools opening in the fall, but he confirmed that the 
administration was exploring every legal avenue to provide federal assistance in Prince 
Edward County. The private agencies assured their cooperation in coordinating efforts with 
the federal government.334  
Within weeks of the Washington conference, the situation quickly deteriorated. 
First, as mentioned, the county board of supervisors refused to allocate sufficient funds to 
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 operate public schools. Second, the National Institute of Mental Health reversed its support 
of the $2.5 million grant to the Institute of Educational Research for their proposal to 
conduct a remedial education program. Herman Downey, staff director of the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee, which oversaw HEW appropriations, attacked the proposal 
as a “prostitution of medical research.” The subcommittee questioned its cost and duration, 
the relationship between literacy and mental health, and if the proposal was an education 
program disguised as a research project. President Kennedy was “mighty anxious that 
everything be done” to save the program, and expressed his “extreme interest and concern” 
to HEW. Nevertheless, the National Council on Mental Health succumbed to political 
pressure and revoked the grant. Third, after five months, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals failed to issue its decision – a decision that either way promised an appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Burke Marshall advised that no possibility existed of the case 
reaching the U.S. Supreme Court in time for a ruling before the spring of 1964.335 As a 
fifth consecutive year without public schools appeared certain, time and options were 
running short. 
The results from the first phase of the Michigan State survey quantified what many 
suspected. Twenty-three percent of the school-age African American children reported that 
they could not read. Of the illiterate children, ninety-two percent were age ten or younger – 
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 the children who came to school-age during the period of the school closings. The survey 
counted 1,725 school-age African American children, of which 269 were currently living 
away from home to attend school, leaving well over a thousand children uneducated. 
Nearly fifteen hundred of the children reported that they would or probably would be 
willing to return to re-opened public schools.336 
In cooperation with the Office of Education, and based on the evidence from the 
Michigan State University report, Bill vanden Heuvel recommended assisting in the 
development of a free private school system, available to all wishing to attend – both black 
and white – for the 1963-1964 school year. The proposal called for establishing a “model 
school system,” consisting of an integrated faculty, small classroom units, un-graded 
instruction, an emphasis on special education and pupil services, and periodic testing. The 
Attorney General was “greatly taken with the idea.” Kennedy expressed his doubts, but 
authorized vanden Heuvel to proceed. “Let’s go ahead and see if we can do it,” said Robert 
Kennedy. “Step-by-step build it up.”337 
 For the model school system to be successful, support had to be built in the black 
community, starting with Rev. L. Francis Griffin. Bill vanden Heuvel persuaded Griffin 
that a temporary school system could provide the resources necessary to make up for the 
lost years, rather than losing yet another year of education while the U.S. Supreme Court 
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 deliberated. The public school system, when opened, would “then be able to move forward 
from a running start rather than just picking up the pieces of five lost years.” The schools, 
vanden Heuvel acknowledged, would likely be predominantly, if not completely, African 
American. From the beginning, the NAACP refused to accept anything short of 
desegregated public schools. Nevertheless, Rev. Griffin agreed to support the program 
with the caveat that the black students would not accept tuition grants, and an assurance 
that the case would indeed be argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. Vanden Heuvel 
pledged that the school system would not diminish the Department of Justice’s effort to 
end racial segregation permanently in the county’s schools.338 
On July 16, 1963, the federal government’s proposal for a model school was 
“favorably received” at a second conference hosted at the Office of Education. Still, some 
expressed doubts that raising $1-1.5 million, hiring one hundred teachers, purchasing 
educational supplies, securing school buildings, and acquiring buses could be 
accomplished for the start of classes in September. The proposed model school system for 
Prince Edward County became the worst-kept secret. At the same time, forecasters 
considered violence inevitable if the school crisis remained deadlocked. “The proposed 
model school,” opined Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “may be one way to prevent 
violence in the only place in the United States that has no public schools.”339 
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 Boycott for Freedom 
 
 Prince Edward County’s racial strife remained manageable, producing no major 
incidents of physical confrontation. “Violence has no place in Prince Edward, nor in the 
problem we are attempting to solve,” cautioned J. Barrye Wall. Violent confrontations 
would have distracted attention from the segregationists’ legal argument, attracted negative 
media coverage, and invited federal intervention – both legal and military. J. Barrye Wall 
employed The Farmville Herald to calm racial tensions, promote civility, and remind his 
readers that the county’s black and white citizens “must live here together.” B. Blanton 
Hanbury, president of the private schools, observed, “Everything has been peaceful and 
harmonious. It speaks very well for both our colored people and the white people.” Rev. L. 
Francis Griffin attributed the relative tranquility to the patience of the county’s African 
Americans. However, Rev. Griffin, recently elevated to president of Virginia State 
Conference of the NAACP, reported increased pressure from African Americans for more 
militant action across the Commonwealth. Birmingham “served to arouse a great many 
lethargic and complacent Negroes to action in Virginia and elsewhere.”340 
President Kennedy acknowledged that the “events in Birmingham have stepped up 
the tempo of the nationwide drive for full equality,” warning the United States Conference 
of Mayors that “the demonstrations of unrest…can be expected in many other cities in the 
next few months.” President Kennedy pledged federal assistance to local officials, but 
counseled the mayors to explore local solutions, because “the Federal Government does 
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 not control these demonstrations. It neither starts them, directs them, nor stops them.” 
Governor Harrison criticized the Kennedy Administration for creating the impression that 
black leaders were “over and beyond the law and not amendable to it.” African Americans, 
encouraged by the “sympathetic climate” created by the Kennedy Administration, pushed 
more aggressively for social progress in 1963.341  
The summer months witnessed a prolonged direct-action campaign in Danville, 
Virginia to attack segregation in public accommodations and employment discrimination. 
The Danville picketers faced repressive police measures comparable, if not exceeding, the 
actions taken in Birmingham, including the employment of fire hoses and nightsticks, 
which required forty-six demonstrators to receive medical attention. The violence in 
Danville alarmed the State NAACP leaders.  Rev. L. Francis Griffin and Lester Banks 
informed Governor Harrison that integration would “be accomplished non-violently if 
possible, but violently if necessary.”342 
 In the wake of the Danville crisis, J. Barrye Wall proposed to “make this a summer 
of contentment,” but the locked-out children could no longer contain their discontent. 
Scores of teenagers returned home from their “bootleg education,” many with a new 
outlook, inspiration from the unfolding social revolution, and unwilling to further endure 
the segregated society their parents’ complacency perpetuated. The teenagers did not share 
their parents’ fear of losing their job or store credit. Demonstrations “are the only way to 
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 get what we want,” determined one teenager. Many joined the NAACP Youth Council, 
and received training in non-violent techniques from veterans of the Danville protests – 
members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC).343  
 On Thursday July 26, 1963, African American youths began a peaceful protest in 
the Farmville business district. Rev. L. Francis Griffin pledged that the demonstrations 
would continue “indefinitely on a daily basis” in protest against “closed schools, delay in 
the courts, and segregation in its totality.” On Friday, the downtown demonstrations 
continued, supplemented by “stand-ins” at the movie theater, “try-ins” at department 
stores, and “sit-ins” at lunch counters – all with no arrests. On Saturday, the busiest 
shopping day for the five-county region, the protestors grew to one hundred twenty-five 
strong, singing “freedom songs” as they marched down Main Street. The police arrested 
Rev. Richard Hale and nine others for loitering and blocking the sidewalk outside a 
luncheonette. The protestors immediately fell “limp” to the pavement, were arrested, and 
then carried to jail.344 
On Sunday, African Americans attempted to worship at white churches. The Johns 
Memorial Episcopal Church admitted seven African Americans to their service – all sat 
with Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss at his invitation, but the Presbyterian and Methodist churches 
turned African American worshipers away. Ushers barred African Americans from 
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 entering the Farmville Baptist Church. In response, Rev. James Samuel Williams led 
twenty-one protestors in song and prayer on the church steps, before they were arrested for 
violating a Virginia statute that made it illegal to “unlawfully and willfully interrupt and 
disturb a public worship service.”345 
On Monday, in anticipation of further arrests, Circuit Court Judge Joel W. Flood 
issued an order declaring the prisons of the eight neighboring counties and three cities “to 
be Prince Edward County jails” – enough space, said one African American leader, “to 
house every citizen of Prince Edward County, Negro and white, including horses, cattle, 
and dogs.” African Americans considered the court order an act of intimidation, an effort 
to curtail the demonstrations.346 
Frank Nat Watkins, Commonwealth’s Attorney, requested assistance from 
Governor Harrison to maintain law and order. “The tempo of the harassment of the citizens 
of Prince Edward County and the State of Virginia,” observed Watkins, “is increasing day 
by day.” Small towns and counties were “not equipped” to handle the mounting caseload 
created by prolonged, organized civil rights demonstrations. Soon, Watkins warned, local 
law enforcement may not be able to maintain peace and order, whereby, assistance from 
the National Guard would be required.347 
J. Barrye Wall, Jr. anticipated that the “demonstrations will slowly stop and all will 
be over.” In fact, the protestors continued marching, bearing placards that read: “We’ve 
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 Been Patient Long Enough,” “Shall Jails Be Our Schools?” and “We Learn Our Civics in 
Jail.” Rev. L. Francis Griffin moved to supplement the campaign with an economic 
boycott of Farmville businesses. As one protestor believed, if African Americans stopped 
buying, “the white people would give in.” The demonstrators distributed handbills, which 
read:  
 
MAKE YOUR $$$ WORK FOR FREEDOM 
Our Negro Children of Prince Edward County have been: 
segregated…discriminated against…locked out of schools…denied the 
right to worship God…and jailed. The above acts have been condoned, if 
not, supported by the merchants of Farmville. 
 
NEGROES CAN STOP THIS!! 
Buy where you and your children will be treated with dignity and respect!! 
 
MAKE FARMVILLE A GHOST TOWN!!! 
Farmville must be as empty as a desert every day until we have public 
schools for all children in Prince Edward County. Negroes of Amelia, 
Nottoway, Charlotte, Appomattox, Buckingham, Cumberland, and 
Lunenburg Counties, support the boycott against the Prince Edward County 
merchants.  
 
DON’T BUY IN FARMVILLE!! BOYCOTT FOR FREEDOM!! 
 
A Farmville merchant, Emanuel Weinberg,348 considered the handbills as “the next thing 
to blackmail,” and admitted that “it’s getting to be aggravating.” Rather than slowing 
down, the demonstrations appeared to be strengthening, and tension increasing. “The 
community was…boiling,” observed Bill vanden Heuvel.349  
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  The presence of an integrated volunteer group from New York threatened to boil 
the tension over into violence. In mid-July, members of the United Federation of Teachers 
and students from Queens College arrived in Farmville to conduct a free seven-week 
remedial education program for the county’s locked out children. “We hope to show by 
example, as well as to teach these educationally deprived children,” said Richard 
Parrish,350 “that all Americans can work and live together amicably.” Southside Virginia 
was unaccustomed to the close contact between blacks and whites. “We don’t approve of 
white girls associating with Negro men,” reported one segregationist. “Some of the whites, 
more emotional ones – very few, are inclined to start something,” reported J. Barrye Wall, 
“but we have them pretty well in hand.”351 
 
Prince Edward Free School Association 
 
 Organizing the model school system to begin operation in September required all 
hands on ship. The administration had to forge cooperation among private agencies, 
federal, state, and local officials, and gain the support of the community, both black and 
white – a formidable task for parties who had only known one another as adversaries in a 
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 twelve-year legal struggle. President Kennedy delegated the responsibilities to several 
departments in his administration. However, President Kennedy employed the moral 
authority of his office by “direct[ing] that his personal concern about the situation be 
communicated to those responsible for setting up a satisfactory program in the county.”352 
The Kennedy Administration deemed Governor Harrison’s support indispensable 
to the success of the model school system. The state’s support would repudiate accusations 
that the federal government imposed an educational program against the will of the state 
and localities, and, instead, increase community acceptance of the program. For Governor 
Harrison, the Prince Edward County situation remained “a bur…under our saddle.” 
Everywhere the governor went to deliver a speech, someone asked him about Prince 
Edward County. The criticism from the press mounted. The Washington Post, for example, 
opined:  
 
Governor Harrison blandly ignores a moral default that is progressively 
shadowing the reputation of his administration and of his state. Does the 
Governor ever think, one wonders, what history will say of the men who let 
1,400 small Negro children pay the price of Virginia’s long quarrel with the 
Federal Constitution? The locked schools have become a national symbol of 
a petty and immeasurably vindictive spirit. 
 
Governor Harrison hoped that formal education would be provided for African American 
students, but continually failed to take the initiative. However, Harrison recognized the 
consequences of inaction to not only the state’s reputation, but the segregationists’ legal 
standing, and public safety.  “It would prove disastrous to test our tuition grant program 
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 where there are absolutely no public schools or any freedom of choice,” the governor 
lamented. Also, Harrison admitted, the Prince Edward County “situation is bad,” and he 
feared violence.353 
On July 30, 1963, after two months of negotiations, Governor Harrison, J. Segar 
Gravatt, and Bill vanden Heuvel concluded an agreement to organize a non-profit 
corporation, chartered under Virginia law, to provide education in Prince Edward County.  
The conferees arranged a preliminary agreement, subject to the school board’s approval, to 
lease the county’s public school buildings. Finally, Governor Harrison pledged to “use his 
good offices to procure the services” of a board of trustees.354 
The Kennedy Administration envisioned a bi-racial board of trustees, composed of 
Virginian educators. “By restricting the trustees to Virginia educators,” explained Bill 
vanden Heuvel:  
 
a maximum of community acceptance could be achieved and perhaps a path 
opened that would encourage the reopening of the public schools….To have 
a group of distinguished Virginians reflect their own concern about 
educational opportunity will have an impact of inestimable value. 
 
Such a group would permit the “moderate voices in Virginia…an opportunity to be heard.” 
Colgate Darden355 topped the administration’s list to serve as the chairman of the board of 
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 trustees. Darden was a former congressman, past governor, President emeritus of the 
University of Virginia, and, the administration believed, the “only Virginian…with 
sufficient independent stature to stand up to Sen. Byrd…and have significant influence at 
the same time.”356 
 President Kennedy dispatched Brooks Hays,357 a White House aide and former 
southern congressman, to Virginia to discuss with Colgate Darden his serving on the board 
of trustees. “The President feels he has to have the schools open in Prince Edward,” Hays 
told Darden, and President Kennedy wanted Darden to “undertake it.” Darden described 
the school closings as “deplorable,” but considered this matter the state’s responsibility. 
“Only the state can do it with any chance of success because the effort must have public 
support,” explained Darden. He would only accept the post upon the request of Governor 
Harrison, which soon followed.358 
 Still, Colgate Darden expressed some reservations. Darden refused to accept the 
chairmanship unless the children stopped demonstrating in Farmville. “I’m willing to 
undertake this,” Darden explained to Rev. L. Francis Griffin and Bill vanden Heuvel, “but 
I can’t do so unless you all can stop the marching….I don’t believe you can teach children 
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 under those circumstances.” As a matter of principle, Rev. Griffin refused to ask the 
children to end the demonstrations, but predicted that once schools opened the children’s 
participation would likely diminish. “I’m not going to open a school down there under 
conditions which I deem impossible,” Darden responded, and then threatened to withdraw 
his support. Privately, Bill vanden Heuvel explained to Darden that the black leadership 
was “not willing to go to their people and tell them they can’t march. They just can’t do 
that and have the people trust them; but I can say this to you: if you go to work on the 
schools, there won’t be a parade while you are there.” Darden withdrew his ultimatum and 
accepted the post of chairman.359 
Colgate Darden’s acceptance of the chairmanship imparted legitimacy on the model 
school project. “The success of the whole venture hung” on Darden’s decision, believed 
Dr. C. G. Gordon Moss – as did many others. Further, Darden’s participation removed the 
final obstacle for other preeminent Virginians to accept posts on the board of trustees, 
which included three white educators: Darden; Fred B. Cole,360 and F.D.G. Ribble,361 and 
three black educators: Robert P. Daniel,362 Thomas H. Henderson,363 and Earl H. 
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 McClenny364 – all of whom served at the request of Governor Harrison. “The racial 
balance among the board members, their eminence and their dedication to education 
validated our effort,” reflected Bill vanden Heuvel.365 
On August 14, 1963, Governor Harrison, accompanied by J. Segar Gravatt, Bill 
vanden Heuvel, Rev. L. Francis Griffin, and Henry Marsh,366 an NAACP attorney, 
announced the formation of the Prince Edward Free School Association, “a non profit 
association incorporated under the laws of Virginia, whose purposes will be to establish, 
maintain and operate a system of schools for the education of the children of Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, without regard to race, creed or color.” The announcement of 
free education for the locked out children of Prince Edward County was significant, but 
this press conference had broader importance. As Rev. Heslip Lee observed, “Never before 
have we witnessed the Governor of the state sitting down with NAACP leaders at a press 
conference, and never before have we witnessed a picture of these state leaders on the front 
pages of our newspapers and on our television.367 
 
A Task of Herculean Proportions 
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 On August 17, 1963, the board of trustees held their first meeting. Governor 
Harrison opened by stating: “The purpose [of the Free Schools] is to provide a first-class 
education for the children to whom this opportunity has been denied because of the closing 
of the schools in Prince Edward County in 1959.” After making his statement, Governor 
Harrison “excused himself,” essentially ending the state’s active involvement in the Free 
Schools. The board of trustees, with the assistance of the federal government, accepted the 
responsibility of hiring a superintendent, teachers, and staff, collecting supplies, acquiring 
the school buildings, and raising money – all this by September 16, the designated first day 
of school.368 
 On August 27, 1963, the board of trustees appointed Dr. Neil V. Sullivan369 
superintendent of the Free Schools. Colgate Darden introduced Dr. Sullivan as “a 
distinguished public educator whose experience in rural and ungraded education makes 
him eminently qualified for this project.” The ungraded program emphasized individual 
instruction to ensure “rapid progress.” Students would be grouped by age, and then 
advance based on their achievement, thereby, allowing fast learners to proceed, while 
slower learners received the necessary remediation. The Free School organizers 
determined that an ungraded program would best serve the needs of Prince Edward 
County’s locked out children, who possessed a wide range of educational experiences and 
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 abilities. Dr. Sullivan considered his assignment a “task of Herculean proportions,” 
especially with time running out and no teachers or classrooms.370  
The difficulty of staffing a “highly qualified faculty” was compounded by a 
national teacher shortage and that teachers were already under contract with other school 
divisions. Dr. Sullivan mailed hundreds of letters requesting qualified teachers from large 
cities and teacher training colleges, asked for assistance from the United States 
Employment Office, the Peace Corps, the National Education Association, and civic 
organizations, and placed ads in leading newspapers, but his efforts fell well short of 
staffing a 100-teacher faculty. When informed of the dilemma, Bill vanden Heuvel 
immediately contacted the National Education Association and Peace Corps officials, and 
requested the assistance of the Office of Education. Teachers from several sections of the 
country, including: California, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, answered the call. 
Still, more than half of the faculty members were Virginians – much to the delight of the 
board of trustees. More notable, one-fourth of the teachers were white, making the Free 
Schools the most integrated faculty in Virginia.371  
 The Department of Justice and Governor Harrison’s agreements concerning the 
lease of the school buildings were only preliminary talks, still requiring the approval of the 
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 county. Colgate Darden called on J. Segar Gravatt, the county board of supervisors’ 
attorney and a member of the University of Virginia’s Board of Visitors during Darden’s 
tenure as president. Gravatt pledged to assist in gaining support for the Free Schools from 
the county’s white leadership. “Some members of the Board of Supervisors had some 
reservations about the undertaking,” reported Gravatt. Darden traveled to Farmville to 
provide a personal assurance that the Free Schools would not “interfere in any way with 
court proceedings.” The Free Schools were a private entity, independent from the state, 
designed to provide education while the case moved through the courts. The county 
relented, and pledged their support to the Free Schools. J. Barrye Wall published an 
editorial easing the minds of his readers, and reflecting Darden’s assurances: “Opening the 
private ‘free schools’ does not prejudice the county’s position in its case before the courts. 
It does relieve the pressures upon the courts….We wish it well.”372 
 On September 4, 1963, negotiations concluded between county officials and the 
Prince Edward Free School Association for the lease of four school buildings and twenty 
buses – $2,800 per month. On his visit to the buildings, Dr. Sullivan fretted: 
 
I would have been hard put to hide the discouragement at what I found…. 
Dirt, dust and rubbish were everywhere. Floorboards were rotting; plaster 
had fallen; water had penetrated walls. Wastepaper baskets had not been 
emptied when the schools were closed, and the stench from the 
contaminated remains was sickening. The toilet areas with open slate 
urinals were cluttered with debris. 
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 The condition of the school buses exhibited the wear that could be expected from a fleet 
that sat idle for four years. Also, the schools lacked educational equipment and supplies.  
“The library, a beautiful room,” wrote Dr. Sullivan, “had only a few volumes on the 
shelves. Audio-visual equipment was virtually non-existent; the cafeteria kitchen had 
limited facilities. The classrooms and storage rooms contained no textbooks whatsoever.” 
In response, over the course of the school year, private organizations and individuals 
donated gifts valued at over $500,000, including: appliances, teaching machines, movie 
projectors, large screen televisions, and thousands of books; the Department of Agriculture 
provided surplus food, which the Free Schools stored in a rented warehouse in Lynchburg; 
and Bill vanden Heuvel and Dr. Sullivan contacted book companies, who were weary of 
the Free School’s solvency, to convince them to send the large shipment of textbooks.373 
The Prince Edward Free School Association anticipated a budget exceeding $1 
million. Bill vanden Heuvel had begun “an endless series of conversations” with the 
leadership of major foundations, which resulted in significant contributions, including: 
$250,000 from the Ford Foundation and $100,000 from the Field Foundation. Securing 
these vast sums was not easy, as the corporations did not want to fund a failing venture. 
Robert Kennedy personally intervened, calling corporations to provide assurance of the 
administration’s commitment to the Free Schools. In all, foundations donated two-thirds of 
the total contributions. Organizations, such as the National Education Association and 
parent-teachers organizations contributed about one-fourth of the money. Finally, private 
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 contributors produced the remaining ten percent, including a $10,000 donation, made 
“privately and with no publicity” by President Kennedy.374 
 
 On September 16, 1963, after a four year hiatus, universal education returned to 
Prince Edward County, Virginia. “Despite all the handicaps of uncertainty and a late start 
in the year,” reported one journalist, “the Free Schools opened on schedule.” The repaired 
bus fleet transported 1,500 children, including a handful of white students, to four 
renovated school buildings, housing the most integrated faculty in Virginia. The children 
appeared “gay and excited,” and their teachers “visibly moved.”375 Now the real work – 
teaching the educationally starved children – could begin. 
 
* * * * * 
 
 
 Burke Marshall listed the Prince Edward Free Schools as one of the Department of 
Justice’s “principal achievements” in the field of civil rights during Robert Kennedy’s 
tenure as Attorney General. Strange, the Free Schools were not established to protect 
federal court orders – as in the integration of the University of Mississippi and the 
University of Alabama, or to enforce laws – such as voting rights legislation, or as a means 
to restore law and order – as in Birmingham. In fact, the establishment of a federally 
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 sponsored, privately operated school system went beyond the purview of the Attorney 
General’s traditional responsibilities, but Robert Kennedy knew that, in terms of opening 
the schools, “the state was not going to do it, the county was not going to do it…We knew 
the only way it could be done was by private effort.”376 In the void of state and local 
leadership, in absence of interracial communication, and in the interregnum of court 
proceedings, the Kennedys deemed educating the children of Prince Edward County a 
federal responsibility, and employed extra-ordinary means to fulfill that end. 
 The Kennedy Administration initiated the Free Schools, but did not impose the 
program on unwilling state and local officials, or exclude the county’s black leadership in 
the planning – as Southside Schools, Inc. had in organizing an all-black private school 
system in 1959. Rather, the administration negotiated a temporary solution between 
parties, who had “no lines of communication,” but only viewed one another as adversaries. 
The federal government gained the support of Governor Harrison, who had never taken the 
initiative to employ the state’s resources to find a solution. Since the local white leadership 
detested the federal government, the administration’s effort to convince Colgate Darden to 
accept the chairmanship of the board of trustees proved invaluable to gaining acceptance 
for the Free Schools among the white community.  The NAACP had pledged to settle for 
nothing short of desegregated public education, but Bill vanden Heuvel gained the black 
leadership’s support by convincing them that the Free Schools were only a temporary 
solution, and that the Department of Justice would continue its efforts on their behalf in the 
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 federal courts. Finally, the administration made the Free Schools a national effort, as 
private foundations and individuals donated over a million dollars worth of cash and 
equipment. The creation and maintenance of the Free Schools hinged on federal-state-
local-private cooperation, and the administration brought these parties together to return 
universal education to Prince Edward County. 
However, the Prince Edward Free School Association provided more than 
education. The Free Schools “turned out to be an attack on impoverished conditions.” 
Hunger and malnutrition were met with free and reduced hot lunches. In an effort to 
combat winter conditions, the Free Schools collected and distributed four tons of warm 
clothing to needy families. Second, the Free Schools provided medical care, including an 
on-site dentist, and health clinics. Third, to combat cultural isolation, students took field 
trips to New York, Washington, D.C., Williamsburg, Charlottesville, and other historical 
sites. Finally, the Free Schools modeled bi-racial cooperation. By February 1964, bi-racial 
groups began meeting to discuss opening the public schools, and later for airing general 
problems. “The Free School system,” wrote one journalist, “was a vital factor in some of 
these developments and secondary one in others…. [The Free Schools] served as a 
catalytic agent in related areas of community life.”377 
The success of the Free Schools stems from the cooperation of federal, state, local, 
and private entities. However, without the Kennedy Administration acting as an 
intermediary between the warring factions, and without the resources and determination of 
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 the federal government to initiate such a program as the Free Schools, the educational 
erosion would likely have continued, thus threatening to escalate this community’s tension 
into open violence. Rather, the Free Schools created an educational bridge to the eventual 
reopening of the public schools, and, at the same time, contributed to improving interracial 
cooperation. Without President Kennedy’s authorization and personal concern, the Free 
Schools would never have existed. No education. No free hot lunches. No warm clothes. 
No basic medical or dental care. The assassination of John F. Kennedy, therefore, was met 
with profound grief in the Free School community.  In tribute to President Kennedy, the 
Free School sent a leather-bound scroll to Jacqueline Kennedy, which read:  
 
Our beloved President John F. Kennedy once considered us in our distress. 
We, the students of Prince Edward County Free Schools in Farmville, 
Virginia, think of Caroline, John and Mrs. Kennedy in their sorrow. It is 
also ours. 
 
Every one of the 1,567 Free School students signed the scroll “in their own hard-won 
handwriting.”378 
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Chapter 5: Let Us Continue 
 
 
“John F. Kennedy told his countrymen that our national work would not be 
finished ‘in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this administration, 
nor even perhaps in our lifetime on this planet. But,’ he said, ‘let us begin.’ 
Today, in this moment of new resolve, I would say to my fellow Americans, 
let us continue.” 
 
- President Lyndon B. Johnson379 
 
 
 
 John F. Kennedy did not solve the Prince Edward school dilemma within the first 
one hundred days, nor in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of his administration. 
The Johnson Administration, however, continued the work that the Kennedy 
Administration began. President Johnson invoked President Kennedy’s memory to guide 
public opinion and lobby Congress for passage of the Civil Rights Bill. “No memorial or 
eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory,” declared President 
Johnson.380 The Department of Justice continued to oversee the Free Schools, and prepared 
arguments for further proceedings in the federal courts. President Kennedy’s judicial 
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 appointees – men who extended the influence of the New Frontier for years, if not decades 
– oversaw the dismantling of Prince Edward County’s defiance to the Brown decision.  
 
Abnegation of Our Plain Duty 
 
 On August 12, 1963 – two days before Governor Harrison officially announced the 
formation of the Prince Edward Free School Association, and seven months after hearing 
arguments, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals referred the Prince Edward County 
school case to the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals to interpret the State 
Constitution. In their majority opinion, Herbert S. Boreman and Clement F. Haynsworth, 
Jr., both Eisenhower appointees, justified their caution: “If we should hazard a forecast and 
it should be proven wrong, any judgment based upon it will appear both gratuitously 
premature and empty when the state questions are authoritatively resolved in state courts.” 
Further, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court vacated the findings of the Federal District Court, 
which ordered the reopening of the public schools, prohibited the distribution of state 
tuition grants, and forbid tax credits for contributions to the private school system.381 
Judge J. Spencer Bell, a Kennedy appointee, wrote a nine-page dissenting opinion, 
claiming the court’s failure to move presented “a truly shocking example of the law’s 
delay” and an “abnegation of our plain duty.” Virginia’s public school system, Judge Bell 
argued, “is maintained, supported and administered on a statewide basis…therefore, the 
closure of the schools constitutes discrimination.” Judges Boreman and Haynsworth, on 
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 the other hand, ruled that the plaintiffs must prove that the county had a duty to operate 
public schools before the federal courts could provide relief. Second, Judge Bell 
determined that Prince Edward County “closed the schools solely to frustrate the orders of 
the Federal courts that the schools be desegregated.” Judge Bell considered either point – 
the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or the circumvention of court orders – 
sufficient to immediately implement the Federal District Court’s ruling.382  
 The abstention of Judge Simon E. Sobeloff and Judge Albert V. Bryan, Sr. 
diminished the prospects of an affirmative ruling for the plaintiffs. Several weeks earlier, 
the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, working at full capacity (Judges Bell, Boreman, 
Bryan, Haynsworth, and Sobeloff), upheld the Federal District Court in a school closing 
case. Judge John D. Butzner, Jr.,383 a Kennedy appointee, enjoined Powhatan County, a 
rural county adjacent to Prince Edward, from “taking any steps or actions designed to bring 
about the closing” of any of its public schools, or from “withholding funds or failing to 
appropriate or pay funds for the operation of public school or grades or classes thereof” – 
measures far firmer than Judge Lewis’ ruling in the Prince Edward County case. The U.S. 
Fourth Circuit Court enjoined Powhatan County officials “from acting directly or 
indirectly to close schools – during such time as other public schools are open in Virginia.” 
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 In fact, Bell, Bryan, and Sobeloff, with Boreman and Haynsworth dissenting, awarded the 
plaintiffs counsel fees, finding this an “equitable remedy” for “a case so extreme.”384 
 The Prince Edward County school situation was more extreme than that in 
Powhatan County. Had Judges Sobeloff and Bryan not disqualified themselves from the 
Prince Edward County case, there may have been a different outcome. Segregationists and 
historians, likely, would agree that Judge Sobeloff would have joined Judge Bell in 
opposition to Judges Haynsworth and Boreman. As U.S. Solicitor General, Sobeloff 
presented the United States’ arguments in the Brown case, prompting strong opposition 
from southern Senators to his nomination to the federal bench, who warned against, among 
other things, his belief in “judicial legislation.” Many segregationists determined that 
Sobeloff, a liberal Republican from Maryland, harbored an anti-South bias. “Sobeloff hates 
the guts of everything south of the Potomac,” opined one journalist. As chief judge of the 
Fourth Circuit, Sobeloff amassed a judicial record opposing delay in school desegregation, 
and would have likely supported the plaintiffs in the Prince Edward County case.385 
 If a five-judge court heard the case, Judge Albert V. Bryan, Sr., known for “his 
strict adherence to precedent,” would likely have cast the deciding vote. In 1952, Albert 
Bryan, a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, sat on a three-
judge panel to determine the constitutionality of school segregation in the Prince Edward 
County case. Judge Bryan wrote the opinion, which upheld the constitutionality of the 
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 separate but equal doctrine, but was later reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education. In the school desegregation cases he heard after Brown, Judge Bryan 
“adopted the narrowest possible interpretation” of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
implementation orders. However, after the State and federal courts struck down Virginia’s 
massive resistance laws in 1959, Judge Bryan issued the orders to desegregate Alexandria 
and Arlington’s public schools – along with Norfolk, these schools were the first to 
desegregate in Virginia. In April 1960, Judge Bryan ordered Prince Edward County 
officials to comply with the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling of May 1959 by 
admitting black students to the all-white public schools. As a judge on the U.S. Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals – elevated from the Federal District Court by President Kennedy, 
Bryan joined Judges Bell and Sobeloff in opposition to Powhatan County’s threatened 
school closing. For a judge known for his “strict adherence to precedent,” Bryan would 
likely have voted in favor of the plaintiffs in the Prince Edward County case.386 
 Sobeloff, Bryan, and Bell, therefore, would have provided a majority in favor of the 
plaintiffs in the Prince Edward County case. If this court would not permit Powhatan 
County to close its public schools, it is conceivable that it would have directed the Federal 
District Court to issue orders to reopen Prince Edward County’s public schools. Prince 
Edward County’s only options would have been further defiance, warranting the 
intervention of the Executive Branch to enforce court orders, or appealing to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. It is possible that the Supreme Court would not have granted Prince 
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 Edward County a writ of certiorari, thus upholding the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ ruling, and forcing the reopening of the public schools by September 1963. But 
that is not what happened. Instead, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 
injunction on tuition grants and referred the case to State court.  
 
 In September 1963, the counties of Chesterfield, King and Queen, and Surry, and 
the city of Hopewell joined the cities of Charlottesville and Norfolk, and the counties of 
Powhatan, Prince Edward, and Warren in offering segregated private education to sidestep 
the Brown decision. An estimated 4,650 students enrolled in these programs, and were 
eligible to receive tuition grants – $250 per year for elementary students and $275 per year 
for high school students. By virtue of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals lifting the 
injunction, students attending the Prince Edward School Foundation were again eligible for 
public assistance. The NAACP sought a stay of that order, but the court upheld its own 
ruling, although not without opposition. Judge J. Spencer Bell wrote in his dissenting 
opinion: 
 
I dissent because the effect of this order will be to further entrench and 
perpetuate the irreparable harm inherent in the operation of an illegal tuition 
grant system while the public schools in Prince Edward County remain 
closed. 
 
The NAACP appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, because without a stay of the ruling, 
“the effect will be to entrench and perpetuate opposition to what is the only conceivable 
solution to this problem – the maintenance of a public school system free of racial 
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 discrimination.” Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.387 granted the NAACP’s request 
and issued an order to temporarily bar tuition grants to Prince Edward School Foundation 
students until the Supreme Court could review the NAACP’s petition, which asked the 
high court to hear the Prince Edward County case on all its merits.388 
 Justice Brennan’s order disappointed parents of the private school students. Leo A. 
Wells, a local resident, argued that Prince Edward County’s parents “paid the same taxes 
that taxpayers of other counties of the state and we are entitled to the same relief….Parents 
like myself are hard hit to pay tuition for their children.” J. Barrye Wall claimed that 
“Prince Edward parents are discriminated against while federal courts adjudicate 
constitutional questions so important to all American citizens.” In The Farmville Herald, 
Wall presented a plea on behalf of the parents, who he said “deserve and need the 
assistance.”389  
 In the fall of 1963, the Prince Edward School Foundation remained in financial 
straits. “It appears that we will need at least $50,000 more to relieve the burdens of some 
parents,” J. Barrye Wall explained to Colgate Darden. Contrarily, the Prince Edward Free 
School Association received several large donations from charitable foundations, including 
$50,000 from both the Danforth Foundation and the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation, 
$100,000 from the Field Foundation, and $250,000 from the Ford Foundation – all 
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 publicized in national newspapers. “I would appreciate it if you would give me some 
information which would aid [the Prince Edward School Foundation] in presenting our 
case” to charitable foundations, Wall wrote to Darden. “Any tips you can give us will be 
appreciated.” 390  
 Governor Harrison employed his influence to secure financial assistance for Prince 
Edward County’s white parents. Earlier, Governor Harrison declined to raise money for the 
Free Schools, because that would set the precedent for him to do so for every organization, 
including the Prince Edward School Foundation. Nevertheless, Harrison recognized the 
financial burden on Prince Edward County’s white parents, and used his office to support 
grant proposals for the county’s private schools. However, large donors failed to answer 
the call. The Free Schools’ largest donor, the Ford Foundation, for example, flatly rejected 
the governor’s request, stating: “With our grant of $250,000 made for the purpose of 
opening schools in Prince Edward County, we feel that we have done all we can in 
providing money for this situation and are not prepared to make further grants toward the 
education of children in the county.” 391 
 The Prince Edward School Foundation’s insolvency bore witness to the fallacy of 
replacing public education with a segregated private school system. Doubts resurfaced over 
the viability of sustaining the private schools, and diminished the argument for the outright 
abolishment of public education. Further, the operation of the Free Schools threatened to 
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 siphon off white students from the Foundation. Perhaps, the time had come to resume 
public education – at the very least, to recommence the tuition grant program. 
Nevertheless, Wall employed The Farmville Herald to encourage the white community to 
continue the fight. The white parents “must win this legal fight. Too much sacrifice has 
been made, the questions involved are too grave, the answers too important to liberty and 
freedom of all Americans and to the future of education for their cause to be lost.”392 The 
county chose to continue fighting in the courts for the reinstatement of tuition grants. 
On December 2, 1963, the Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals, by a six-to-
one vote, supported the white parents by affirming Judge John Wingo Knowles’ decision 
that the state had no legal obligation to operate public schools in any locality, that Prince 
Edward County had the right to close its public schools to avoid desegregation, and found 
no reason to prohibit the distribution of tuition grants. In a strong dissent, Chief Judge John 
W. Eggleston393 called the school closings “shameful,” adding that “the refusal of the 
highest court of this state to recognize here the rights of the citizens of Prince Edward 
County guaranteed to them under the Constitution of the United States is a clear invitation 
to the Federal court to step in and enforce such rights. I am sure the invitation will be 
promptly accepted. We shall see.”394 
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 Not Enough Speed 
 
In anticipation of an unfavorable ruling from the Virginia State Supreme Court of 
Appeals, the NAACP appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the school closings 
and the state’s tuition grant program violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The NAACP 
“urgently and respectfully requested” that the Supreme Court resolve the issues “in such 
convenient haste” to permit the opening of desegregated schools by September 1964. 
Weeks later, the U.S. Solicitor General, Archibald Cox, filed a supporting brief dismissing 
the state court’s ruling, and expressing the Department of Justice’s desire for an 
accelerated hearing and resolution. Cox urged the Supreme Court to affirm “the right of 
school children to obtain the desegregated public education which was declared in this 
very case more than nine years ago.” On January 6, 1964, the Supreme Court acceded, 
stating that “in view of the long delay and the importance of the questions presented,” the 
high court would bypass further proceedings in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, and hear 
the Prince Edward County case on its full merits in the early spring.395 
On March 30, 1964, the litigants, again, presented arguments before the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The state and county attorneys argued that the high court’s ordering a 
legislative body to levy taxes would be unprecedented, and that the Constitution does not 
guarantee children the right to attend public schools. J. Segar Gravatt explained that the 
school closings, local option, and tuition grants presented children with the freedom of 
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 choice to “select the school they wish to attend.” Associate Justice Potter Stewart396 asked 
Gravatt if the school closings and the tuition grant program “deprived people of their 
constitutional right to attend an integrated public school in Prince Edward County?” 
Gravatt responded that county officials provided its residents with freedom of choice, 
citing the availability of state and local tuition grants for both black and white students, 
and reminding the court that black parents refused to accept the white leadership’s offer to 
establish a segregated private school system for black children. Finally, Gravatt urged the 
court “not to restrict our freedoms.” 
 “May I ask about those little colored children who have been without an education? 
Have they had freedom?” asked Chief Justice Earl Warren.397 
 “They’ve had liberties,” responded Gravatt. 
 “And freedom to go through life without and education,” retorted the Chief Justice. 
 In the gallery sat five Free School students. One of the students whispered, 
“They’ve got them cornered now.” 
 Robert L. Carter, a NAACP attorney, and U.S. Solicitor General Archibald Cox, 
acting as a friend of the court, presented arguments on behalf of the locked out children. 
Carter argued that the county closed the public schools to avoid a court order, and that 
racially desegregated schools should be more than conceptual, but a reality. Archibald Cox 
argued that the school closings were a malevolent act to deny education to the county’s 
African American children. The school closings represented “invidious discrimination” 
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 against the locked out children, and a clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
because children in other localities throughout Virginia were afforded an education. “If this 
experiment in ignorance is continued,” argued the U.S. Solicitor General, “it will affect the 
whole state.” Cox urged the Supreme Court to issue an order to compel the county board of 
supervisors to levy taxes for public schools.398 
On May 25, 1964 – ten years and eight days after the Brown decision, a unanimous 
Court determined in Griffin that “the time for ‘deliberate speed’ has run out.” Writing for 
the Court, Justice Hugo L. Black399 found that “there has been entirely too much 
deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing the constitutional rights which we held [in 
1954] had been denied Prince Edward County Negro children.”  The Supreme Court 
determined that the closed public schools must be reopened, and, therefore, directed the 
Federal District Court to provide African American children “quick and effective relief.”400 
In support of the NAACP and Department of Justice’s motions, the Supreme Court 
permitted the Federal District Court, if necessary, to “require the county board of 
supervisors to levy taxes and appropriate funds for public school operations,” raising the 
ire of massive resisters and states’ rights advocates. The Richmond Times-Dispatch 
considered the Court’s edict “alarming in the highest degree” and “one of the most 
dangerous precedents in the history of our judicial system.” Never before had the federal 
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 courts directed a legislative body to levy taxes. “If the Prince Edward decision means that 
Federal judges can direct elected officials of a locality to levy taxes and appropriate 
funds,” responded Senator Harry F. Byrd, “then [the Griffin] decision is the greatest 
usurpation of power any court has ever assumed.” As J. Segar Gravatt explained, 
“Whenever the court thinks that any legislative body in any place in the United States 
should provide some public facility or do some act for the public welfare…now the court 
can at least claim the power to direct the levy of taxes for a specific purpose.”401  
The state’s segregationist leaders called for resistance to the Griffin decision. 
Senator Harry F. Byrd urged J. Segar Gravatt to advise the county board of supervisors not 
to levy taxes for public schools. Congressman Watkins M. Abbitt believed the Supreme 
Court was “modifying, stretching, disregarding and interpreting the Constitution to fit the 
court’s own political and social philosophy.” Abbitt immediately introduced legislation in 
the House of Representatives to prohibit the federal courts from forcing a state or locality 
to levy taxes. The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties insist that state 
governments to “assert that the [Griffin decision] is not recognized as being legal and 
binding upon any local or state legislative body.”402 
In anticipation of criticism, Justice Hugo L. Black wrote a defense of the edict in 
the court’s opinion. “An order of this kind is within the court’s power if required to assure 
these petitioners that their constitutional rights will no longer be denied.” The Supreme 
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 Court met Prince Edward County’s extreme defiance of the Brown decision with an 
unprecedented court order. J. Harvie Wilkinson III succinctly described the high court’s 
quandary in the Virginia Law Review: 
 
Here was a party to the original Brown decision, back in Court a decade 
later, with its private schools segregated and public schools shut down. Here 
was a county willing to forsake altogether democracy’s noble experiment – 
universal public education – to defy the Brown decision. Here were Negro 
schoolchildren not better off after Brown but much worse. And there the 
Supreme Court, indeed the entire federal judiciary, seemingly unable after 
ten long years to help. Thus the Justices, as in Little Rock, had to end the 
obstruction as swiftly as possible. And in Griffin v. County School Board, 
the Court did just that.403 
 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court entrusted Federal District Judge Oren R. Lewis to oversee 
the county’s adherence to the Griffin decision. Judge Lewis’ previous decisions in the case 
had been far from swift or decisive. Now, with the county officials hinting at defiance, and 
with the sweeping authority bestowed from the U.S. Supreme Court, Judge Lewis set June 
25, 1964 as the deadline for the county board of supervisors to levy taxes “adequate” to 
operate a public school system “like that operated in other counties in Virginia.”404 
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 The Last Vestige of Massive Resistance 
 
 In Griffin, the Supreme Court failed to deliver a definitive ruling on the tuition 
grant program. “If the court wanted to say [the tuition grants] were illegal,” Governor 
Harrison told reporters, “it had a wonderful opportunity to do so.” Rather, the Supreme 
Court left the freedom of choice program intact, but upheld the injunction on tuition grants 
in Prince Edward County as long as the public schools were closed. Ostensibly, the county 
could reopen the public schools, whose enrollment would be almost, if not, entirely 
African American, and then the white children would be eligible, again, for state 
assistance, thus sustaining an otherwise insolvent private academy. “The tuition grants 
certainly would be helpful to our patrons,” acknowledged Robert T. Redd, the private 
school administrator.405 Under a dual system of publicly funded public and private schools, 
African Americans stood to gain little after thirteen years of litigation.  
 In June 1964, the NAACP challenged the constitutionality of another Southside 
county’s use of tuition grants in Federal District Court. Following the State Pupil 
Placement Board’s assigning seven African Americans to Surry County’s all-white high 
school, all of the white students withdrew from the school, which the county then closed, 
and enrolled in a segregated private academy supported by public tuition grants. Federal 
District Court Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. issued an order prohibiting the county from 
closing the white school “or any other school under its jurisdiction and control while any 
other public school in Virginia is operated” – an action consistent with his ruling in the 
 201
 Powhatan County case and the Supreme Court’s decision in Griffin. Also, the Federal 
District Court clarified the Supreme Court’s ambiguity on the issue of tuition grants. Judge 
Butzner prohibited tuition grant payments to students at “any school that discriminates in 
the admission and education of pupils on the basis of race.” Although Judge Butzner’s 
order only applied to Surry County, The Richmond Times-Dispatch warned that the ruling 
had “implications for the entire South,” and threw “grave doubt on the legality of the use 
of tuition grants in Prince Edward.”406 
 Judge Oren R. Lewis had indicated that the injunction on tuition grants to Prince 
Edward County students would be lifted upon the resumption of public education. 
Although Judge Lewis set a deadline for county officials to allocate funding for the public 
schools, and to the dismay of the plaintiffs, he would “not put a dollar amount in the 
order.” Judge Lewis said, “I don’t intend to be the superintendent of the Prince Edward 
County School system.” The court, Judge Lewis explained, “is going to assume [the 
county board of supervisors] will do their duty, the same as I have to do mine – as 
obnoxious as it sometimes may seem.”407 
 On June 23, 1964, the Prince Edward County board of supervisors voted four-to-
two to appropriate funding for the “reopening, operating, and maintaining public schools 
without racial discrimination.” The county school board requested $339,300 in local funds, 
but the board of supervisors considered $189,000 “sufficient and reasonable to operate and 
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 maintain the public schools…in compliance with the order” of the Federal District Court. 
Rev. L. Francis Griffin found the public school allocations “hopelessly inadequate,” and 
“evidence that an integrated school system is not intended by the supervisors.” Rather, the 
board of supervisors provided $375,000 in tuition grants for white private school students. 
Rev. Griffin warned that the county officials were “reverting to the same pattern of pre-
1954” – a separate but unequal dual school system.408 Judge Lewis’s malevolence and 
courtroom rhetoric clearly emboldened the county officials to craft such an iniquitous 
school budget.  
 On June 29, 1964, in response, NAACP attorneys Samuel W. Tucker and Henry L. 
Marsh III filed another motion in Federal District Court.  The NAACP asked Judge Lewis 
to issue an order to force the county to open all of the public school buildings, and draft a 
budget to educate all school-aged children – both black and white – in the public system at 
a sum no less than the school board’s recommendation. In making their argument, Tucker 
and Marsh cited Judge Butzner’s recent ruling in Surry County, which prohibited the 
closing of any public school building. Second, the attorneys asked that tuition grants be 
barred to students who attended racially segregated private schools, again, citing Judge 
Butzner’s ruling in the Surry County case. The NAACP worked to apply the Surry County 
judgment to the rest of the state.409  
 Two days later, the State Board of Education unanimously approved retroactive 
tuition grant payments to Prince Edward County’s white parents for the 1963-1964 school 
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 year – a figure estimated at $225,000, setting an application deadline for July 10. Henry 
Marsh argued that any payment made before public schools reopened would “clearly 
violate” the Federal District Court’s injunction on tuition grants, and the NAACP 
requested an immediate restraining order from Judge Lewis, but were rebuffed. Samuel W. 
Tucker appealed to U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge J. Spencer Bell considered the 
“payment of such grants would result in irreparable injury to the substantial rights of the 
plaintiffs,” and, therefore, issued an order enjoining the state and county from issuing 
payments until the issue could be argued in Federal District Court and appealed to the U.S. 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.410 
 At the July 1964 hearing, Judge Lewis noted that the NAACP attorneys’ legal 
actions were “grossly interfering with the opening of schools,” and he refused to entertain 
any more “frivolous motions.” The NAACP attorneys were prepared to present their 
arguments, but Judge Lewis refused them a hearing, stating: “I am not going to tolerate any 
foolishness.” Judge Lewis rejected the appeal to issue an injunction on the distribution of 
future tuition grants, or direct the county board of supervisors to increase the school 
budget. Judge Lewis did, however, make Judge J. Spencer Bell’s injunction on the 
retroactive tuition grants permanent. The Norfolk Virginia-Pilot editorialized that the court 
proceedings “could take place only in Alice’s Wonderland or its modern counterpart, 
Virginia.”411 
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  The NAACP appealed to the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to increase the 
school budget and issue an injunction on the payment of tuition grants to Prince Edward 
County residents. Alarmed by a possible injunction on tuition grants, the county leadership 
caught the NAACP “flatfooted” by organizing a covert campaign to distribute payments to 
white residents. At midnight on August 5, 1964, county leaders and private school officials 
notified the white residents that county tuition grant payments were available to be cashed 
immediately at local banks.  The “midnight raid on the public treasury,” as Samuel W. 
Tucker described it, distributed $180,000 – money for the first semester of school, a clear 
testament to the county’s reverence for the freedom of choice plan. “Freedom of choice is 
still massive resistance, no matter what you call it,” argued Tucker, and he pledged to 
attack the constitutionality of the program.412 
 
President Kennedy’s judicial appointments – J. Spencer Bell, Albert V. Bryan, Sr., 
and John D. Butzner, Jr. – contributed significantly to the abolition of the public 
subsidization of Prince Edward County’s private schools, and to the breakdown of 
Virginia’s tuition grant program altogether. On December 2, 1964, the U.S. Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals (Judges Bell, Boreman, Bryan, Haynsworth, and Sobeloff) found the 
payment of public tuition grants to segregated private schools “a transparent evasion of the 
14th Amendment.” The public support of white academies, the court determined, were 
“tailor made to continue their initially avowed and persistently pursued policy of 
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 segregation.” Therefore, the court upheld Judge Butzner’s injunction on the payment of 
tuition grants to students of Surry County’s segregated private schools, and overturned 
Judge Lewis by applying that ruling to Prince Edward County, thereby blocking further 
tuition grants payments to students at the Prince Edward School Foundation.413 
 On March 10, 1965, a special three-judge court – Albert V. Bryan, Sr., John D. 
Butzner, Jr., and Walter E. Hoffman414 – ordered the end of state tuition grant payments to 
students at nine segregated private school systems, including the Prince Edward School 
Foundation, which was already under injunction by the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Writing for the court, Judge Bryan determined that “if the [segregated] private 
school is the creature of or is preponderantly maintained by the grants, then the operation 
of the school is a state action,” and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court 
ruled that the State could not provide more than fifty percent of a private school’s budget. 
The three-judge court crippled the tuition grant program as a means of publicly funding 
segregated schools, but did not destroy it. 415 
 Next, on June 20, 1966, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found the Prince 
Edward County board of supervisors in civil contempt for distributing county tuition grants 
while still under a court injunction – the “midnight raid” of August 1964. The supervisors, 
wrote Judge Bryan, “undertook to put the money beyond its control as well as that of the 
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 court….Obviously the aim was to thwart the impact of any adverse decree which might 
ultimately be forthcoming.” The court’s three-to-two majority – Judges Bell, Bryan, and 
Sobeloff – ordered the six county supervisors “jointly and severally” to repay the $180,000 
lost to the public treasury.416 
 Finally, on February 11, 1969, Judges Bryan, Butzner, and Hoffman found the 
state’s tuition grant program unconstitutional. Private schools had adjusted their budgets to 
meet the requirements outlined by the three-judge panel in 1965, but the NAACP, arguing 
that this program still permitted the state to support racially segregated schools, reopened 
the suit. In addition, the federal courts had since invalidated similar publicly funded 
programs in other southern states. The three-judge panel determined that “any assistance 
whatever by the State towards provision of a racially-segregated education exceeds the 
pale of tolerance demarked by the Constitution.” This decision destroyed the tuition grant 
program, “the last major vestige of [Virginia’s] massive resistance.”417 
 
* * * * * 
 
 On September 8, 1964, after five years, public education returned to Prince Edward 
County, Virginia. The Prince Edward Free School Association made a significant 
contribution in the transition from the absence of educational opportunities to the 
resumption of public education. The board of trustees transferred all of the Free School 
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 property to the school board, including approximately $300,000 worth of educational 
equipment. In addition, the trustees endowed the public schools with a $23,000 grant to 
continue the special education program. T.J. McIlwaine, the superintendent, reported that 
the grant “will make possible programs which we could not have provided from the regular 
school budget.” Also, the trustees contributed $4,500 for a nursing program, installed a 
refrigeration unit in the cafeteria, and donated additional money to continue the hot lunch 
program. Finally, thirty-five teachers, including several white teachers, continued their 
employment at the public schools. 418 
The Prince Edward County public schools were opened to all races, but, as 
predicted, the enrollment was overwhelmingly black. Only seven white students – all of 
whom attended the Free Schools – enrolled in the public schools, while over 1,200 white 
students registered with the Prince Edward School Foundation. White enrollment remained 
low until President Kennedy’s judicial appointees broke down Virginia’s tuition grant 
program. By the end of the 1970s, with tuition costs increasing, white students’ enrollment 
in the public schools increased to twenty-three percent. “Whites still feel the same way 
about us,” observed Rev. L. Francis Griffin, “but they don’t want to pay the high tuition at 
Prince Edward Academy.”419 
White people’s views of African Americans mattered little in the eyes of the law, 
particularly after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One day after President Johnson 
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 signed President Kennedy’s civil rights bill into law, African Americans challenged Prince 
Edward County’s compliance to the public accommodations section of the act. African 
Americans were admitted with courtesy to two previously segregated restaurants and the 
movie theater. President Eisenhower had repeatedly asserted that laws cannot change the 
hearts of men. Certainly, the hearts of Prince Edward County’s segregationists did not 
suddenly change after passage of the bill. “Acceptance of what the law requires is the 
beginning of change,” thought Burke Marshall.  “The law has to lead sometimes.” 420 
 The Kennedy Administration’s legacy in Prince Edward County extended well 
beyond November 22, 1963. The Free Schools touched the lives of over 1,500 students, 
and the donation of $100,000s of equipment and $10,000s of grants to the public schools 
touched the lives of many more. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 broke down many of the 
county’s final legal vestiges of Jim Crow. Kennedy’s Department of Justice, again, 
presented arguments in federal court in defense of the locked out children. Finally, long 
after President Kennedy’s civil rights team left the Executive Branch, his judicial 
appointees further extended the influence of the administration by tearing down the last 
remnant of Virginia’s massive resistance to school desegregation. 
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EPILOGUE: With History the Final Judge 
 
 
“Five years ago, rural Prince Edward County, Virginia, closed its public 
schools rather than desegregate them. How can we measure the cost of that 
defiance? How did it affect the Negro children whose futures have been 
permanently crippled because they could not learn to read? How did it 
affect the white children, sent to makeshift – but segregated schools – 
private schools? How did it affect the citizens of [Farmville], who have 
walked past the vacant public school buildings while children were left to 
linger in the streets and fields? And how did it affect Virginia, whose 
leadership helped create this republic? The point is that the costs of defiance 
are beyond measure. They touch generations yet unborn. They destroy 
possibilities for progress in the present. They scar our history.” 
 
- Robert F. Kennedy421 
 
 
 
 The Kennedy Administration’s performance in Prince Edward County contradicts 
the dominant narrative that has shaped the evaluation of the administration’s overall civil 
rights record. First, the Kennedy Administration has been criticized for reacting to civil 
rights episodes, and not taking proactive measures to prevent crises. Contrarily, within the 
first one hundred days of the administration, the Attorney General, supported by President 
Kennedy, took decisive legal action to protect the constitutional rights of Prince Edward 
 
421 Speech delivered at the Herbert H. Lehman Human Relations Award Dinner of the American Jewish 
Committee Appeal for Human Relations, New York City, April 16, 1964 in Hopkins, ed., Rights for 
Americans, 204-205. 
 County’s locked out children – an effort designed to prevent another Little Rock or New 
Orleans from occurring in Farmville, and to thwart the exportation of Prince Edward 
County-styled education throughout the South. Although the Federal District Court Judge 
rejected the Attorney General’s intervention motion, administration officials made 
preparations for assistance in the event that the federal courts handed down an affirmative 
order to reopen the schools. When it appeared that schools would be closed for yet another 
year, President Kennedy authorized the Department of Justice to sponsor the Prince 
Edward Free School Association to build a bridge from the educational vacuum to the 
resumption of public education. Also, the Free Schools’ opening stemmed the county’s 
racial tension, which teetered on the brink of violent confrontation. In short, the Kennedy 
Administration immediately recognized the significance of the Prince Edward County 
situation, and continually sought to take action regardless of setbacks in the protracted 
court proceedings. 
 
 In his one thousand days, John F. Kennedy filled one hundred twenty-five 
vacancies in the Federal District Courts, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Historians have criticized President Kennedy for appointing “lifetime 
litigation-overseers…dedicated to frustrating” civil rights litigation. In Kennedy Justice, 
for example, Victor S. Navasky constructed a condemnation of the administration’s 
judicial appointments, but based that assessment on the federal judges Kennedy nominated 
to the Fifth Circuit, specifically outlining Judge W. Harold Cox’s outrageous courtroom 
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 behavior.422 The jurists of the Fifth Circuit cannot be discounted, but nor can other federal 
appointees be ignored in developing a thorough assessment of Kennedy’s civil rights 
record, nor should historians penalize the administration for the obstructionism and 
indecisiveness of federal judges who received appointment to the federal bench before the 
torch was passed to the New Frontier. 
 Federal District Court Judge Oren R. Lewis, an Eisenhower appointee, proved 
indecisive in presiding over the Prince Edward County school crisis. In June 1961, Judge 
Lewis denied Robert Kennedy’s intervention motion in the Prince Edward County case for, 
among other reasons, the delay the Department of Justice’s involvement would cause. 
Thirteen months later, in July 1962, Judge Lewis determined that the state was responsible 
for the operation of public schools, ordered the schools reopened, and then stayed his order 
until the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his ruling. The delay caused by 
Judge Lewis’ indecisiveness could have been averted had federal intervention been 
granted, permitting the United States to name the State of Virginia as a defendant. Further, 
Judge Lewis overlooked the precedents established by Federal District Court Judges J. 
Skelly Wright and John D. Butzner, Jr., permitting state and county officials to wage a 
legal battle of attrition. 
 President Kennedy’s appointment of Judge John D. Butzner, Jr. to the U.S. District 
Court of the Eastern District of Virginia offered a contrast to Judge Lewis. Judge Butzner 
permitted the Department of Justice to file suit in the Prince George County to prohibit 
segregation in impacted schools. In the Powhatan County case, Judge Butzner drafted 
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 clear, unequivocal orders that officials could not close the schools or withhold funding. 
Judge Butzner’s ruling prohibiting the payment of tuition grants to segregated private 
schools in Surry County was upheld by the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, extended 
to Prince Edward County, and eventually the entire Commonwealth. Judge Butzner’s 
rulings – both indirectly and directly – severed the lifeblood of the Prince Edward School 
Foundation, and those seeking to defy the Brown decision by operating publicly funded 
segregated private schools.  
 President Kennedy’s appointees to the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld 
the administration’s opposition to school closings. Judges J. Spencer Bell and Albert V. 
Bryan, Sr. repeatedly joined Chief Judge Simon E. Sobeloff in forming a majority to 
defend the constitutional rights of African American students – a majority necessary to 
overrule Judges Boreman and Haynsworth. President Kennedy’s appointees created a 
panel sympathetic to Prince Edward County’s locked out children, but due to the unique 
circumstances of the case, and by no fault of the President, Judges Bryan and Sobeloff 
disqualified themselves from the January 1963 hearing, thrusting Judges Boreman and 
Haynsworth into the majority, and further delaying justice.  
 Despite the setbacks, Kennedy’s judicial appointees continued to rule in favor of 
the county’s locked out children. The U.S. Supreme Court bypassed further proceedings in 
the lower courts, and heard the case on its full merits. A unanimous court, including two 
Kennedy appointees: Justices Arthur Goldberg423 and Byron White,424 directed the Federal 
                                                 
423 Arthur Goldberg (1908-1990) served as Secretary of Labor from1961-1962 and as an Associate Justice on 
the U.S. Supreme Court from 1962-1965. 
 
 214
 District Court to order Prince Edward County to reopen its public schools. When Judge 
Lewis, again, proved ineffective in the administration of justice, Judge J. Spencer Bell 
issued a stay on the payment of tuition grants to students of the Prince Edward School 
Foundation until the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals could hear arguments on the 
issue. The Circuit Court, with Judges Bryan and Bell concurring, prohibited any future 
tuition grant payments while the private school operated as a segregated facility. Finally, 
Judge Bryan wrote the opinion that struck the final blow to Virginia’s freedom of choice of 
plan. 
In the final analysis, all of President Kennedy’s appointees to the federal judiciary 
who had any involvement in the Prince Edward County case supported the locked out 
children and opposed public school closings. Judges Bell, Bryan, and Butzner, and Justices 
Goldberg and White were not the racist, obstructionist judges that historians have 
portrayed as representative of all President Kennedy’s judicial appointees. Rather, these 
jurists supported the due administration of justice that Robert Kennedy sought for the 
locked out children in his April 1961 federal intervention motion. 
 
Some historians have advanced the argument that President Kennedy soft-peddled 
civil rights for fear of alienating southern congressmen. The Virginia congressional 
delegation unanimously supported the Southern Manifesto, and consisted of two imposing 
figures – Congressman Howard W. Smith and Senator Harry F. Byrd, both of whom 
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 openly opposed civil rights. Congressman Smith chaired the powerful House Rules 
Committee, which, as one journalist described, was “virtually a third house of Congress 
equal, or in some ways superior, to the House and the Senate,” and a direct challenge to 
Kennedy’s domestic program. In response, at the inception of his administration, President 
Kennedy did not cow to Congressman Smith, but supported packing the Rules Committee 
to minimize the chairman’s power, a fight won by only five votes.425 Harry F. Byrd 
chaired the Senate Finance Committee, controlled the levers of power in Virginia politics, 
and anointed State leaders. The Kennedy Administration’s stand in Prince Edward County 
was a direct challenge to the Byrd Organization’s core support, and thus to Harry Byrd and 
his chief lieutenants. Kennedy’s actions in defense of the locked out children exposed the 
administration to the charge that the central government was imposing its authority over 
the state – a clear rallying cry for states’ rights activists across the South – and an 
invitation to attack his legislative program. The Kennedy Administration’s Prince Edward 
County policy was not a calculated political decision, nor an inroad to carrying Virginia in 
1964, and hardly appeasement to southern legislators, but a moral imperative. 
 
 President Kennedy and his Attorney General have been criticized for being 
unsympathetic to the plight of African Americans in their quest for equality. In fact, the 
Kennedy Administration was the only government entity – be it federal, state, or local, 
executive, legislative, or judicial – who vociferously defended the rights of Prince Edward 
County’s locked out children. President Eisenhower failed to exert the moral authority of 
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 the presidency in support of the Brown decision or express disapproval over the county’s 
school closings. The U.S. Congress passed two inadequate civil rights bills in 1957 and 
1960, neither of which supported school desegregation, leaving the Southern Manifesto as 
Congress’ only answer to Brown. The federal judiciary did not act with “all deliberate 
speed,” but, in the case of Judges Lewis, Boreman, and Haynsworth, with indecisiveness 
and obstructionism. The state leadership aided and abetted the county’s segregationists in 
their defiance to the Brown decision. The General Assembly adapted to the changing 
political and legal environment, passing legislation and amending the State Constitution to 
sanction segregated private education, which was upheld by the state courts. Governor 
Harrison lacked the political courage to challenge the Byrd Organization, and lead the state 
in taking decisive action to remedy the Prince Edward County school crisis. The county 
leadership continually insisted that their elected representatives expressed the will of the 
majority, and should remain free from the long arm of the federal government. However, 
the power structure sought to control who constituted the majority by seeking retention of 
the poll tax in state and local elections, a clear attempt to suppress black political power, 
and ensure the perpetuation of Jim Crow. Prince Edward County’s African Americans 
were politically powerless. “Unfortunately,” explained Rev. L. Francis Griffin, “because 
we can not find help on a local level, we have to turn to others for aid.” 426 Immediately 
after John F. Kennedy won the general election, civil rights leaders lobbied the President-
elect for assistance in Prince Edward County. 
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  The Kennedy Administration recognized the plight of Prince Edward County’s 
African Americans, signaled its support early, and sought to remedy the situation. In the 
administration’s first public meeting with county officials, the White House was 
represented by Frank D. Reeves, an African American and former NAACP lawyer who 
worked on the Prince Edward County case – a clear indication of the Kennedy 
Administration’s attitude. Weeks later, the Department of Justice announced that the 
Attorney General filed a brief in Federal District Court to enter the litigation, not as a 
friend of the court, but as a party plaintiff. The Department of Justice’s unprecedented 
move came without an invitation from the court, without congressional approval, and 
affirmed the administration’s unequivocal support of the locked out children, even if it 
meant stretching the authority of the Attorney General. Robert F. Kennedy defended his 
action, expressed the immorality of the school closures, and articulated the 
administration’s support of the Brown decision in his maiden address as Attorney General, 
a speech that presented a window into the federal government’s civil rights policy. “The 
forces on behalf of equality for the Negro could plan their moves after the [University of 
Georgia Law Day Speech] of May 6, 1961,” wrote one biographer, “in the knowledge that 
the power of the United States Government would be sympathetic to their legal attempts to 
redress their grievances.”427 
 The Federal District Court Judge denied the Attorney General’s motion, but that 
did not reduce the administration’s concern for the locked out children. The Departments 
of Justice and Health, Education, and Welfare worked behind-the-scenes to assist the 
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 children and find a legal resolution. President Kennedy publicly denounced school closures 
generally, and Robert Kennedy condemned the Prince Edward County situation 
specifically. The Kennedys expressed their sympathy for the locked out children, but they 
also refrained from inflaming a situation that teetered on the brink of violence, while at the 
same time respecting court rulings.  
 Still, when the court proceedings proved too slow in rendering justice for over one 
thousand students, President Kennedy authorized his administration to find relief for the 
locked out children, which led to the Free Schools. President Kennedy directed his aides to 
assure all individuals connected to the creation of the Free Schools of his personal concern 
for the project. The administration brought together federal, state, local, and private 
agencies to organize a model school system available to all children of Prince Edward 
County regardless of race. The Kennedy Administration went above their duty as State and 
local leaders abrogated their responsibilities. “Let history show,” said Rev. Heslip Lee: 
 
that the President of the United States did more to assist Prince Edward 
County than the Governor of Virginia. Let history show that the United 
States Attorney General was far more interested in reviving public 
education in Prince Edward County than the Virginia Attorney General was. 
That a lawyer from Yankee Land was more interested in opening the 
schools of Prince Edward than the Virginia Bar Association. And that 
philanthropic foundations from all over this nation were more interested in 
financing the operation of the public schools of Prince Edward County than 
the State Government of Virginia.428  
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  Rev. L. Francis Griffin believed that “the black people of Prince Edward saved the 
South’s public schools.” African American parents “suffered [their] children to be 
destroyed in order that the law might speak.” The locked out children certainly made the 
critical sacrifice. The five years of lost education “permanently crippled and disabled [the 
children] educationally.”429 The local black leaders, specifically Rev. L. Francis Griffin, 
displayed an enormous amount of perseverance and personal courage in the thirteen year 
legal battle. The NAACP poured in a tremendous sum of legal resources, and other civil 
rights organizations provided financial and educational assistance. Nevertheless, the 
African American community lacked the social, political, economic, and legal power to 
overcome the forces of the state and local leadership. Prince Edward County’s locked out 
children needed federal assistance, and the Kennedy Administration fulfilled its moral 
responsibility. 
 The Kennedy Administration’s performance in Prince Edward County, Virginia 
does not fit neatly into the dominant narrative. In fact, the dominant narrative is defied. 
How many other underreported civil rights events in the Kennedy years could help 
construct a thorough assessment of the administration’s civil rights record? How many 
indignant African Americans were assisted through the efforts of the administration? How 
many crises were averted by Burke Marshall and John Seigenthaler cooperating with local 
officials? How many other federal judges followed the precedent set by the Brown 
decision, but whose rulings have been forgotten by history? In how many other places did 
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 the administration defy southern legislators to carry out justice? The unexplored stories are 
the New Frontier in Kennedy scholarship. 
 The Kennedy Administration’s actions in defense of Prince Edward County’s 
locked out children is but part of the New Frontier. This exploration determines that from 
the beginning the administration viewed Prince Edward County as a national issue. The 
state and local leaders abrogated their responsibilities and children were deprived of their 
constitutional rights. The administration took proactive measures, despite the political 
consequences, to protect the interests of the United States, and the rights of African 
American children, and these actions were supported by Kennedy’s judicial appointees. 
Finally, the administration brought together federal, state, local, and private entities, in a 
national effort, to resolve, what Robert F. Kennedy described as “a national disgrace,” and 
“a blight” on the country. “It is obvious,” Burke Marshall declared, “that the 
administration believes that the closing of the schools in Prince Edward County is a matter 
of national concern.”430 
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